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4ABSTRACT
This thesis brings together topics in philosophy of language, social ontology, and
generative linguistic theory. The first main contribution is to develop a theory of
artefacts, and to apply it to linguistic entities. The general account of artefacts I
offer here draws heavily on Amie Thomasson’s work, but I go on to isolate a
class of artefacts which I refer to as essentially communicative artefacts, ECAs, and I
argue that words fall into this category. One benefit of this approach is that
insights arising from social ontology can be used to remedy deficiencies in
philosophical discussions of words: for example, I show why the failure of form-
theoretic approaches to word individuation poses a significant obstacle to attempts
to deploy Searleian assumptions about social ontology in a theory of words. The
second main contribution is to provide an account of public language which is
compatible with developments in generative linguistics. Too often, philosophical
discussions of words ignore conceptions of language which are prevalent in
linguistics, which means that fruitful connections between the disciplines are
missed, and that worries expressed by linguists about philosophical conceptions
of public language go unanswered. My account of words is intended not only to
be compatible with generative linguistic theory, but also to be thoroughly
embedded in the philosophy of science and mind which animates generative
linguistic theorising. From this vantage point, I evaluate a range of sceptical
arguments which have been levelled against public language views. I conclude
that what the philosophy of generative linguistics recommends is not an
eliminativist position with respect to public language, nor a naively scientistic
one, but a practical, principled, methodological preference. A third contribution
is to provide original objections to extant theories of words, including those due
to David Kaplan, Herman Cappelen, and Zoltan Szabo.
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ECA Essentially Communicative Artefact
FLB Faculty of Language: Broad sense
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FT The Form-theoretic approach to word individuation
NRP Naturalistic Reality Principle (due to Collins)
RA The Recognisability Argument (for the FT approach)
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INTRODUCTION
Public Language
In philosophy, language is often thought of as a mind-external, public
phenomenon. Words and sentences are assumed to be kinds of utterances and
inscriptions. Their instances are concrete, physical entities found in books, on
billboards and in acoustic blasts emitted during speech. After all, we are not
telepathic. We cannot communicate, give orders or make promises just by
beaming our thoughts from one mind directly into another. Linguistic
communication among humans requires speakers to modify their physical
environments in ways which are detectable by their interlocutors. Central to this
picture is a view which takes a public language to be a system of concrete, mind-
external signs which people know and use. An individual may have only a partial
grasp of the language spoken in their linguistic community, but each person’s
grasp is of the same sign system, since one of the functions of the sign system is
to facilitate coordinated communication among speakers.
Public languages are typically taken to depend on speakers’ communicative
intentions and on conventions which are maintained within a linguistic
community. They are therefore regarded as social entities, aspects of the manifest
image. Indeed, public languages give every sign of being thoroughly cultural
entities. After all, it is perfectly true that the English language was shaped by,
among other things, the Norman invasion of Britain, the work of Chaucer and
Shakespeare, the invention of the printing press, dictionaries, etc. One thinks also
of language as a social phenomenon in considering the impact of the French
government on the marginalisation of regional languages in France in the 19th
century, and the influence of bodies such as the Académie Française. Language, in
this sense, is something which is specific to a community, not to the species.
Finally, language is generally understood to be the focus of a welter of research in
philosophy and the social sciences.
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I-language
A contrasting picture emerges from generative linguistics. There, the explanatory
focus is targeted inward on the cognitive processes which underlie and explain
aspects of our linguistic behaviour. It is assumed that linguistic facts are
ultimately facts about individual language users, not about some mind-
independent linguistic reality. To explain why humans acquire languages with
specific properties (while monkeys and rocks do not) even without formal
instruction, it is assumed that the human mind is innately configured in certain
specific ways. The task of linguistics is then to understand what properties
human mind/brains have to have in order to explain our remarkable ability to
systematically pair sounds with meanings over an unbounded range.
On this approach, the goal is not to provide a theory of communication, or a
theory of why people say what they say. For general reasons pertaining to
scientific methodology, an attempt is made to abstract away from the messy
detail of our linguistic behaviour in order to make progress. Notably, generative
linguistics has long been understood as idealising away from facts about linguistic
performance in order to get a theoretical grip on linguistic competence, the
relatively stable state which underlies the human capacity to pair sound and
meaning in systematic ways. According to modern jargon, this capacity of an
individual is labelled I-language:
The word “language” has highly divergent meanings in different
contexts and disciplines. In informal usage, a language is
understood as a culturally specific communication system (English,
Navajo, etc.). In the varieties of modern linguistics that concern us
here, the term “language” is used quite differently to refer to an
internal component of the mind/brain (sometimes called “internal
language” or “I-language”). We assume that this is the primary
object of interest for the study of the evolution and function of
the language faculty. (Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch, 2002: 1570)
An individual’s I-language is thus understood as a subconscious capacity to pair
sounds and meanings:
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So understood, competence designates the capacity to pair discrete,
structured messages or meanings with sounds (or some other
vehicle, such as hand gestures in sign language) over an unbounded
range. The science is concerned with the structure and
development of this capacity; its integration with other cognitive
capacities; its realization in the human brain; and how it has
evolved in the human species alone. (Collins, 2010:46)
The hypothesis that there are I-languages should be distinguished from the
hypothesis that there is such a thing as Universal Grammar. The study of Universal
Grammar is not the study of I-languages as such, but of the initial state of the
language faculty which is part of an individual’s genetic endowment, and is
assumed to be more or less the same across individuals throughout the species.
An individual’s linguistic competence develops over time in response to their
exposure to spoken language, before eventually reaching a relatively stable state.
An I-language can be construed as a state of linguistic competence which
characterises an individual at a specific stage of development. An individual’s I-
language is a natural variation on a species property. I-languages are thus natural
objects, not socially constructed ones.
Evidence for this view of linguistic competence comes from a variety of sources
including, the well-known Poverty of Stimulus argument, the existence of linguistic
universals, the process of creolisation, over-regularisation errors, language
pathologies, the ubiquity of language in humans and its absence in other species,1
as well as evidence that linguistic processing is associated with specific parts of
the brain. Pursuing the inquiry into language as an aspect of human psychology
and, ultimately, biology has yielded theories which are precise, explanatory and
which have achieved a degree of integration with other successful sciences.
Theorists in the generativist tradition insist that inquiry into language is best
served by pursuing this internalist perspective. Some put the point more
forcefully, holding that there is no such thing as public language. This eliminativist
attitude is contentious. Even many Chomskians recognise that eliminativism
1 ‘Language’ is used here in a sense which is not equivalent to ‘communication’.
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about mind-external linguistic phenomena is not strictly mandated by the success
of generative linguistics. Instead, a more moderate stance is typically adopted
which simply denies that externalist conceptions of language enter into serious
naturalistic inquiry.
Language as biology and culture
In short, while it seems obvious that language is partly a cultural phenomenon,
we have an empirically successful science which views language as a narrow
aspect of human biology. Some linguists and philosophers see the foregoing
contrasts as amounting to an unresolvable conflict. One of the things I want to
do in this thesis is to show that the two approaches are compatible and
complementary, though they reflect different theoretical interests and priorities.
One way of seeing this is to view language as analogous to such phenomena as
love, jealousy, fear, disease, or disability. These are phenomena which have both
biological and cultural facets. Similarly, take the example of sexual reproduction.
Biologists have a technical conception of the biological processes involved in
sexual reproduction including its role in natural selection. But sexual
reproduction, in humans at least, is not only a biological phenomenon. It can be
studied from the point of view of the social sciences. For example, sexual
reproduction in the broad sense is a phenomenon of interest to experts from a
variety of disciplines, right up to the sociologist or historian of the institution of
marriage.
If we are scientific realists of one stripe or another – as I am – then we ought to
believe in I-languages. This discovery illuminates crucial aspects of natural
language, what it is, how individuals acquire it, and enables us to ask questions
about how it might have evolved. But there are aspects of language – the ways
people use it, the role it plays in communication, how it unites people under a
common identity or alienates them, how it can be used to persuade or to
denigrate and slur, how it can be deployed in literature – which are not addressed
by the biological approach pursued in the cognitive science of linguistics.
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Generative linguistics quite rightly seeks to abstract away from such parochial,
human centric, norm-governed phenomena, just as the biology of sexual
reproduction abstracts away from the details of marriage law in seventeenth
century Scotland. But philosophy can afford to treat language as a multi-faceted
phenomenon which cross-cuts distinctions such as ‘biological vs cultural,’
‘natural vs social’ or ‘mental vs non-mental’. It turns out, I think, that I am
broadly in agreement with people like Chomsky about the phenomenon of
public language, its relations to human intentions, etc. We differ only in our
levels of enthusiasm for and optimism about a programme in philosophy of
language which continues to pursue the phenomenon of public language in the
social ontological vein.
Words
My choice to focus on words does not reflect any prejudice against larger units
such as sentences. Sometimes I extend the discussion to units such as sentences,
phonemes, etc., but I mostly confine my attention to words in order to avoid
needless complexity. A further reason to focus on words is that they are of
independent interest to specific areas of inquiry in philosophy, such as referential
semantics (where a referential semantic theory is understood to involve relations
between words and the world) or work on slurs. Moreover, a small literature on
words has emerged in philosophy of language, especially since Kaplan (1990).
Since this literature has rarely been integrated with topics in social ontology on
the one hand and generative linguistics on the other, this thesis is intended to do
just that.
Thinking about words is in equal measures fascinating and infuriating in light of
the fact that the notion of a word belongs at once to everyday, common sense
ways of understanding the world, and to more theoretical discourse. Worse, there
is no single notion of word. Both common sense and theory distinguishes
different senses of word. Worse still, common sense and theoretical conceptions
have intermingled to a certain degree. Sometimes this is because some linguist or
15
philosopher over the years has taken on some common sense notion and put it
to work in a theoretical context; sometimes it is because ordinary people are
exposed to theoretical conceptions of language (through education, television,
etc.)
What a mess! With such a plethora of ways of thinking about language and of
candidates for what we might be thinking about when we do, it is impossible not
to feel confusion when trying to answer the question, ‘what is a word?’.
Philosophers, linguists and the folk use a bewildering variety of word-like
concepts. It’s a paradigmatically philosophical task to try to clarify such concepts,
and to work out what the relations between them are. That is the task partially
undertaken in this thesis. Separating out theoretical and common sense
conceptions of words and inquiring into the relations between them is a kind of
Sellarsian task of showing “how things in the broadest sense of the term hang
together in the broadest sense of the term” (Sellars, 1963:1). In this thesis I try to
pick apart the tangled relations between the theoretical entities posited in
linguistics and the linguistic objects which furnish our everyday lives.
Speaking, writing, signing
I have chosen to include writing in the theory of words, a choice which is
standard in the philosophy of language literature but not free of controversy. For
example, echoing Aristotle, Stebbing writes:2
Sound-tokens are historically prior to shape-tokens; it is in this
sense that spoken words are more fundamental than written words.
Perhaps Aristotle was right in saying that the latter are symbols of
the former. I think, however, that it is better to say that shape-
tokens represent sound-tokens. (Stebbing, 1935:7)
Stebbing’s idea is that for a given language there is only one fundamental medium
in which words are instantiated (speech or sign, etc.); inscriptions are mere
2 The passage from Aristotle which Stebbing cites is as follows: “Spoken words…are symbols of
affections of the soul and written words are symbols of spoken words.” (Aristotle, De Interpretatione 1,
16a3-8 as translated in Modrak, 2001).
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representations of words.3 One might wonder why the historical priority of speech
over writing entails anything of import about their metaphysics. Nonetheless,
Stebbing is in auspicious company. Saussure also maintains that written words are
mere representations of spoken ones, and that linguistic theory should be
concerned only with the latter:
Language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the sole
purpose for the existence of the second is that of representing the
first. The object of linguistics is not defined in terms of both the
written and spoken forms of words; the latter alone constitute its
focus. But the written word is so closely associated with the spoken
word of which it is the image that it manages to usurp the main
role. People attach more importance to the representation of a
vocal sign than to the sign itself. It is as if someone thought that a
better way of getting to know someone were to look at his
photograph rather than view him directly. (Saussure, 1916/1983:45)
It should be noted that linguists typically do set writing to one side, insisting that
speech is more basic and more universal than writing, with the latter being
obviously a cultural and intellectual achievement passed on through explicit
instruction. Almost everybody who can read and write can speak or sign, but
huge numbers of people who can speak or sign cannot write, especially when we
consider all the humans that have ever lived. Most languages past and present
don’t even have a writing system, but there are no natural languages which have
only a writing system and are never spoken or signed. Writing appears therefore
to be something of a secondary medium of communication. Moreover, the
capacity to speak is acquired by infants without formal instruction and the
development of this capacity proceeds in stages which are uniform across all
cultures. There is also significant evidence for the existence of a critical period
for language acquisition such that if a child is not exposed to language use before
roughly twelve years old they will never acquire a facility with speech comparable
to that of a competent native speaker. In contrast, the ability to read and write is
3 Stebbing’s position should not be confused with Szabo’s (2000) view, discussed in chapter four (§2) that
not only inscriptions but also utterances are mere representations of words, with the latter considered as
abstract particulars. For Stebbing, utterances genuinely instantiate words.
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learned through more or less formal education and can be acquired at any stage
in life.
Nevertheless, philosophers typically take it that words can be tokened in speech
or in writing. My stance on all this is as follows. I’ll be trying to develop a theory
of words which allows that words can be instantiated in both utterances and
inscriptions. If that were to prove impossible it would be comforting to know
that we could on principled grounds exclude inscriptions from the picture and
give a theory of words purely as kinds of spoken tokens. But we should set our
sights higher than that. A theory which treats utterances and inscriptions on all
fours promises to contribute to an understanding of a wider range of linguistic
behaviour, and is less revisionary of common sense attitudes to language.
Moreover, it turns out there’s a perfectly good sense in which inscriptions
instantiate words, with many strong comparisons between utterances and
inscriptions. There are some differences, and where these matter I’ll flag them as
we go.
I will exclude sign languages from the present inquiry, though the subject is
fascinating. I believe my account applies equally well to sign languages, though
many of the details are somewhat different. Since there’s no theoretical payoff in
keeping the extra balls in the air, I’ll maintain simplicity and leave sign languages
out.
Since it is tediously verbose to keep stating that a certain claim applies to both
utterances and inscriptions, I will in places speak only of utterances, except
where making the wider scope of the claim clear is particularly important. I will
also, in places, use the neutral term ‘token’.)
Types and tokens
Philosophers frequently describe the word-utterance relation in terms of types
and tokens: for example, an inscription of ‘alone on a wide wide sea’ has six word
tokens of five different word types. Here, I interpret this to mean that word
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types are kinds of utterances and inscriptions, and that word tokens instantiate word
types in virtue of having properties associated with the type. This is not the only
way of understanding type-token talk. Quine (1987:216-219) holds that a word
type is the class of its tokens. Kaplan (1990) thinks of words as concrete
individuals made up of utterances and inscriptions (and some mental stuff), while
Szabo (1999) considers words to be abstract particulars represented but not
instantiated by word tokens. These metaphysical choices are largely orthogonal to
present concerns, though I will I will discuss Kaplan’s and Szabo’s ideas in
chapter four.
To be clear, I assume that word tokens instantiate word types. In general, I make
no distinction here between types and tokens on the one hand and kinds and
instances on the other, and for convenience I will employ both sets of vocabulary
and treat them as equivalent. I’m not denying that there could be useful
metaphysical distinctions between types and kinds, but I don’t think they will
show up in this thesis.
Two accounts of words
Kaplan (1990) is an important milestone in framing the debate about words,
spawning a small literature. He asked two main questions: What are words? What
makes two utterances utterances of one word? Noting that having a certain form
is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a token of a given word, Kaplan
argued for a kind of intentionalism. According to his view, whether or not
something is a token of a given word depends on whether it was produced with
the right intention in mind. Cappelen (1999), on the other hand, rejects
intentionalism, insists on a view of words as kinds of sounds and shapes, and
embeds his view within Searle’s social ontological theory involving collective
acceptance of rules of the form X counts as Y (in context C). According to both of
these views, words have a kind of mind-dependence. They depend constitutively
on intentions (Kaplan) or conventions (Cappelen).4
4 Cappelen appears to think of conventions as involving collective agreement.
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As I see it, these accounts of words have two serious deficiencies. First, they
have not been accompanied by detailed attempts to incorporate insights from
social ontology. The models of social construction employed are underspecified
or have flaws which make them unable to do the work they are supposed to do.
Second, they have been worked out largely in isolation from research in
generative linguistics. This is a shame because (i) Chomskian complaints about
philosophers’ talk of public language are not responded to, and (ii) insights from
generative linguistics which can be fruitfully put to work in a theory of public
language go overlooked.
The standard model of social ontology
Cappelen’s and Kaplan’s approaches are broadly within what is sometimes called
the standard model of social ontology, according to which many social objects are
taken to be partially constituted by human mental representations. I argue that
this is a fruitful framework for thinking about words, though there are pitfalls
and controversies which we need to avoid or take a stance on. So one of the
main things I undertake to do in this thesis is to set out a decent framework
drawing on the standard model.
I’ll leave out approaches in social ontology which are outside the standard model,
e.g. Millikan (1984), Elder (2007). This is an attempt to give a theory of words
from within the standard model of social ontology. If it should turn out that the
various tools of the standard model (intentions, conventions, etc.) are not up to
the job of giving a theory of words, then that would be a result of some
importance in general social ontology. In fact, the standard model has the
resources to provide a pretty good theory of words, at least when allied with a
sensitivity to some of the insights of modern linguistics. It also enables us to
interpret the Chomskian complaints about public language in a way which is
reasonable and worth engaging with.
I develop an account of linguistic entities as social artefacts which depend
constitutively on speaker intentions. Drawing on Amie Thomasson’s work on
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artefacts I argue that part of what makes it the case that an utterance is of a given
word is that it is intended to be recognisable as an utterance of that word. The
account I develop is independently plausible as an account of certain kinds of
artefacts, and it harmonises beautifully with certain interpretations of linguistic
theory. My view therefore remedies two significant deficiencies of Cappelen’s
and Kaplan’s views.
What is common to approaches in the standard model of social ontology is
analogous to what is sometimes called the head-first approach to the problem of
intentionality. How is it that an acoustic blast can be about cats? In philosophical
discussions of intentionality, it’s fairly common to say that a spoken utterance has
only derived intentionality, as opposed to the original intentionality which characterises
human mental states. The idea is that human beliefs and intentions are somehow
responsible for the intentional profile of the utterance. To point out that word
tokens get their meanings via human intentions is not, of course, to resolve the
problem of intentionality. Assuming we can make sense of how a meaning can
be conferred on an inanimate object by intention, we only manage to explain the
semantic properties of the external object in virtue of mental states which do
themselves have semantic features. As Putnam notes:
[T]o have the intention that anything, even private language (even
the words ‘Winston Churchill’ spoken in my mind and not out
loud), should represent Churchill, I must have been able to think
about Churchill in the first place. (Putnam, 1981:4)
This head-first approach to intentionality is fairly common. As noted, it just
pushes the issue of intentionality back a step. Philosophical attempts to naturalise
intentionality have focussed their efforts on mental representation, including
notably Dretske (1981) and Millikan (1984). Though naturalistic efforts to reduce
mental representation have not been entirely successful, I will continue to assume
that we can employ contentful mental states in explanations of the intentionality
of external objects. Though we cannot complete what Rey (1996) calls the
downward project of providing a reductive account of mental representation, we
can undertake the horizontal project which involves pointing out the explanatory
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roles played by posited mental representations in cognitive science and everyday
life. The head-first approach puts the intentionality of mental states like beliefs
and intentions to work explaining the linguistic properties of mind-external
words.
Objectives
My aims in this thesis are as follows:
(i) I want to uphold a scientific realist attitude regarding linguistic theory. I do
not seek to censure the practice of linguistics or to impose a revisionary
interpretation on it.
(ii) I do want to show that a theory of I-language is not a complete theory of
language. (Chomskians won’t find this surprising or incorrect). Moreover, I want
to give a plausible story about how words can be regarded as social artefacts, and
argue for a pluralistic stance which makes room for Chomskian “I-languages”
and public languages answering to different explanatory roles. My goal is to
articulate a notion of public language words as essentially communicative
artefacts which preserves common sense notions of language and resists
sceptical attitudes towards disciplines – such as philosophy, forensic linguistics,
sociology etc. – which inquire into language as a social phenomenon.
(iii) I want to show the deficiencies of certain rival theories of words.
(iv) A key objective is to charitably articulate Chomskian complaints about
philosophers’ attitudes to public language and show how they can be answered.
The ultimate goal is to achieve peace, love and theoretical integration between
philosophers and linguists by giving some content to the notion that language is
both biology and culture.
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Chapter overview
Chapter 1. Many of the contributions to the topic of words in philosophy of
language assume that words are in some sense social objects, perhaps depending
on the intentions of speakers or on conventions which hold in a community. It is
therefore useful to draw heavily on debates in social ontology in order to
establish a framework within which to pursue the inquiry into words. In chapter
one I focus on debates about artefacts in recent social ontology. In particular, I
develop an account of essentially intentional artefacts, instances of which depend
constitutively on their creators’ intentions. I provide an account of artefact
categorisation and attend to a significant class of artefacts which have an
essentially communicative or symbolic character: I refer to these as essentially
communicative artefacts, ECAs. The point is to provide a substantive perspective on
artefacts which can be brought to bear on the theory of words in the remainder
of the thesis.
Chapter 2. In chapter two I apply the account to words, arguing that the latter
can fruitfully be regarded as ECAs. I argue that the ECA view of words can be
embedded within the philosophy of science and mind associated with generative
linguistics in a way which recruits extra support for the view. In this chapter I
also address two major objections which hold, for one reason or another, that
the intentions my story needs to get off the ground are not available. In addition,
I indicate the kind of approach to questions of word individuation which is
suggested by the ECA view of words, and respond to a variety of objections.
Chapter 3. The view that words are kinds of sounds and shapes (the form-
theoretic view, FT) remains relatively popular, despite attracting criticism.
Cappelen (1999) defends a version of FT which is implemented within the social
ontological framework provided by Searle. After outlining the Searle-Cappelen
model of words, I spend some time articulating the argument which motivates
FT, something often ignored in the literature. I then state the case against FT,
which partly involves rehearsing empirical arguments which are well known. In
addition, I argue that FT’s appeal lies in a tempting but misleading conception of
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the processes involved in word recognition. I expose the misconception, thereby
undermining FT. I suggest that the demise of FT throws up a problem which
hinders any attempt to apply the Searleian social ontological theory to words.
Next, a theory of words ought to say something about the formal features of
utterances and inscriptions: Kaplan (1990) was wrong to think that form was
irrelevant to word type. I give an account of this matter drawing on my theory of
words as artefacts. Finally, I make it clear that my account of words is distinct
from Cappelen’s in important ways, meaning that it is immune to the problems I
raise for Cappelen’s view.
Chapter 4. Having put most of my positive account in place in the first three
chapters, as well as criticising one of the main extant alternatives to my view, I
turn in the fourth chapter to providing criticism of two further related views.
Kaplan is well known for endorsing an intentionalist theory of words, though his
version of the approach is significantly different to mine. I raise a number of
problems for his account. In the second part of the chapter I turn to a critique of
Szabo’s suggestion that words are created abstract particulars, represented but
not instantiated by utterances and inscriptions.
Chapter 5. In the final chapter I turn to the various sceptical attitudes taken by
theorists in the generative tradition towards public language notions such as that
developed in this thesis. First of all I outline the most radical critiques of public
language, views according to which words considered as mind-external entities
can be eliminated from our ontology. Having criticised these radical positions, I
consider the claim that artefacts (and by extension, words) are somehow inapt
for entering into scientific inquiry. After showing how these objections can be
met I go on to outline what remains of the Chomskian critique of public
language. What remains is an agreement between the Chomskians and some
philosophers that the arrows of linguistic explanation point from public language
inwards to human cognition. What the Chomskians add to this is a
methodological scepticism about the prospects for any serious scientific inquiry
targeting public language. That critique has to be taken seriously, though it is by
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no means the death knell for philosophical inquiry into public language which
some have claimed.
25
CHAPTER 1: ARTEFACTS
Examples of artefacts include chopsticks, knives, Frisbees, cars, computers,
tuxedos, houses, apple crumbles, paintings, the Eiffel Tower, one pound coins,
crucifixes, paperweights, ballistic missiles, paperclips, tattoos, pacemakers,
wedding rings, newspapers, abacuses, handwritten signatures, etc.
That such and such an object is a chopstick or a one pound coin involves, in
some sense, facts about people and the attitudes they bear to objects in their
environment. Thomasson (2007:52) expresses the view that “artifacts and other
social and cultural objects are ‘creations of the mind’, depending in certain ways
on human beliefs or activities.” For Thomasson, this dependence is not just
causal but constitutive. That an artefact is an object which has been intentionally
made or adapted is taken to be a conceptual truth.
The view that artefacts are partially constituted by human intentions is
widespread in the field of social ontology. Adherents include Baker (2004),
Dipert (1993), Hilpinen (1993), and Khalidi (2015). Within this intentionalist
approach to artefacts, Thomasson (2003a, 2003b, 2007, 2009, 2014) has provided
one of the most developed accounts currently available. More broadly, these
views are situated within what Guala (2007:956) calls “the Standard Model of
Social Ontology” which seeks to ground aspects of social reality in human
beliefs, attitudes and intentions. One finds variations on themes associated with
the standard model entering into the literature on words, e.g. Kaplan (1990),
Bromberger and Halle (2000), Barber (2006, 2013), Stainton (2014) and
McCulloch (1991).
The purpose of this chapter is to give a theory of artefacts, and in particular a
class of artefacts which have an essentially communicative function, in a sense to
be explained. To this end I draw heavily on the work of Amie Thomasson. With
this substantive account of an important class of artefacts in hand, I’ll go on in
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chapter two to apply the theory to the case of words. I’ll argue that from the
perspective developed here, it is natural to consider words as intentional
artefactual kinds, and that doing so provides a rich account of the nature of
words.
The most immediate benefit is that a theory of words can be embedded in a
wider project in social ontology, allowing insights developed there to be applied
to the account of words. A secondary benefit is that words provide an interesting
test case for the general theory of artefacts. To the extent that the theory can be
successfully applied to words, it increases the breadth of its explanatory power.
To the extent that it cannot be so applied, we may be able to see ways of refining
the theory of artefacts to account for a wider variety of phenomena.
1. INTENTIONALISM ABOUT ARTEFACTS
This section proposes a definition of artefacts, distinguishing them from non-
artefacts, and also delineates certain kinds of contrasts within the broad class of
artefacts.
1.1 The authorial connection
According to Hilpinen, something is an artefact “only if it is intentionally
produced under some description of the object” (Hilpinen, 1992:60).
Thomasson adopts a similar characterisation, writing that artefacts are “things
that are intentionally made and which have at least some intended features”
(Thomasson, 2014:48). On this conception, artefacts are the intentional products
of human activity.5 There is an authorial connection between an artisan and the
artefacts they produce: artisans exercise agency in becoming the authors or
creators of a new artefact.
5 Crows modify tools, beavers build dams, bowerbirds build bowers. Are these artefacts? Do animals have
intentions? I don’t know the answers to these questions. It seems fair to bracket such issues and say the
account just applies to human artefacts. However, suppose the answer to the second question is negative.
Then I think there will be some pressure to allow that some artefacts have their natures independently of
their creators’ intentions, even some human artefacts. Still, I don’t think this would undermine my claims
about the class of artefacts which are most at issue here (the essentially communicative artefacts). See §5.3
of this chapter for (a little) more discussion.
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We can refer to this conception of artefacts as intentionalism. The intentionalist
defines artefacts in such a way as to rule out, in the first place, naturally occurring
objects such as rocks, shells, atoms, planets, etc. To focus on artefacts is to focus
on things which are artificial. It also excludes what we might call instruments,
naturally occurring objects used unmodified by some human for a purpose, such
as a stick seized upon to beat off an attacker.
What else does the definition exclude? Well, artefacts are not just things which
have been made or adapted by humans: pieces of slag produced during iron
production can be described as things made by humans, as can broken shards of
pottery, but these are not artefacts in the sense of the term we’re interested in.
Although pieces of iron slag can result from human actions they are not intended
results of those actions, but are mere by-products. And while the vase was an
intentional product, the shards are not. The shard’s being made of Chinese
porcelain results from human intention in some way, but no one intended the
shard to be made of porcelain. Assuming the breakage was accidental, no one
intended the shard to exist at all. It was the vase that was intended to be made of
porcelain. Relatedly, though a village might be constructed intentionally, it could
also emerge as an unintended result of the intentional building of individual
houses. In the latter case, the village is not really an artefact in our sense,
although it might be made up of artefacts.
We have to insist that artefacts be things made by humans, because there are non-
artefactual objects which have intended features. For example, someone might
brand a wild animal to indicate ownership. The brand is an artefact, but the
animal is not. The animal has not been made by humans. So there are objects
which have intended features without being artefacts, according to our definition.
Similarly, though I have the property of being seated intentionally, I am not an
artefact, because there was no intention to create a seated person.
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Finally, not all social objects are artefacts in our sense. For example, cowrie shells
have long been used as a form of currency in many parts of the world (example
due to Epstein, 2013). Relative to such practices, cowrie shells have a certain
monetary value even if they have never been encountered by a human. Similarly,
undiscovered oil deposits can be the property of some company. Such objects do
not owe their socially constructed properties to human attitudes towards their
particular instances, but to general attitudes regarding those kinds of things.
Our definition does and should allow that some natural objects become artefacts.
For example, if I take a pebble from a beach and place it on some loose papers
in an office, then the pebble is a paperweight. I have created a new artefact by
taking on an existing natural object without modification. This process is referred
to here as minimal creation, of which more below. (What is the difference, then,
between the paperweight and what I referred to above as ‘instruments’? I answer
this question in §2.2 of this chapter.)
The definition also includes things like curium atoms and GM tomatoes, since
these are generally the intended products of human activity. Now, it’s fine that
these be treated as artefacts, but we should note that there is an important
difference between a curium atom and artefacts such as wheelbarrows, Frisbees,
words, etc. Curium atoms are sometimes created intentionally in nuclear reactors,
making them artefacts, but their dependence on human intentions is just causal,
and not constitutive. Curium atoms are what they are in virtue of their internal
essences, and could come to exist independently of human activity. From the
perspective of the philosopher, the most interesting artefacts are those which
depend constitutively on human intentions, those which are what they are in
virtue of a distinctively mental contribution made by their artificers. Nothing, it
seems, could be a Frisbee if no one ever intended it to be a Frisbee or regarded it
as such. Co-opting a term used by Thomasson, I refer to the artefacts which
depend constitutively on human intentions as essentially intentional artefacts. Giving
an account of this distinctively mental contribution to the characters of
essentially intentional artefacts is one of the goals of this chapter.
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To summarise, the focus here will be on essentially intentional artefacts. These
are things which are intentionally made by humans under some description and
which have at least some intended features, at least one of which is partially
constituted by human intentions regarding those very objects. Within this class
of artefacts, there is room for another distinction: some of them can be
characterised as artefacts which have an essentially communicative function (perhaps in
addition to more practical functions). This distinction roughly corresponds to
Searle’s distinction between social facts (e.g. that x is a hammer) and institutional
facts (e.g. that x is a dollar bill, a wedding ring, or a chess pawn). These
communicative artefacts are terrifically interesting in their own right, but
especially important here since I’ll be arguing in the rest of this thesis that words
fall into this category.
Finally, we should note that our definition of artefacts conflicts with some of the
ways in which ‘artefact’ is commonly used. An archaeologist might well say that
the piece of iron slag or the shard of pottery is an artefact. Additionally, ‘artefact’
is usually used to refer to medium sized dry goods. In our sense it can include
tiny objects such as the products of nano-engineering, huge objects like the
Great Pyramid of Giza, as well less tangible, more ephemeral objects like clouds
of poisonous gas or utterances. Perhaps one can also make one’s body into an
artefact, as may be the case for a semaphorist. These divergences from common
usage are of course no objection to the proposed definition. The definition
aspires to capture an intuitive concept corresponding to a particularly interesting
class of objects; it is not intended to apply to all ordinary uses of ‘artefact’.
1.2 Intended functions or intended features?
This way of defining artefacts is extremely widespread. Possibly even more
widespread is a stricter definition: it is often held that artefacts are objects with
an intended function, and that what makes it the case that two artefacts are of the
same artefactual kind is that they have the same intended function (Kornblith,
1980, Baker, 2004). But not all artefacts have an intended function. Thomasson
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(2014) gives the example of idle doodles. She also points out that it is perfectly
conceivable that someone could create a statue which is not intended to have any
particular function. Even for artefacts which do have an intended function, it is
often the case that having this intended function is neither necessary nor
sufficient for being an artefact of that kind: Bloom (1996) notes that a boat
might not be intended ever to see water (if it’s for show, say); we can add that
two groups of adventurers might end up making a boat and a raft respectively,
though each artefact was intended to do no more and no less than transport
them downriver.
Thomasson thus reasonably argues that we should liberalise the traditional
definition of artefacts. Artefacts are objects which are intentionally made and
have at least some features by intention, where these can include not only
functional properties, but also “structural properties, sensory properties (flavour,
color, sound), aesthetic properties, and so on” (Thomasson, 2014:49).
1.3 Success conditions
Though necessary, an intention to create an object with properties relevant to
membership of a given artefact kind is not on its own sufficient for creating an
artefact of that kind. The knife-maker has not only to intend to make a sharp
blade, but also to succeed (more or less). If things go badly wrong in the
workshop then what gets produced might not even qualify as a badly made knife.
Success need not be complete: a bent knife may still be a knife, but this tolerance
has limits. If you are barely successful in imposing the features you intend on
your product then it may fail to be an instance of the intended artefactual kind.
As Thomasson (2003b:24) notes, the requirement that the artisan’s creative
intentions need only be largely successfully realised introduces some vagueness
into the account. Whether the defining intentions are successfully realised
enough for a given artefact to count as an artefact of the intended kind is
unlikely to be a binary matter. There may well be borderline cases of knives,
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cups, etc. Thomasson points out, however, that this is a virtue of the account,
since it should come as no surprise that ordinary kinds have vague application
conditions and are subject to sorites style paradoxes.
Our artefact-regarding intentions are not self-fulfilling. This is quite clear in the
case of the knife maker – success requires the object produced to have certain
physical features – but there are cases where we have to be a little more careful.
For example, if I take a pebble from the beach it looks like I just have to form
the intention to use it in a certain way for it to become a paperweight. However,
note that not just anything could be a paperweight: a distant galaxy or a puff of
smoke is simply not up to the task. The pebble has to have certain properties in
order for my paperweight intentions to be fulfilled. Later in this chapter (§4) I’ll
be discussing artefacts like chess pawns and traffic lights where the successful
realisation of the artisan’s intentions consists in something more delicate: it
consists in successfully communicating those intentions to other users of the artefact.
1.4 Metaphysical assumptions
Baker (2004:4) argues that “artifacts are constituted by aggregates of things,” –
ultimately atoms – and that constitution is not identity. This is supposed to make
sense of the intuition that the career of an artefact does not coincide with that
of the aggregate which constitutes it at a given moment in time. For example, an
ancient aggregate of grains of sand can come together under the supervision of
an artist to constitute a sandpainting of a volcano. One way of looking at this is
to regard it as the creation of a brand new entity, a new sandpainting. The very
same sandpainting can then survive the destruction of some of the grains of
sand, but the aggregate cannot. Adopting such a view would also enable one to
say that the pebble constitutes a paperweight, the latter being a brand new object
which only comes into existence when the pebble is found and an intended
function is imposed upon it.
I find this a natural and perspicuous way to think about artefacts, and this thesis
is largely written in that vein. It goes without saying that these are controversial
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assumptions. If there are two objects – both a pebble and a paperweight – then
how can they occupy the same space? If each weighs one kilo, why don’t the
scales show a combined weight of two kilos? Such problems are well known and
the subject of much debate. Employing this framework here does not seem to
introduce any new problems that weren’t known about before.
These assumptions track Epstein’s (2009) “liberal model of objects.” As he
points out, if someone objects to these liberal metaphysical assumptions about
constitution, it should be possible to translate the account into something more
neutral. Instead of regarding the paperweight as a brand new object over and
above the pebble, we can just have the pebble (an aggregate) and the various
relations it stands in to other entities. Thus, when the pebble is taken from the
beach it acquires the extrinsic property of being a paperweight. As far as I can
see, most of what I say in this thesis could be translated into the more
conservative ontological framework without serious loss.
2. MOTIVATING INTENTIONALISM
The intentionalist approach introduced in the previous section is intended to
capture a view which represents something of a consensus in philosophy at the
present time.6 It also, I hope, distinguishes knives, Frisbees, cars, etc. in a very
intuitive way from natural objects, natural instruments, social objects like cowrie
shells, by-products like iron slag, and the like. The purpose of this section is to
provide additional motivation for the intentionalist conception of artefacts. The
first two sub-sections argue that intentionalism captures the intuitive way of
thinking about artefacts. The third tries to explain why this kind of conceptual
analysis is a reasonable method to employ.
2.1 Swamp artefacts
According to Thomasson, it is a conceptual truth that artefacts are products of
intentional human activity. One way of supporting this claim is by pointing out
that it offers a good explanation of a fairly widespread reaction to certain kinds
6 This is not to say that it is undisputed nor that it has no rival theories.
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of thought experiments. For example, suppose that there are naturally occurring
objects currently on Mars which are intrinsic duplicates of the chair I’m sitting
on. Since those objects are not the products of intentional human activity but
have come about purely by chance we can call them swamp chairs. The vocabulary
is intended to evoke Davidson’s swampman thought experiment, in the sense
that swamp words are freak products of nature, not arising as a result of any
human intention. Are swamp chairs chairs? Intuitively not, one would have
thought.
In fact, Bloom (1996) offers experimental evidence which suggests intuitions
provoked by such thought experiments are split. Should we then abandon the
promising idea that it is a conceptual truth that artefacts are the products of
human intentions? I would suggest that an explanation of the intuition that
swamp chairs are chairs is that people are subject to a kind of design bias: things
which have straight edges, right angles, complexity, orderliness etc., as well as
things which look like familiar objects which we know to be usually intentionally
produced, are more likely to be categorised as artefacts. If this is correct, we
should see an increased tendency to attribute artefacthood as the complexity and
neatness of the objects increases. I think this is likely to be a good prediction.
People are more likely to say that a swamp Chippendale chair is a chair than that
some roughly chair shaped piece of rock is a chair. But the roughly chair shaped
piece of rock would be a clear case of a chair if it had been intentionally
produced.7
2.2 Minimal creation and exaptation
I have been suggesting that artefacts are objects which have some features by
intention. This should not be taken to mean that artefacts are necessarily the
result of some physical process in which a natural object is sculpted or modified.
7 Dipert probes similar intuitions by nothing that an eroded brick might be an intrinsic duplicate of a
natural sedimentary rock, while a natural piece of metal might be an intrinsic duplicate of a gear. He
draws the following conclusion: “[A]rtifactuality does not consist in any present physical qualities of a
thing… Such physical qualities at most give us symptomatic evidence that an object is, or is not,
artefactual; the real basis of its artifactuality must lie elsewhere…An object is, or is not, an artefact based
on what its history was” (Dipert, 1993:15).
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A naturally frost-split rock could be made into a knife as soon as some
wandering human finds it and forms an intention to use it in certain ways; a
pebble can become a paperweight; a piece of driftwood can be a work of found
art. Such cases involve what Thomasson calls minimal creation. There is a choice
about whether to conceive of such cases as involving the creation of a new
object in addition to the naturally existing one, or to say that there is just the
original object which acquires a new extrinsic property. As noted in §1.4, I’m
thinking about these things in the former way, though I’m hoping that most of
what I say could be translated into the vocabulary of the conservative ontology.
In any case, one’s ontological preferences in this regard are orthogonal to one’s
stance on minimal creation. The idea that some aggregate of things constitutes
but is not identical to an artefact is a feature of the view independently of the
phenomenon of minimal creation. After all, the classic puzzles about the Statue
and the Lump are concerned with ordinary, non-minimal creation.
The idea that a brand new artefact can be minimally created should be no more
problematic than the idea that a brand new artefact can be brought into existence
by carving a piece of stone. Minimal creation is just a kind of artefact creation
which does not require any physical modification of a naturally occurring object.
It can occur when an object is found whose natural properties make it well suited
to the role intended by its discoverer. In cases of minimal creation, a natural
object becomes an artefact, perhaps in virtue of an intended function which the
artisan intends it to fulfil. Even here, the artisan’s intentions are not self-fulfilling.
Intending to use a pebble as a paperweight results in a new object, but intending
to use an existing object as a paperweight is not sufficient for that object’s being a
paperweight: the rock has to fall within certain physical parameters in order for
the creator’s intentions to be successfully realised (e.g. weighing less than 500
kilos, not being made of candyfloss).
Related to the phenomenon of minimal creation is that of exaptation, in which
an existing artefact becomes an artefact of a different kind. For example, as
Thomasson (2014) notes, a shipment of chopsticks could find their way to an
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isolated community who know nothing about chopsticks and end up being used
as hair sticks. It is not unreasonable to describe this as a case of minimal creation
of new artefacts. Just as you can find a frost-split rock and turn it into a knife in
virtue of some intended role which the rock happens to be naturally fitted to
fulfil, it appears that you can find take some human artefacts and turn them into
other kinds of artefacts. A single object may be continuously converted from one
artefactual kind to another during its lifetime, even without changing its intrinsic
form.8 Again, there’s a choice about whether to think about this as one object
being destroyed and a new one created, or in terms of an aggregate of things
which persists through changes in its extrinsic properties.
What’s interesting about such cases is that they illustrate how creator intention
can be partially constitutive of the nature of an artefact. Take the pebble-turned-
paperweight. Suppose the pebble has existed more or less unchanged for a
million years. When a human with certain intentions comes along, something
happens. Suddenly, the pebble constitutes an instance of a particular kind of
artefact, a paperweight. What has changed? Nothing but the beliefs and
intentions of the human. In this case, a certain kind of intention is the final
ingredient needed for the pebble to be a paperweight. Bloom makes a similar
point:
Given that the creation of members of these kinds need not
involve any physical changes, our judgments are driven here solely
by our intuitions about intentionality. We construe a penny as a
pawn only if we intuit that a person sincerely intends for the penny
to fall into the class of pawns… Note that one does not have to do
anything to the penny for it to become a pawn… [W]hat makes this
penny a pawn (as opposed to a queen, say) is the mental state of
the person who is considering the chess problem. (Bloom, 1996:18)
A reasonable explanation of our attitudes towards cases of minimal creation is
that artefacts are taken to depend constitutively on their creators’ intentions.
8 An extreme version of this view could hold that each user of the artefact creates it anew. This recalls
van Fraassen’s (1993) suggestion that an artwork is not identical to a painting or sculpture, but consists in
an individual’s imaginative interpretation of it: “the material work is the temporally persisting focus of a
sequence of imaginative creations, which can alternately be viewed as a single imaginative work evolving
through centuries, liberated from the confines of any one individual mind, including the artist’s.”
36
Moreover, the phenomenon illustrates how the specific content of a creator’s
intention contributes to the character of the artefact created. In relation to the
penny which becomes a chess pawn, Bloom writes:
The right sort of intention is essential; someone who does not
know the rules of chess could not do this, as she lacks the right
understanding of what it is for something to be a pawn. (Bloom,
1996:18)
A few puzzles arise. For example, why is it that can we make a hair stick by using
a chopstick to hold one’s hair up and yet if we place a teapot on a stack of papers
we still just have a teapot? This problem about exaptation can be resolved (see
§4.4), but that resolution makes use of some conceptual machinery introduced
later in this chapter. For now, let’s focus on a puzzle about minimal creation:
why consider the taking of the pebble to result in the creation of a paperweight
while saying that a stick seized upon as a weapon in the heat of the moment is
merely a case of using a natural object as an instrument?
The distinction between artefactual instruments and non-artefactual ones is no
doubt gradual and blurry, but the contrast has to do with the ways human agents
conceive of the objects they use, and the extent to which an object satisfies that
conception in a non-accidental way. Let me explain the point by example. A
particular stick may be used as a weapon because it was the only object within
reach, or it may be selected amongst many available sticks for its natural
usefulness as a weapon. Suppose it has been carefully chosen – after a thorough
examination of promising looking sticks – for its strength, shape, hardness,
weight, distribution of weight, smoothness and graspability. In this case the
human has a rich conception of the kind of object they need and a particular
natural object has been selected as largely satisfying that conception. We can give
a detailed explanation of the features of the weapon which refers to the human’s
intentions. To my mind, it is natural to describe this as creating a new artefact
even while insisting that the same stick seized upon blindly would have remained
a mere instrument. Similarly, the pebble-turned-paperweight can be assumed to
have been selected for its size, weight, aesthetic properties, etc. Of course, such
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distinctions are blurry: the stick seized upon blindly was presumably selected in
preference to any grains of sand or clumps of mud nearby because the hardness,
size, shape, etc. of the piece of wood were conceptualised as making it a more
effective weapon than those other items.
2.3 Reference to artefacts
The previous two sub-sections were intended to support the proposed definition
of artefacts by showing how its adequacy would explain fairly widespread
reactions to thought experiments. This argumentative strategy is common in
both the psychological and philosophical literature on artefacts. But one might
object that this is no way to begin an inquiry into the metaphysics are artefacts.
We could just be wrong about what artefacts are.
Thomasson (2007) provides the following response. First, she argues that facts
about how artefactual kind terms are grounded support the intentionalist
account of artefacts. Suppose we ostend some region of space-time and coin a
new word to refer to the kind of thing which is present there. Thomasson
(2007:55) notes that “a speaker who seeks to ground that term’s reference must
have at least a very high-level background conception of what sorts of features
are relevant to being a member of this sort of kind,” such as “chemical,
biological, artefactual, cultural, legal, etc.” In other words, the speaker has to have
some conception of the kind of thing they intend to name, otherwise it is
indeterminate what kind of thing the new term refers to. Thomasson writes:
Those who ground the reference of any artefactual kind term must
themselves have some conception of what general sorts of features
are relevant to determining the kind’s nature and the term’s
extension, for it is this that establishes the term as a would-be
artefactual kind term. About this, they cannot be proven to be in
error through later empirical investigations, since this establishes
the sort of nature that is relevant to the reference of the term, if it
refers at all.” (Thomasson, 2007:55)
Thomasson thinks that the speaker who grounds the reference of an artefactual
kind term is intending to refer to the kind of entity of which creator intention is
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partially constitutive. They can be wrong about whether or not the term thus
grounded refers, but if it refers at all, it refers to an intentional artefactual kind.
In turn, the maker of a new kind of artefact grounds the reference of a new
artefactual kind term in specific features which the prototype artefact is intended
to have. These intentions delineate an artefactual kind. The speaker cannot be
wrong about the kind of artefact they intended to make, although they can be
wrong about whether or not they have succeeded in creating an artefact of that
kind, (and they can be wrong about whether artefacts of that kind are correctly
referred to using some public language word).
The idea is that we can begin our inquiry into artefacts by focussing on artefact
concepts. If the proposed definition does a good job of capturing the concept
of an artefact, then we can justifiably ask whether any such entities exist, but we
cannot ask whether that is what artefacts really are. We already know what
artefacts are, if they exist. Similarly, the inventor of a new kind of artefact can’t
be wrong about the kind of artefact they are trying to make because the content
of their intentions amounts to a stipulation of what kind of artefact they are
trying to make.
This response is not entirely satisfactory. Suppose it turns out that there are no
entities which depend constitutively on human intentions in the way suggested
above. Something could qualify as an artefact by satisfying our artefact
conception imperfectly. Moreover, as noted in the introduction, Elder (2007)
defends a non-intentionalist account of (a class of) artefacts based on an
interpretation of Millikan (1984). He calls such entities copied kinds:
[T]he members of any copied kind are characterized by what Ruth
Millikan calls a ‘proper function’… That is, the members are
produced by a process or mechanism which copies them from
previous members similarly shaped, and does so as a causal
consequence of performances, by those previous members, of
certain functions – productions by them of certain effects. (Elder,
2007:38)
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On this view, it is denied that intentions have any role to play in a theory of
artefacts:
[T]he creation does not begin with the artisan’s intending what he
does. Rather the essential properties which his product will inherit
stem from a history of function and of copying that began well
before the artisan undertakes his work. This history reaches
forward through the artisan’s motion – it shapes his shaping. Its
existence and its efficacy are independent, largely or even entirely
of the artisan’s will. (Elder, 2007:39-40)
If this is right, the study of artefactual kinds is more akin to the study of natural
kinds. They constitute joints in nature which have to be uncovered using the
usual empirical methods, while the metaphysics of artefacts would be a chapter
in the philosophy of science.
This approach to artefacts is a serious competitor to the standard view I’ve been
canvassing here, but it is largely set aside in this thesis. By way of excuse, note,
first, that Elder (2007) does not intend his account of copied kinds to be
applicable to all artefacts. It might be that some artefacts are copied kinds while
others fall within the remit of the intentionalist account. Later in this chapter I
will be zeroing in on artefacts which have an essentially communicative function.
Perhaps these would always remain beyond the purview of the copied kinds
account. Second, Thomasson (2007:57) tries to argue (though I am unsure how
successfully) that the notion that artefacts have derived or proper functions still
requires that these functions be intended by their creators. Third, since this thesis
is primarily about linguistic artefacts, and not concerned primarily with general
problems in social ontology, it seems appropriate to continue to use the standard
view. Whether or not this is a fruitful way of thinking about words will become
clear in later chapters. In any case, applying the intentionalist account to the case
of words is a potentially fruitful thing to do, both for the light results in social
ontology may throw on language and for the extra scrutiny the standard account
receives in virtue of being applied to the case of language. Fourth, Bloom
(2007:4) makes the psychological generalisation that while “[n]atural kinds are
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understood in terms of internal essences” artefacts are conceived in terms of
“creator intent, characteristic function, and the social and cultural context of the
artifact’s creation and use”; if this is correct – if it is part of the very concept of
an artefact that it be partially constituted by intentions – then we can construe
the present adoption of intentionalism about artefacts as an attempt to sustain a
metaphysics which reflects intuitive conceptions, with the copied kinds approach
as a fall back option.
3. ARTEFACT KINDS
So far I’ve tried to speak mainly about individual artefacts, keeping discussion of
artefact kinds and artefact categorisation to a minimum. In this section I address
these topics head on.
Thomasson argues that the creation of an artefact depends on its creator’s
having a fairly rich conception of the artefactual kind of which the created
artefact is to be an instance. Hilpinen has much the same view:
When a person intends to make an object of a certain kind, his
productive intention has as its content some description of the
intended object, and the author’s intention “ties” to an artefact a
number of predicates which determine the intended character of the
object. (Hilpinen, 2011)
For example, the person who stipulates that a penny is to be a pawn in a game of
chess has to have a fairly rich conception of what pawns are, including what they
can and cannot do on a chess board. Thomasson proceeds to explicate sameness
of artefactual kind in terms of (largely successfully realised) matching intentions
on behalf of their creators. Thus, the reason why two chess pawns are pawns is
that they were produced with the same chess-regarding intentions in mind. This
is the view I’ll be exploring in this section.
It’s worth recalling that this tour through the philosophy of artefacts is not
undertaken purely for its own sake, but to develop the tools we need to offer a
theory of words in subsequent chapters. Questions about word individuation
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have been central to philosophical discussion of words. The following discussion
of artefact categorisation yields insights which we can bring to bear on the case
of words.
3.1 Matching conceptions
Thomasson proposes that, in the case of prototypes, the artisan starts with
certain features in mind, functions that the artefact is to perform, structural
features it is to have, etc. If the would-be inventor does not have a substantive
idea about the central features of the thing they are making, they are just messing
around, hoping for a felicitous discovery. If they do, then this conception
provides criteria for success:
[The inventor] must have some goals to direct her activity.
Including some features she intends to impose on the object
created. Thus she must have a substantive idea of what sort of a
thing it is she intends to create (say, a K), where that idea
incorporates certain features relevant to being a K, so that she can
judge her activity’s success in terms of the degree to which the
product instantiates the relevant features. In this case, clearly, there
is no question of the artisan getting it right or wrong about what it
would take to be a K, what features are K-relevant. At this stage,
what is relevant to being a K is purely a matter for invention or
stipulation by the artisan based on her goals or intentions; she is
not trying to discover what makes something a K (so that she could
be said to get it right or wrong), instead, she is delineating a new
kind by establishing success criteria for her activity. Thus, she
creates not only an artifact, but delineates a new artefactual kind,
complete with normative success conditions for creating something
of that kind. (Thomasson, 2007:60)
With respect to later artisans, either they know about Ks (i.e. they have a
conception of Ks which matches that of earlier creators) or they do not. If they
do not then they are in the same position as the inventor. If their conception of
the object is the same (they intend to impose the same K-relevant features) then
they are intending to make a K:
So a later artisan succeeds at making a K only if he has a
substantive, and substantively correct, concept of what a K is and
succeeds at imposing on the object all or most of the features
relevant to executing that concept. Having a substantively correct
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concept, in turn, must be a matter of substantially matching the
prior concept of Ks, since inventors’ concepts were originally
definitive of what counts as relevant to kind membership.
(Thomasson, 2007:62)
To take an example, suppose I try to make a knife. Either I have seen knives
before, or I haven’t. If I haven’t then I’m in the same situation as the maker of
the prototype. If I strike upon the same essential features (sharp blade, handle,
used for cutting food, etc.) then I may succeed in making a knife. In either case, it
just depends on whether my conception of the thing I want to make is a close
enough match for the conceptions that other people have of knives (and whether
or not my intentions are largely successfully realised.) Artefacts can thus be
multiply invented. (It is of course, perfectly plausible that isolated individuals or
groups could develop knives from scratch. This is a positive feature of the
present approach. Some theories of artefacts have trouble securing this intuitive
result. See chapter four (§1.6) for discussion.)
3.2 Ignorant artisans
Against Thomasson one might object that it makes perfect sense to say that I
could take a horseshoe to a blacksmith in a country without horses and get them
to make me another one. The blacksmith may have no conception of horses and
understand nothing about horseshoes, but is nonetheless able to produce an
intrinsic duplicate of the one I brought. The objection is thus that an artisan
could be entirely ignorant of the essential features of an artefact they have
produced.
A good option here is to say that my intentions are the ones which make the
blacksmith’s product a horseshoe. From the blacksmith’s perspective, they are
creating a piece of metal with certain intended proportions, one which has the
intended function of satisfying the client. The blacksmith is like a machine which
I have intentionally set in motion. They can replicate all of the intrinsic, physical
properties of the horseshoe but cannot confer upon it the socially/mentally
constructed properties which make it a horseshoe (such as being intended to
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shoe horses). That can only be done by someone with a rich conception of what
it takes for an object to qualify as a horseshoe.
The rejoinder to this might be that we don’t need to appeal to any third-party
intentions. The blacksmith has been presented with an unknown artefact and is
able to reproduce it faithfully by replicating its physical properties. Why can we
not maintain that this is at least sometimes sufficient for creating a horseshoe?
The reason we can’t do this can be illustrated by example: suppose that some
artisan has no conception of Frisbees or of plates. On Monday, Anne brings
them a Frisbee and asks them to make another one the same. They do so. On
Tuesday, Brian brings them a plate – which happens to be intrinsically
indistinguishable from Monday’s Frisbee – and asks them to make another one
the same. They do so. In virtue of what is Monday’s creation a Frisbee and
Tuesday’s a plate? My answer is that it depends on Anne’s intentions and on
Brian’s intentions respectively. Anne intended for the artisan to create a Frisbee,
and Brian intended for them to make a plate. This is what settles that Monday’s
creation is a Frisbee and that Tuesday’s is a plate. We cannot appeal to the
artisan’s own intentions. From their perspective they have made identical client-
satisfying artefacts on successive days. Nothing the artisan thinks or does could
decide whether the objects are Frisbees or plates.
It won’t help to argue that on Monday the artisan makes a Frisbee because they
take a Frisbee as their model, and that on Tuesday they make a plate because they
take a plate as their model. Suppose that Anne’s and Brian’s belongings have
become mixed up so that Anne has mistakenly taken Brian’s plate to the artisan
as the exemplar for her desired Frisbee, and that Brian has mistakenly taken
Anne’s Frisbee as an exemplar for the plate he wants. The artisan still makes a
Frisbee on Monday and a plate on Tuesday. This suggests that what matters is
not whether the artisan’s exemplar is a Frisbee or a plate but what the client
intends to be caused to be made by the artisan.
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For a slightly different case, suppose someone notices that finger spinners are
selling like hot cakes but has no idea what they are. They could still manufacture
and sell a batch of finger spinners merely by carefully producing intrinsic
duplicates of existing finger spinners. In this case, there are no finger spinner
savvy clients directing production, but we can perhaps appeal to the notion that
the artisan is acting in a way which is deferential to a certain practice of making
finger spinners. There are, in the vicinity, people who have the right kind of rich
conception of what finger spinners are, and the artisan is deferential towards
those people.
3.3 Self-referentiality
What makes a plate a plate and a Frisbee a Frisbee? A tempting thought is that
part of the story is that Frisbees are intended to be Frisbees and plates are
intended to be plates. This is a natural way of expressing the idea that the
content of a creator’s intentions make a contribution to the artefactual kind of
the objects they produce, but it is not adequate as an account of that
contribution. Searle (1995, 2007) confronts a similar problem when he notes that
social concepts often exhibit a troubling kind of “self referentiality”:
If part of the content of the claim that something is money is that
it is believed to be money, then what is the content of that belief?
If the content of the belief that something is money contains in
part the belief that it is money, then the belief that something is
money is in part the belief that it is believed to be money; and
there is, in turn, no way to explain the content of that belief
without repeating the same feature over and over again. (Searle
1995:33)
The problem can be dissolved by clarifying that talk of something being money
because people believe it is money should be construed as mere informal
presentation of the view. This way of speaking creates the appearance of
circularity where there is none.
Searle’s approach in social ontology is discussed in chapter three, so detailed
presentation of his view can wait until then, but a quick glimpse is useful here in
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order to see our way out of the present problem. On Searle’s view, social objects
like dollar bills have the social properties they do in virtue of the fact that some
community collectively accepts constitutive rules whose form is given by the
following schema:
X counts as Y (in C)
Suppose we want to give an account of what makes something a one dollar coin.
The X term in Searle’s schema is supposed to be filled out with terms which refer
to a kind of object, presumably one with a specific shape, weight, material
constitution and provenance (e.g. being issued by the Bureau of Exchange). The Y
term is supposed to be filled out with “status functions” such as being a medium
of exchange, a store of value, etc. (‘C’ stands for a context in which Xs are to
count as Ys.) On this view, what it is to be a one dollar coin is explicated in terms
of the cluster of properties in Y. Thus, a dollar is not defined as something
believed to be a dollar; a dollar is defined as anything which counts as having the
properties in Y. As Searle puts it:
[Y]ou don’t have to use the word ‘money’ in order to define money.
The word ‘money’ functions as a summary term or as a placeholder
for being a medium of exchange, a store of value, a payment for
services rendered, a measure of value of other currencies, and so
on. And if something performs all of those functions, then it’s
money. So we do not have a vicious circularity or infinite regress. If
I say that in order for something to be money, people have to
believe that it’s money, there is no circularity, because they can have
that belief without having the word ‘money’. The word ‘money’
here just is a place-holder for a large number of other functional
expressions.
To be sure, this is not a reduction of social facts to non-social ones: such an
account does not explain what it is to be, for example, a medium of exchange at
a more basic level. What’s at issue is how socially constructed properties get
attached to an independently specifiable substrate. For Searle it’s through
collective acceptance of constitutive rules of the form illustrated by the XYC
schema. The passage from X to Y is ampliative. In virtue of collective acceptance
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of an XYC rule, the Xs end up having new properties they didn’t have before.
We can understand how these new properties attach to Xs, even if we can’t see
how to reduce the Y properties (or even the X properties, for that matter) to
non-social, non-intentional states of affairs. New socially constructed properties
get attached to entities of type X, and the concept of money is analysed in terms
of some cluster of Y properties. There is no circularity here.
There are various problems with Searle’s XYC schema, but further discussion of
the account can be postponed until chapter three, (where I explain why the XYC
schema is ill-fitted to explaining the mental/social construction of many
artefacts). Here I want to translate Searle’s response to the circularity objection so
that we can pursue the Thomassonian conception of artefacts and begin to make
some headway with the question with which we started: what makes a plate a
plate and a Frisbee a Frisbee?
If a Frisbee is defined as something which is intended to be a Frisbee, then we
haven’t defined Frisbees any more than we define blargs by claiming that blargs
are things which are intended to be blargs. But although we might informally
present the Thomassonian view that way, that is not really what’s going on.
Instead, what it is to be a Frisbee is explained in terms of intended features such
as being intended for use in a certain kind of recreational activity, intended
aerodynamic properties, etc. So, artefact kinds are understood in terms of
clusters of intended features. They are not defined self-referentially. (The
objection also goes awry in assuming that this kind of social ontological
theorising is expected to yield definitions of artefactual kinds. For many kinds of
artefacts it may be impossible to provide a definition in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions.)
3.4 The structure of artefact concepts
What kinds of features are central to the natures of artefactual kinds? Intrinsic
physical features and appearances play some role in artefactual categorisation, but
artefactual kinds cannot generally be defined in terms of such features. For
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example, not all chairs look alike (e.g. folding camping chairs, chairs carved out
of logs, Chippendale chairs, dentist’s chairs, orthopaedic chairs, etc.), though
none of these are borderline cases of chairs. At the same time, some things that
duplicate the physical properties of paradigmatic chairs are not chairs (e.g.
swamp chairs).
An alternative would be to define artefacts in terms of their actual causal powers,
but this won’t work either. One might think that clocks are things which can be
used to tell the time, but a broken clock is still a clock, while watches and stars
are not clocks. Similarly, a Frisbee is not a plate, even though it could be used as
one. A general problem is that artefacts have far too many causal powers. A
pebble turned paperweight could be used to hammer in a nail, hold a door open
or grind pepper in a mortar, but it is not a hammer, doorstop or pestle. It is a
paperweight. We can’t make sense of that just by talking about the pebble’s brute
causal powers. Nor is actual use generally either necessary or sufficient for
membership of an artefactual kind: boats which never make it to the water are
still boats, and desks which people sit on are not chairs.
In the previous section I canvassed the idea that artefacts are objects produced to
serve some purpose or intended function. Against this I noted that some kinds
of artefacts may have no function or have a function which is neither necessary
nor sufficient for being a member of the kind (e.g. a statue). Even for those
artefacts where intended function does seem relevant, e.g. boats, intended
function may be neither necessary nor sufficient: a boat might not be intended
ever to see water while two groups of adventurers might end up making a boat
and a raft respectively, though each artefact was intended to have the function of
transporting them downriver. Bloom (1996) notes the results of experiments in
psychology which test the relative weight which people accord to physical form
and intended function in artefact categorisation. These experiments suggest that
intended function is not generally either necessary or sufficient for being a
member of a given artefact kind since there is a tendency to judge (i) that a
rubber sphere attached to dolphins which is intended to carry people over bodies
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of water (i.e. something which has the intended function associated with boats
but atypical physical properties) is not a boat, and (ii) that a boat shaped object
intended exclusively for unmanned retrieval of marine biological data is a boat.
It turns out to be exceedingly difficult to give a general account of the kinds of
features which are taken to be relevant to membership of an artefactual kind. It is
no easier to give a specific account of the features which are taken to be relevant
to specific artefact kinds. This is partly due to the fact that there is diachronic
variation within artefactual kinds: the suits of the 1930s, 1970s and present day
are not quite the same: they don’t look the same, they’re not made the same way
or of the same materials, and they have different social roles. But there is also
synchronic variation. Within a given artefactual kind there tends to be enormous
variety, making attempts to define an artefactual kind subject to immediate
counterexamples.
What is more, some members of an artefact kind tend to be judged as more or
less typical exemplars of the kind. For example, chairs shaped like a hand or
suspended from the ceiling on chains are thought to be rather atypical chairs.
These kinds of judgements are best explained by taking artefact concepts to have
a family resemblance structure instead of a classical structure defined in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions.
Thomasson states that we should not expect artefact kinds to be definable in
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Artefact concepts, she suggests
could be ‘cluster concepts’. Presumably, the thought is that an artefact kind is
associated with a range of properties, but something can be an artefact of that
kind without having all of those properties; at the same time, there may be no
single property which is necessary for being a member of the kind.
Thomasson proposes a distinction between strict and loose artefactual kinds. At
least some artefact kinds are strict in the sense that they have strict application
conditions, perhaps because they are associated with technical expertise. She
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gives the examples of double breasted waistcoats and Peking duck. The thought
here may be that since these kinds are technical artefacts associated with
professional standards, very precise criteria for what counts as instantiating the
kinds should be forthcoming. To cover these kinds of artefacts, Thomasson
proposes the following principle:
Necessarily, for all x and all strict artifactual kinds K, x is a K if and
only if x is the product of a largely successful intention that (Kx),
where one intends (Kx) if and only if one has a substantive concept
of the nature of Ks that matches that of prior makers of Ks (if any)
and intends to realize that concept by imposing K-relevant features
on the object. (Thomasson, 2003b:24)
Whether or not double breasted waistcoats or Peking Duck can really be
provided with strict application conditions in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions is debateable. What is certainly the case is that many, many artefactual
kind terms have much looser application conditions. For one thing, there are
many different ways of being a key or a bottle. Moreover, as Thomasson notes,
the properties associated with many such artefactual kinds are subject to change
over time. She gives the example of modern dresses which may differ markedly
from what a dress was understood to be by Victorian dressmakers. The problem
is that the dependence principle for strict artefacts does not allow for drift in the
nature of an artefactual kind over time: it specifies that later artisans must have a
conception which (exactly) matches that of earlier artisans. To remedy this,
Thomasson proposes this more inclusive version of the above dependence
principle, which requires only that later makers have a conception which largely
matches that of earlier makers:
Necessarily, for all x and all artifactual kinds K, x is a K only if x is
the product of a largely successful intention that (Kx), where one
intends (Kx) only if one has a substantive concept of the nature of
Ks that largely matches that of some group of prior makers of Ks (if
there are any) and intends to realize that concept by imposing K-
relevant features on the object. (Thomasson, 2003b:26)
This weaker condition requires only that later makers’ conceptions largely match
those of some other group of makers. This allows for gradual drift over time as,
50
for example, adding machines evolve into computers (or the Old English word,
‘docga’, evolves into ‘dog’). But it also preserves continuity since you can’t make
an artefact of a certain kind if your conception of the kind does not even
remotely match that of at least some prior maker of that kind of artefact. No one
can produce a top hat and claim it’s a barrel of beer (just as no one can produce a
monosyllabic utterance with no consonants and claim it’s an instance of
‘otorhinolaryngologist’.)
The revised dependence principle differs from that formulated for so-called
‘strict’ artefactual kinds in specifying only a necessary condition on being an
instance of a given artefactual kind. This is because we have to make space for
some intricate phenomena. For one thing, someone could produce an artefact
according to an artefact kind conception which differs a little bit, but not too
much, from some prior group of makers of artefacts of that kind, and be only
largely successful in realising their intentions. The result of this could be an
artefact which shares relatively few significant properties with prior artefacts of
the kind.
Second, artefacts can evolve radically over long periods of time to such an extent
that we may be unwilling to admit that artefacts on opposite ends of the
spectrum are artefacts of the same kind. Thomasson gives the example of early
adding machines and computers. As Thomasson notes:
Artifactual kinds are notoriously malleable and historical in nature –
indeed the possibilities for this are built into our description
above… [O]ver time, the concept of K’s, spelling out which
features are K-relevant, may gradually change… [T]he process of
stipulation has become much more gradual and diffuse, as it is
responsive to the intentions of a great number of makers over an
extended period of time. (Thomasson, 2007:62-63)
Third, artefactual kinds are subject to fission and fusion (though Thomasson
mentions only fission.) Thomasson mentions the case of 18th century
knickerbockers which apparently gave rise to two different kinds of garments
worn today, one being a kind of underwear and the other a kind of outerwear
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used for sports. Artefactual kinds are also plausibly susceptible to fusion, such as,
for example, when an existing piece of technology takes on an extra role (e.g.
smartphones could take on the role of keys, credit cards, etc.). Thomasson’s
weaker dependence principle is silent on questions like these, though she could
probably again insist that that’s just how things ought to be.
Recall that the shift from strict to loose artefactual kinds involves abandoning the
attempt to define artefactual kinds. Still, there are two things we can say. First, it
is often relatively easy to specify sufficient conditions for being a member of a
loose artefactual kind. For example, anything which is the product of a largely
successfully realised intention to make a small cart with a single wheel at the
front, supported by two fixed legs at the rear, which can be lifted or pushed by
two horizontal handles, and is to be used for transporting awkward loads in
gardening and building…is a wheelbarrow. Having these intended properties
seems to be sufficient for being a wheelbarrow, even though none of them is
necessary. Second, if anything is a wheelbarrow, then it must be the product of a
largely successfully realised intention which largely matches this conception.
4. ARTEFACTS AND RECOGNISABILITY
Essentially intentional artefacts depend constitutively on human mental states. In
that sense they are like the social entities such as laws, schools, cocktail parties,
etc. But one might wonder if artefacts should necessarily be considered to be
social entities. What seems most important in the case of an artefact is that its
creator – who is often a single individual – have certain intentions. For example,
it might seem plausible that when someone makes a knife their very own
intentions are what do the work: if someone is intentionally (and largely
successfully) honing a sharp edge to produce a cutting tool then that is plausibly
sufficient for creating a knife. However, Thomasson (2014) argues that many
artefacts are distinctively social in character, depending not just on a single
individual’s intentions but on those of a multiplicity of individuals.9 Coins are an
9 In her (2003b, 2007) Thomasson assumes that artefacts do not in general depend on anything but the
intentions of individual makers. By her (2014), this has changed.
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obvious example. No piece of metal could have a monetary value of one dollar,
or have the function of being a medium of exchange, just in virtue of a single
individual’s intention. For this to work, there has at the very least to be a
multiplicity of individuals with beliefs and intentions regarding coins.
Thomasson proposes to make sense of the publicness of some artefacts in terms
of a technical notion of recognisability. A similar notion can also be found in
Dipert (1993). The matter is also related to Searle’s distinction between social and
institutional facts. On views such as these, there is a certain class of artefacts
which have symbolic or communicative features. These can include physical
features which serve no practical function directly, but which enable the artefact
to be recognisable.
This aspect of artefact theory is especially important for present purposes. This is
because it calls attention to a distinctive mechanism of social construction which
helps to understand a wide variety of artefacts. In the next chapter I’ll show how
this mechanism can be used to explain features of words. Here, I’ll provide a
more detailed account of these recognisability features than has been provided
before.
4.1 Thomasson on recognisability
Thomasson argues that among the properties of artefacts which may be criterial
for their being members of a given kind are “what might be broadly construed as
receptive and normative features, involving how the object created is to be
regarded, used, treated or behaved in regard to” (Thomasson, 2014:47). These
include being recognisable as having various features. For example, a shop-front
will be designed with the intention that it be recognisable (by a certain intended
audience) as indicating a place where such and such products are being sold.
Without other people with the right beliefs and intentions there can’t be a shop
front, since anything which wasn’t widely recognisable as indicating that products
are to be procured within couldn’t really be counted as a shopfront.
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The basic idea is that many artefacts have structural, detectable features which do
not serve any purpose directly, but which serve to make the object recognisable
as having various socially constructed properties. For example, the red and white
pole traditionally positioned outside a barber’s shop is intended to make the place
recognisable as somewhere you can ask to get a haircut in exchange for money.
Thomasson’s idea is that a crucial property of many artefacts is that they have
certain detectable features which enable the object to be recognisable as a kind
of thing which is intended to be used or treated in certain ways. This illustrates
one sense in which an artefact could be described as a social or public artefact, as
opposed to a purely individualistic artefact. The features which contribute
essentially to the artefact’s makeup may depend upon the beliefs and intentions
of a wider community, not only on the intentions of the individual creator.
Thomasson qualifies this account in three ways. First, since a hermit might make
themselves a teapot we should characterise receptive features not as involving an
intention that the object be recognised as having such and such a feature, but only
that it be recognisable. Second, since a rubber shark may be intended to be
recognisable as a rubber shark only by the film crew, and not by the audience in a
cinema, the receptive criteria should involve recognisability relative to an
intended audience. Third, since some artefacts may be entirely personal creations
not intended to be recognisable by anyone other than the maker (or not even by
the maker), Thomasson states that the essential recognisability of artefacts is
assumed to apply to just a subclass of the artefacts, those which are public artefacts.
Thomasson (2014:56) considers two objections to the notion that receptive
features are key to the identity conditions of many artefactual kinds. The first is
the worry that someone alone on a desert island could create an artefact such as a
knife. To this Thomasson replies that if the person has previously lived in a
human society then their activities are still infused with the conventions and
norms of home, so that their creating a knife can be described as intending to
create something which adheres to those public criteria. If, on the other hand,
they have not, and have miraculously survived infancy and managed to fashion
54
various useful objects, Thomasson thinks we might admit that there can be private
tools, artefacts in a broader sense of the term, but not public artefacts like knives
and chairs. (So, even if the castaway creates something that looks like a knife and
is used for cutting it wouldn’t be an instance of the public artefactual kind, knife.
This does seem a rather infelicitous result. Happily, my own take on these
matters (see §4.3) does not have this consequence).
The second objection concerns prototypical artefacts: when a kind of artefact is
first invented, it looks like only the intentions of the creator can possibly count.
Thomasson (2014:56) replies by noting that many new artefacts are recognisable
as being subject to existing norms: “the Wright Brothers may well have intended
their creation to be subject to at least some of the norms for treatment of
transportation devices.” Additionally, if someone were to insist that the first
knife or the first hammer was really not intended to evoke any social conventions
or norms then we could reply that that first knife was a private tool, and that the
public kind, knife, emerged from that early state of affairs gradually.
4.2 Clarifications of Thomasson on recognisability
Thomasson tends to present recognitional features as just a further kind of
feature which can be relevant to artefactual categorisation: just as an artefact kind
could be described in terms of functional features or formal features, or some
kind of mixture of these, recognitional features are just treated as another kind of
feature to throw into the mix. However, this way of thinking of the view fails to
do it justice. Instead, we should understand intended recognisability as a
mechanism of social construction. In this sub-section I’m going to try to make it
clear how this mechanism works. (I’m going to work through this in a cumulative
way. This will involve posing some objections to formulations of the view that
don’t really work. These are not intended as objections to Thomasson, but as
stepping stones to understanding her view).
One way to present Thomasson’s view is to say that an instance of a public
artefactual kind must be the product of a largely successfully realised intention to
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make a thing recognisable as an artefact of that kind. This is fine as a casual
characterisation of the view, but phrased this way it of course invites the kind of
circularity worry I discussed above. Less casually, then, the recognisability
criterion could be stated as follows:
RECOGNISABILITY: An instance of a public artefactual kind must be the
product of a largely successfully realised intention to make a thing recognisable
(by a certain audience) as having Y1…Yn.
In this schema, Y1…Yn is some cluster of features associated with artefacts of
that kind. They could be functional features, physical features or – as Thomasson
(2014:47) emphasises – normative features including ways in which “the object
created is to be regarded, used, treated or behaved in regard to.”
Naturally, being the product of a successfully realised intention to make a thing
which just looks like it has Y1…Yn isn’t generally sufficient for making a thing
which actually has Y1…Yn. So we still need to say something about how an
artefact gets its Y properties. To the extent that the Y properties are physical
properties, there’s no mystery. What is essential to gold spheres is being spherical
and made of gold. One succeeds in one’s intention to create a gold sphere by
physically shaping a piece of gold. But properties like being subject to certain
norms, having a certain function etc. cannot be imposed just by physically
shaping the object. As a result, we need something like the following:
RECOGNISABILITY´: An instance of a public artefactual kind must be the
product of a largely successfully realised intention to make a thing recognisable
(by a certain audience) as being intended to be Y1…Yn.
What is distinctive to public artefacts, on this view, is that they are products of a
certain kind of second-order intention. The artisan intends a piece of wood to be
a pawn and intends that this intention be recognisable. The success of such an
intention generally requires structural features of objects (or nearby objects)
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which communicate the intended Y features. What is key here is that for at least
some Y properties, getting people to realise that something was created with an
intention that it be Y is sufficient for that thing being Y. For example, a
craftsman may intend to make a thing which is recognisable as being intended to
be a pawn (where being a pawn is analysed in terms of conventions in the game
of chess). One way of signalling their intention that certain pieces be pawns is to
give the pieces of wood that characteristic pawn shape, though not all pawns are
like this. In games of chess played with real people, types of chess piece can be
signalled by writing letters on people’s backs, giving them coloured hats and so
on. Similarly, recall Bloom’s example in which a penny becomes a pawn. What
seems to be crucial to being a pawn is not some particular shape (some particular
way of signalling pawn-ness). These structural features of pawns are merely there
to indicate their creators’ intentions. Getting people to recognise those intentions
is then sufficient for the pieces of wood (or pennies) to be pawns.
Actually, that can’t be quite right, since you might expect that a creator’s
intentions have not only to be recognised but also accepted. If I stipulate that a
particular penny is a pawn, it seems that I only succeed in making a pawn if the
other player accepts that it is. But requiring creator intentions to be actually
accepted seems too strong. If I buy a chess set and refuse to accept that such and
such is a pawn, and if I treat the pawn as firewood, I’m still burning a pawn, even
though no one ever accepted the creator’s intention that it be a pawn. Similarly, if
the creator hides a new set of chess pieces in a vault so that no one ever sees
them, they’re still pawns, bishops, etc. Perhaps what’s required is not that the
creator’s intention be accepted, but that it be acceptable to some significant set of
individuals: the creator’s intention that the object be a pawn can be successful if
the object is such that it communicates the creator’s intention that it be a pawn,
and the object would be accepted as a pawn by a certain significant set of
individuals in virtue of their recognition of the creator’s intention. So the
recognisability criterion can be stated, with added verbosity, as follows:
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RECOGNISABILITY´´: An instance of a public artefactual kind must be the
product of a largely successfully realised intention to make a thing recognisable
(by a certain audience) as being intended to be Y1…Yn and the intention that it
be Y1…Yn is acceptable (to that audience).
This mechanism of social construction won’t work for all Y properties.
Successfully intentionally making something that looks like it is intended to be
used for cutting isn’t sufficient for making a knife. It also has to have certain
causal powers which enable it to cut. But for some Y properties – e.g. that a line
in the sand is the baseline for a game of volleyball, the success of the intention to
make a baseline consists in that intention’s being recognised (and being
accepted/acceptable) by the intended audience. Clearly, this mechanism of social
construction depends on mental states not just of the individual maker, but on
wider attitudes in the community. People need to be disposed to recognise and
accept the thing as having certain (intended) Y properties.
Dipert (1993) makes a related distinction between tools and artefacts. Tools are
objects intentionally made with some purpose in mind, while artefacts are more
like what I’ve been calling public artefacts. Dipert writes:
An artefact is an intentionally modified tool whose modified
properties were invented by the agent to be recognized by an agent
at a later time as having been altered for that, or some other, use. In
other language, an agent has intended that an(other) agent comes to
believe, on the basis of perceiving the presence of one or more
(intentionally modified) properties, that (1) the object is an
especially suitable means for achieving an end and that (2) the
object’s creator intended to cause this belief by these
properties…Hence, artifacts are, unlike tools, distinctively
“social”… They require us as agents to think of other cognitive and
acting agents, their attitudes and thought and emotional
mechanisms, and the content of their thought and attitudes.
(Dipert, 1993:30-31)
To my mind it is extremely awkward to define ‘artefact’ in such a way that a
hammer is not an artefact. But that is just a terminological complaint. Dipert’s
58
account is clearly closely related to Thomasson’s. Dipert highlights what he calls
the “communicative purpose” of (what he calls) artefacts:
According to my definition, all artifacts have a communicative
purpose. By “communicative purpose” I mean that they were made
with an intention to bring about a belief in an(other) agent. (Dipert,
1993:102)
At this point I would like to introduce a piece of terminology which I will use
throughout this thesis. What Dipert calls “artifacts,” I will call essentially
communicative artefacts, or ECAs. What is characteristic of ECAs is that an
object only gets to be one of these kinds of artefacts via a process in which the
creator’s intention regarding that object is recognisable and acceptable to an
intended audience. That is not the case for wheelbarrows, knives or hammers. It
is the case, I would suggest, for artefacts like voting slips, newspapers, computer
displays, traffic lights, foot-high fences, price tags, police tape, wedding rings, the
conch in Lord of the Flies, trophies and medals, uniforms, crucifixes, churches,
monarchs’ crowns, money, gang tattoos, judges’ wigs, car registration plates, tax
discs, war memorials, cattle brands, do not disturb signs, etc.10 Artefacts such as
these have an essential, symbolic or communicative role.
As noted, I think it is best to think of “recognisability” or the “communicative
purpose” of an artefact as a mechanism of social construction: that some object
makes clear its creator’s intentions regarding its function or the norms to which it
is subject is what turns a lifeless object into an ECA.
4.3 Recognisability and publicness
Sometimes we want to say of an artefact (or kind of artefact) that it is public or
social, in some sense. What might we mean by this? In this section I’ve been
discussing artefacts whose character depends on the recognisability to an
audience of its creator’s intentions. Thomasson (2014) takes this kind of
recognisability and casts it as the mark of artefact publicness. She also argues that
most artefacts are public in this sense, including, for example, hammers and chairs.
10 I suspect that artworks are generally public artefactual kinds in this strict sense.
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To my mind, this attitude confuses being a public artefact with being an ECA,
and also obscures the distinction between artefacts which are only contingently
intentionally recognisable and those which are essentially intentionally
recognisable (the ECAs).
Let’s start with the second point. It is certainly true that hammers and chairs are
generally intended to be recognisable by a large audience. Thomasson (2014)
emphasises that even a pebble-turned-paperweight may be intended to be
recognisable as subject to paperweight norms: if someone took the pebble and
used it to mash potatoes, the owner of the paperweight could justly complain
that a clearly recognisable norm has been violated. However, although hammers
are typically intended to be recognisable by a large number of people as intended
to be used for hammering, this is not obviously an essential feature of hammers.
One could make a hammer which is only intended to be recognisable to a single
individual, or which is not intended to be recognisable at all. It does seem
conceivable that one could create a hammer merely by successfully intending to
make something for hammering. A second point is that the features of hammers
which make them recognisable are just the same physical features which make
them apt for hammering.
What distinguishes artefacts like wheelbarrows and paperweights on the one
hand, and purely symbolic artefacts is that the former have to have physical
properties which play a direct causal role in fulfilling their assigned function.
Whether or not they need in addition to be recognisable as intended to play that
role is up for debate. A brick wall fulfils its role of blocking access to an area by
being an insurmountable physical obstacle. It can play its role whether or not
anyone is aware that there is a wall there (somebody wearing a blindfold might
charge into it by mistake.) Police tape is not like that. The only physical
constraints on what plays the police tape role are those which require the artefact
to be recognisable as playing the intended role (as well as being portable, robust enough
to withstand a breeze, etc.). Invisible police tape won’t work, but sombreros on
washing machines could work as long as they were recognisable as being
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intended by the police to block off access to an area (if, that is, people knew that
sombreros on washing machines meant what police tape usually means). The
police tape is part of the causal story explaining why passers-by keep away from
the crime scene, but that causal story goes from perceptible features of the
artefact via mental recognition of those features and the knowledge that those
features are associated with an intention to keep members of the public away
from crime scenes. High brick walls are also generally recognisable as boundaries
that we might get into trouble for crossing, but even if they fail to be recognised
as having this function, they can still do their job in virtue of their physical
characteristics (height, solidity, etc.). If passers-by do not recognise that the
police tape has a certain intended function and authority then they are liable to
walk straight through it.11
On the second point, (that is, Thomasson’s and Dipert’s assertion that essential
recognisability is the hallmark of social artefacts) my view is that there can be
ECAs which are not intended to be recognisable by anyone other than an
individual creator. In other words, there can be ECAs which only get to be the
artefacts they are in virtue of the fact that the creator’s intentions are
recognisable and acceptable to a certain audience, where that audience is
restricted to a single member, namely the creator of the artefact. For example, a
secretive journal writer might write in using a cypher known only to them. So the
fact that an artefact depends on its creator’s intentions being recognisable does
not necessarily make it public or social in character.
No doubt there are different things we might mean by talking of public artefacts.
Here are a few of the things we might mean:12
11 This is not to deny that some ECA kinds could be essentially associated with some practical, physical
function in addition to their communicative function. For example, a military uniform is an ECA but it
also has the function of keeping protecting its wearer from the elements.
12 A further sense in which an artefact (or kind) could be held to be public would be if its existence
depended on collective intentionality. In this thesis, I have chosen to bracket issues concerning collective
intentionality, so let’s just stick with the five senses above.
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(i) The artefact belongs to a kind which is widespread. For example, there are
hammers and paperweights all over the world.
(ii) The artefact kind is the work of many hands. In other words, there is no
single inventor of that kind of artefact. Rather, it is the product of successive
modifications over time. For example, the modern computer evolved over
decades requiring the work of many different people.
(iii) People agree (even if the agreement is never expressed) about roughly what
it takes to be a member of that kind. For example, there is a broad agreement
about which things are and which things are not hammers. This is more or less
the idea that the concept corresponding to the artefact kind is one which is
shared.
(iv) The artefact is subject to agreed norms, conventions or laws. For example,
the monetary status of a ten pound note is explicitly written into the laws of the
UK. Hammers can’t be taken into aircraft cabins.
(v) The character of the artefact is determined relative to an activity which
requires the participation of at least two people, such as ten pound notes or
footballs. For such artefacts, that they be successfully intended to be recognisable
by at least two people becomes a constitutive requirement.
A hammer can be a public artefact in each of senses (i) to (iv), so it may make
sense (at least in some contexts) to talk of hammers as public artefacts.
Moreover, most ECAs are probably also public artefacts in sense (v). After all,
symbolic artefacts are usually associated with activities which require
coordination between more than one individual. For the most part, but not
without exception, the existence of ECAs involves the backdrop of a community
in which people are able to recognise and accept each other’s intentions, and in
which they are sensitive to public norms.
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Summarising, my first point against Thomasson is that we ought to distinguish
between symbolic artefacts which are grounded in a certain kind of intended
recognisability (ECAs) and more practical artefacts. Though practical artefacts
like hammers may be intended to be recognisable to a certain audience, that is
arguably not an essential feature of hammers. Hammers can still be described as
social or public objects, in first four senses above, but to be a hammer does not
strictly require a mental contribution from anyone but a single creator. If I intend
to make something for hammering, and it works, I’ve made a hammer. I don’t
need for anyone else to be able to recognise or accept my intentions. In light of
this, I can avoid the unwelcome result – to which Thomasson was pushed – that
the desert-islander marooned from birth turns out to be incapable of making a
knife (even though they could create something which looks and cuts like a
knife). My second point is that the publicness of an artefact does not
immediately follow from the fact that it depends on the recognisability of the
creator’s intentions, since ECAs are sometimes only intended to be recognisable
by their creator. However, there are various senses we can give to the notion of
artefactual publicness.
The point of this discussion is not just to mark the differences between
Thomasson’s view and my own, but also to bring into focus the notion of an
essentially communicative artefact, as well as to begin to elucidate the notion of
artefactual publicness. The reason for attending to these categories is that they
will help us in the next chapter to cast light on public language words.
4.4 Recognisability and exaptation
Why is a chopstick potentially a hair stick while a teapot placed on a stack of
papers never becomes a paperweight? The notion of recognisability can help us
to understand this puzzle about exaptation.
Hair sticks and teapots are not obviously public in the sense introduced above.
They do not appear to depend essentially on being publicly recognisable: that a
teapot is readily identifiable is an apparently contingent feature. It is recognisable
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in virtue of its structural properties which (usually) enable it to play the role of
brewing tea (or which have an aesthetic function).
While public recognisability is not an essential feature of these artefacts, the fact
remains that teapots generally are publicly recognisable. And this recognisability
brings with it various norms of treatment. If you take a teapot and use it as a
watering can or a chamber-pot, you will be misusing a teapot. The fact that you
will be misusing the teapot will be apparent to everyone in virtue of the
structural features of the teapot. So while the various teapot-governing norms
are not essential features of teapots, they can serve to block any intention to
reappropriate the teapot as another kind of artefact. When someone puts a
teapot on a stack of papers it is plain to everyone that it is a teapot. The teapot is
being used to play the paperweight role in flagrant contravention of teapot
norms. It is possible to determine, I suppose, that the teapot is currently
intended by its user to play the paperweight role, but what comes through more
decisively is the teapot maker’s intention that the teapot be used for making tea.
Imagine a plain chopstick with no writing on it. When used to hold one’s hair up,
or when stored with other grooming related artefacts the chopstick is no longer
recognisable as a chopstick. The structural features of the chopstick happen to
be such that when used in accordance with a different intention (the intention
that it hold one’s hair up), that intention is not undermined: there are no features
which signal that the object is a chopstick. (For what it’s worth, if the chopstick
had distinctive writing on it indicating that it was intended to be used for eating,
my intuition is that the process of exaptation would be blocked. You couldn’t
turn that chopstick into a hair stick without modifying it.)
5. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
5.1 Automated production
Many artefacts are produced by machines. As a result, particular token artefacts
are created despite no individual having any intentions regarding those particular
tokens. For example, a bolt which is created by a machine but which falls
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between cracks such that no one ever sees it is still a bolt. In response, we can
point out that the never-seen bolt is ultimately connected to a creator’s intention,
though in a rather indirect way: the bolt is the product of a machine which has
been designed by some artisan with the intention that it produce bolts. Thus, the
never-seen bolt is connected to a kind of elongated creative intention. Dipert
explores a similar theme:
We often then have beliefs and expectations about how our
intentions will or might produce changes in the world. Some of
these are beliefs about more extended causal chains – through the
mediation of our muscles, of tools or machines, or even through
the expected or manipulated actions of other agents. If an event
occurs through one of these (once-)contemplated chains or chain
patterns, then the action is an intentional action. Similarly, if an
intended change of properties occurs to an object through one of
these chains, there is no reason to believe the property is less a tool
or artefactual property than if the causal chain had been shorter.
Thus, I can build a machine that builds and boxes computers, and
the produced computers are intended to be recognized by others as
having been intentionally made to fulfil the function of computing.
Is such a computer an artefact? Yes, and those properties of the
computer that I made the computer-making machine impose on its
products are “intended.” I am the agent whose agency is tied to
those properties if my intention that computers have those
properties brought about products having those properties, even if
those properties were brought about by intentionally constructing a
machine that more mediately caused them. (Dipert, 1993:128)
This certainly seems right. From the point of view of human agency, there is no
good reason to discriminate between events which are brought about directly and
those which are brought about through some longer chain of events initiated by
an agent with a good idea about the likely effects. Nevertheless, the existence of
artefact-producing machines raises a further problem for the intentional account.
Suppose that an engineer programmes the bolt-making machine to produce 1000
new bolts, but that due to an unforeseeable malfunction the machine produces
1001 bolts. Nobody intended the extra bolt to exist, but that doesn’t mean that it
isn’t a bolt. First of all, which of the 1001 items is the one which is allegedly not a
bolt? It is not obvious that it is the last one. Allowing that all 1001 items are
bolts, perhaps what we should say is that the designer of the machine intended
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that it should produce a bolt whenever it is in a certain state. Although the
machine might be in that state accidentally, what happens when it gets into that
state was perfectly well intended by the designer.
5.2 Over-intellectualisation
Epstein (2013, 2015) has objected to much work in social ontology on the
grounds that it over-intellectualises the processes of social construction. Taking
the example of money, he argues that what money is can’t be settled by appealing
to the contents of people’s beliefs and intentions regarding money since people
are in fact fairly ignorant about money. What money is, Epstein suggests, is
closely tied to the functioning of the banking sector, something which is poorly
understood, even by experts.
This is a robust challenge to the intentionalist account, and to the standard model
of social ontology more generally. Since my goal here is to apply the standard
approach to words, I won’t try to answer this challenge in full, but I will make
two brief points (one of which I come back to at greater length in chapter five).
First, it is not part of my project to claim that all social facts can be explained by
the kinds of mental/social construction which I’ve been talking about. Nor do I
necessarily need to claim that all artefacts can be explained in such a way (see
§5.3). Moreover, money, as such, is not an artefact. Perhaps the concept of money
is something like the concept of a recession. No one need have any conception
of a recession for there to be a recession. But dollars are plausibly not like this.
Of course, a dollar bill has various complex properties in virtue of poorly
understood relations to the banking sector, but these need not be what makes the
piece of paper a dollar bill. Second, on my account of artefacts, one should expect
certain kinds of widespread ignorance about artefacts. Since I make this point in
chapter five, I’ll say no more about it here.
5.3 Not all artefacts
Epstein (2015) has stressed that attempts to give unified accounts of whole
swathes of the social landscape often suffer by failing to comprehend the
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intricacies of particular cases of social construction. He suggests that just as in
biology where some kinds are teleonomic and others are just causal role
functions, we should expect to find artefacts which are defined just by causal
role. Elder (2007) has stressed the importance of attending to continuities
between natural kinds and artefactual kinds. For example, beaver dams could be
described as artefacts, but beaver dams seem to be more a manifestation of
beaver biology than intention. Perhaps some of our human artefacts have a
nature which reflects a biological function rather than the content of our own
person-level intentions. Relatedly, Sperber (2007) has pointed out that human
made biological artefacts are ubiquitous (e.g. cats, many trees and flowers, many
types of fruit, seedless grapes, etc.). As noted above, the characters of such
artefacts are not dependent on human mental representations. Finally, Lowe
(2014) argues that technical artefacts (e.g. machines) depend not on human
intentions, but on mind-independent natural laws which govern their operation.
Throughout I have been working towards the notion of an essentially
communicative artefact. Strictly speaking, I don’t need an entirely general
account of artefacts as long as I can understand the class of artefacts to which
words belong, since that is the focus of this thesis. Along the way, I’ve defended
intentionalism about various kinds of artefacts including things like hammers and
wheelbarrows. I do indeed think that intentionalism is a plausible account of the
characters of these artefacts but I also recognise the kind of challenge posed by
less intellectualised approaches to social ontology. What I have most confidence
in is that the intentionalist approach is right for a certain class of symbolic
artefacts – the ECAs – and in particular for words. In this chapter I have
presented a plausible theory of how a material object comes to constitute an
artefact of a given kind in virtue of (typically) structural features which
communicate an artisan’s intentions regarding that object. One of the reasons
I’m sceptical that a biological/teleological approach could be right for these
public, communicative artefacts is that the association of, say, the cross above a
church door and the intended purpose of the building is entirely arbitrary.
Similarly, the formal features of words are only arbitrarily associated with their
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linguistic functions. As Millikan (2003) notes, this kind of arbitrariness marks a
disanalogy with biological kinds.
6. CONCLUSION
I began this chapter by characterising artefacts as objects which are intentionally
made and which have at least some intended features. Some such artefacts are
essentially intentional artefacts. That is, they depend constitutively and not just
causally on their creators’ intentions. Curium atoms are artefacts but not
essentially intentional ones. Within the essentially intentional artefacts, some are
essentially communicative artefacts. These are associated with a distinctive mechanism
of mental/social construction involving the intended recognisability of the
artisan’s intentions. Hammers are essentially intentional artefacts, but not
essentially communicative ones. Examples of ECAs include chess pawns, traffic
lights, and – as I will argue in the next chapter – words.
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CHAPTER 2: WORDS AS ARTEFACTS
The first chapter presented an account of an important class of artefacts. I’ve
been calling such artefacts ECAs, short for essentially communicative artefacts. This
chapter applies the account of ECAs to words.
In §1 I show how to apply the account developed in chapter one to the case of
words, and point out some of the advantages of the view, namely that there is a
deep and fruitful analogy between ECAs and words, and that the view offers a
neat explanation of widespread intuitions about swamp words, minimal creation
and exaptation. In addition, I argue that the ECA view can be embedded within
the philosophy of science and mind associated with generative linguistics in a way
which recruits extra support for the view.
In §2 I address two major objections which hold, for one reason or another, that
the intentions my story needs to get off the ground are not available. In response,
I argue that even spontaneous, everyday speech is intentional - perhaps not in a
full-blooded conscious and deliberative sense, but in a way which is analogous to
playing a musical instrument, and which contrasts with e.g. what’s going on in
your immune system. Subsequently, I attempt to leverage insights arising from
generative linguistics in the account of speakers’ linguistic intentions.
In §3 I indicate the kind of approach to questions of word individuation which is
suggested by the ECA view of words.
In §4 I deal with problem cases such as malapropisms, word-producing machines
and accidental word production, ignorant artisans, and involuntary speech as well
as a range of other objections.
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1. APPLYING THE ACCOUNT TO WORDS
1.1 A fruitful analogy
If someone accepts the account of ECAs presented in the first chapter, then they
are likely to feel tempted to apply the account to linguistic entities such as words.
Indeed, words might seem to be paradigmatic examples of such artefacts. Applying
the Thomassonian account to wedding rings and chess pawns on the one hand,
and words on the other yields similar theoretical virtues and leads to similar
problems with similar solutions. Moreover, there’s a reason why the account is
well-suited to words. ECAs have a symbolic or communicative function: they are
in some sense language like. This is what makes the account well suited to words
as well as non-linguistic artefacts such as sirens, shop fronts, etc. In short, part of
the appeal of the ECA account of words is that there is a deep and fruitful
analogy between words and other (non-linguistic) artefacts. To the extent that
the ECA account is the right theory for such artefacts, there is some prima facie
plausibility to the idea that words are ECAs.
1.2 Swamp words, minimal creation, exaptation
Further support for the ECA view of words accrues from its ability to explain
fairly widespread responses to certain kinds of thought experiments. Consider
the following two cases:
(i) A swamp emits a gaseous belch that sounds just like the word ‘lake’.
(ii) On a distant planet which has never been visited by any intelligent life forms
there is a lake, and near the lake there is a rock whose surface has eroded in such
a way that it is an intrinsic duplicate of some Earthly carving of the word ‘lake’.
Do the scenarios described in (i) and (ii) feature genuine tokens of the word
‘lake’? I have a clear intuition that they do not, and anecdotal evidence suggests
that I am not alone. Moreover, similar intuitions have been widely expressed in
philosophy of language (references below). It appears to be part of the concept
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of a word that its instances are products of intentional human activity. This, it is
worth emphasising, is exactly what the ECA theory of words predicts. But why,
we might ask, should this intuitive, everyday notion of words be taken seriously?
Why should we pay any more attention to folk-linguistics than physicists pay to
folk-physics? In response, attending to the ordinary conception of words is
appropriate if what we’re doing is trying to make sense of everyday conceptions
of language as an aspect of human culture, and if we assume that the beliefs and
intentions of ordinary language users can be partially constitutive of social-level
linguistic phenomena. Thomasson, in her various papers on artefacts, explores
the idea that the folk are – taken as a whole – protected from massive error
regarding certain aspects of the social world. As Searle (1995:32) puts it, with
regard to certain social facts, “you can’t fool all the people all the time.” If that is
right, then careful conceptual analysis can be an appropriate guide to the theorist
of social phenomena.
We can describe the phenomena in (i) and (ii) as swamp words. According to the
ECA view swamp words are not words at all (just as fake money is not money
and toy ducks are not ducks). To these cases of swamp words we can add a
further case:
(iii) Suppose that human pioneers arrive on the planet. They notice the rock and
comment on the coincidence. There even appears to be an arrow shaped
indentation pointing the way from the rock to the lake. Then they make a
decision: they decide to treat the naturally occurring rock as a sign. The
improvised signpost goes on to serve generations of settlers looking for an out-
of-the-way swimming spot.
My intuition is that once the human pioneers have decided to treat the eroded
rock as a sign, or perhaps a little later when the community starts to believe that
the rock is a sign, the rock really is a sign. What has changed? The physical
properties of the eroded rock do not change. It is not necessary for anyone to
modify the eroded rock by tidying up one of the letters or underlining it. What
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change are the beliefs and intentions of humans. Case (iii) is an example of
minimal creation (discussed in the previous chapter), whereby a natural object is
transformed into an artefact with intentional features by what appears to be a
pure act of will.
All of this suggests that speaker intentions play a constitutive role with respect to
word utterances. Similar cases have been described in print before. Putnam
(1981:1-5) describes a case in which an ant crawling in the sand happens to trace
a likeness of the words ‘Winston Churchill’. He notes that, intuitively, the lines
left in the sand do not represent Winston Churchill. On the other hand, if the
lines had been traced by a human being who had seen Churchill and had the skill
write in English, and if they had intended for their creation to represent
Churchill, then the lines would have represented Churchill. The lesson, for
Putnam, is that for a physical object such as an inscription or an acoustic blast
produced during speech to represent another object, it is necessary that it be
intended to do so:
[S]uppose the line had the shape WINSTON CHURCHILL. And
suppose this was just accident (ignoring the improbability
involved). Then the ‘printed shape’ WINSTON CHURCHILL
would not have represented Churchill, although that printed shape
does represent Churchill when it occurs in almost any book today.
So it may seem that what is necessary for representation, or what is
mainly necessary for representation, is intention. (Putnam, 1981:2)
A discourse on paper might seem to be a perfect description of
trees, but if it was produced by monkeys randomly hitting keys on a
typewriter for millions of years, then the words do not refer to
anything. (Putnam, 1981:4)
The case of the monkey and the typewriter introduces a wrinkle which I will iron
out in the objections below (§4.2). For now, just concentrate on the ant trail
which looks like an inscription of the words ‘Winston Churchill’. I share
Putnam’s intuition that the ant trail does not represent Churchill, but I also think
the thought experiment supports the view that the ant trail isn’t even a word. In
the quotation above, Putnam appears to allow that the monkeys on typewriters
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do produce tokens of English words. It’s just that they don’t refer to anything
(because they were not created with the intention that they refer to anything.)
Stebbing’s distinction between a mark and a mark-as-used expresses something
like the same point as that made by Putnam, but she, like me, draws the
conclusion that unintended objects cannot be word tokens:
A spoken token-word is a sound to which someone has attached a
meaning. A sound is not a word unless someone has attached a
meaning to that sound. (Stebbing, 1935:11)
Here, Stebbing is assuming that having a meaning is essential to being a token of
a word. This is not obviously true: there could potentially be token words which
do not have a meaning, such as grammatical words, interjections, frivolous words
like ‘jabberwock’, or a list of made-up words such as ‘blarg’ which are expected
to be used to name as yet undiscovered sub-atomic particles or galaxies. I think
that what the thought experiments strictly support is that in order to be a word
token, an utterance has to be the product of some human intention, not that it
has to have some intended meaning.
I think that this intentional criterion succeeds in drawing a line between genuine
word tokens and non-tokens in a sharp and intuitive way. (Various putative
counterexamples will be discussed and defused in §4).
Dennett (1990) objects to intentionalism about artefacts (and specifically about
words), claiming that creator intentions cannot be as important as the account
makes them out to be because artefacts can be repurposed by later users. Such
phenomena were described in chapter one (§2.2) as cases of exaptation. The
crucial thing is to recognise that using an artefact can be a kind of minimal
creation, where an existing artefact is recreated as a new artefact of a different
kind in virtue of the creative intentions of the user. We can imagine that a
Swedish inscription of ‘god’ (which is etymologically unrelated to the English
word ‘god’, and means good) could be removed from its original context and used
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in an inscription in English of ‘a Roman god’. Plausibly, in its new context the
inscription is a token of the English word ‘god’. It now has a different set of
linguistic features from that intended by the original creator of the inscription.
Still, we can describe the creation of the English inscription as a case of minimal
creation. In virtue of the intentions of the artisan of the English inscription, what
was an inscription of a Swedish word becomes an instance of a new artefactual
kind – the English word, ‘god’. In light of discussions in chapter one, we can
reply to Dennett as follows: the intentionalist approach to artefacts predicts that
exaptation can occur and explains it in terms of minimal creation, a phenomenon
for which there is already a precedent among non-linguistic artefacts.
1.3 Bringing the internalist and externalist perspectives together
Some of the advantages of the ECA theory of words have already been
advertised. For one thing, I’ve suggested that there is a deep and fruitful analogy
between words and other ECAs such as traffic lights, coins, wedding rings, etc. If
someone accepts that there are ECAs at all, then they may be tempted to regard
words as ECAs. Relatedly, viewing words as ECAs helps explain intuitions about
swamp words, minimal creation and exaptation. In this sub-section I’m going to
suggest that the ECA view receives additional support from insights in generative
linguistics.
This is a claim which requires extreme caution. After all, generative linguistics is
strongly associated with many forceful critiques of public language. To be clear,
my claim is not that generative linguistic theory requires the articulation of an ECA
theory of words. What I mean is the following. First, the ECA theory of words is
compatible with a non-revisionary interpretation of generative linguistic theory.
Second, the ECA theory of words can be fruitfully embedded within the
philosophy of science and mind which animates generative linguistics. Third, the
best Chomskian critiques of public language are those which assume something
like my ECA theory of words. Attributing this assumption makes these critiques
plausible and pertinent. These critiques do not motivate any kind of
eliminativism regarding words construed as ECAs. Rather, they recommend
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shifting theoretical attention away from such artefacts an inwards upon the
natural features of human mind/brains. The nature of the Chomskian critiques
of public language is the topic of chapter five, so we can set them aside for now.
Let me explain why I think my ECA view is in harmony with theorising in
generative linguistics. The linguist insists that their focus is on cognitive states of
individuals, not on some mind-external linguistic reality. This focus is on
cognitive states which are invariable across changes in the physical signal. So, for
example, there is a linguistic state associated with the sentence ‘cows eat grass’
which is invariable whether or not one is confronted by an inscription, or an
utterance, or one is just thinking ‘cows eat grass’ in interior monologue. Whether
or not some acoustic blast or patch of ink is a token of ‘cows eat grass’ cannot be
determined just by inspecting the acoustic blast. Being a token of ‘cows eat grass’
is not a property of the blast qua blast. Instead, speakers project linguistic
properties on to externalia.
Collins (2010:48-50) (whose work we will return to in chapter five) makes
remarks to the effect that externalia “are invested with linguistic significance,”
and that the language faculty enables the “projection of structure onto sounds
and marks.” The point of his discussion is precisely to show why a naturalistic
perspective on language will pursue an internalist approach: the source of
linguistic properties, the story goes, lies in mental structures; to the extent that
externalia can be viewed as having linguistic significance, this is because mental
structure is projected onto them. The trouble is, at this point, talk of “projection”
is highly metaphorical. What exactly is “projection”? Does it result in the creation
of a new kind of (mind-external) entity? Under what conditions? Is this a
phenomenon which is restricted to language, or does it occur in non-linguistic
domains as well?
Without doubt, Collins would reply that there is no need to settle any of these
questions from the perspective of generative linguistic theory. Exactly right.
Whether we take seriously the idea that externalia really do have linguistic
75
properties in virtue of some kind of “projection” is of no consequence for the
internalist approach in the cognitive sciences of language. But one way of
construing the relation between the ECA theory of words and standard
assumptions in generative linguistics is to see the former as providing a
substantial account of the notion of “projection” as it is informally used in
linguistic theory. My position is that the projection of linguistic properties onto
externalia is just another case of making something – an artefact – and that the
ways in which an utterance acquires linguistic properties is analogous to the ways
ECAs get their distinctive characteristics.
Recall that, on my account, a chess pawn is what it is roughly because it is
intended to be used in a certain way on a chess board. No physical analysis of
chess pawns could reveal what makes them pawns independently of the beliefs
and intentions of humans. We could say that a certain kind of chess-significance
is projected onto inanimate pieces of wood. In short, the ECA theory of artefacts
involves an account of how minds can impose properties on inanimate objects in
a way which seems tailor made to explain the linguist’s notion of “projection” of
linguistic properties on externalia.
Sadly, it appears that I am not the first person to think of this marriage of
linguistic theory with the idea that human intentions can project properties onto
inanimate objects. Barber summarises his approach to these matters as follows:
This approach takes the mental representations that are instanced
during the performance or perception of an utterance to represent
real aspects of the event, i.e. actual linguistic entities and features,
including referential features; but this reality is constituted of
intersubjective intentions rather than acoustics. A PRO (and not
just your representation of a PRO), for example, genuinely figures
in the event that is your uttering Mary told John to eat. It does so by
virtue of your (tacitly) intending your audience to represent the
utterance-event as instancing PRO, though not in the sense that
you intend PRO to be audible in the acoustic stream… For you to
intend your audience to interpret your act as instancing PRO is for
that utterance to instance PRO… And if a hearer represents the
utterance-event as instancing a PRO, or a reference to food
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ingestion, she does so correctly, since your intending her to do so
(assuming for simplicity that she is your intended audience) is what
it is for the utterance-event to have these linguistic characteristics.
Our internal representations are thus subject to the bar of mind-
external, or at least intersubjective, reality, and to that extent are
representations properly so-called. (Barber, 2013:974)
Barber seems to imply that intending for an utterance to instance PRO is
sufficient for an utterance to instance PRO. That cannot be quite right, and it
can’t be quite what he means either, since he writes elsewhere:
[T]he acoustic stream…cannot have a particular syntax solely
because the utterer intends it to do so... Something extra must
happen… [I]n order for a hearer to understand a speaker, she must
recognize which sentence the speaker intended the hearer to treat
as the object of interpretation. This is an epistemic claim, but there
is nothing to prevent us from supposing that a constitutive fact
underpins it, namely, that the identity of the sentence uttered turns
on the intention of the speaker to be recognized by his or her
audience as having produced that sentence. (Barber, 2006:27-28)
This view is strikingly like my own. Nevertheless, Barber’s treatment of the view
leaves many questions unanswered. Chief among these is the objection that the
kinds of mental states posited in linguistics are too ‘thin’ to count as intentions.
This is one of the problems to be dealt with in the next section.
Summarising, I believe that my ECA theory of words is precisely that which a
Chomskian ought to adopt, if they care at all about language as a mind-external
phenomenon. They are not obliged to care. They are already doing good work on
the nature of I-language and theorists do not have to be interested in everything.
But there is no incompatibility here. Chomskians can allow that we have person-
level beliefs and intentions about language. They can allow that linguistic
properties are “projected” onto externalia. Adopting this view does not prevent
them from pursuing the internalistic inquiry. In fact it agrees with them that an
internalistic inquiry is the correct way to explain facts about public language. The
main differences between me and the public language deniers are these:
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(i) While generative linguistics quite rightly aims for integration with
neurobiology, I believe we should also pursue integration between generative
linguistics and the social sciences.
(ii) Generative linguistics, again quite rightly, seeks to get theoretical traction by
abstracting away from many of the details about public language, and a major
part of the Chomskian critique of public is just a sceptical attitude towards the
prospects for making any real progress with inquiries into messy, social-level
domains. Against this methodological scepticism, I would urge that ECA words
can be fruitfully studied from a social scientific perspective.
All of this will be explained at greater length in chapter five. In this section I have
been sketching the features of the ECA account of words and extolling some of
its virtues. In the next section I discuss two major lines of resistance to this
approach.
2. INTENDING WORDS
In my experience of presenting these kinds of views to philosophers, there is a
single worry which is always raised in various forms. It concerns the plausibility
of the claim that word production is a genuinely intentional activity.
One form of this objection targets the idea just introduced that we can treat the
mental states posited in linguistic theorising as something like intentions, and as
being responsible for imbuing externalia with linguistic properties.
A different kind of objection is that ordinary speech can appear spontaneous and
unreflective in a way which strains the description of utterances as artefacts
shaped by intention. Take the words a person utters when they ask for the bus
ticket which they buy every single day, or when they excitedly relate the details of
some anecdote. Do speakers form an intention to produce every single word
token that they do produce? We might feel that speaking – or at least the aspect
78
of speaking which consists in producing words – is something we do
automatically, without paying too much attention.
I will tackle the second kind of objection in §2.1. This presents an opportunity to
discuss the kinds of intentions which could play the required role in a theory of
artefacts. Then in the rest of this section I’ll give the background to the first kind
of objection and explain my response.
A third kind of objection is that it is possible to imagine a host of problem cases
and apparent counter-examples to the idea that word production is always
intentional. These cases include malapropisms, word-producing machines,
apparently involuntary speech, and the like. These kinds of objections will be
considered along with other objections to the ECA view in §4 of this chapter.
2.1 Speedy and spontaneous intentions
According to the ECA view of words, language use is an intentional activity.
Speaking, signing and writing are things that we do as agents. To a certain extent
we do them consciously and on purpose and we typically have reasons for doing
them. We can also be held responsible for speaking the way we do or for not
speaking when we should. In other words, people have person level thoughts,
beliefs and intentions regarding their utterances, and they typically intend to utter
the words they do. But people typically regard speech as a fairly spontaneous
activity, and one which is engaged in by small children. It is therefore worth
making a case for the claim that speech is intentional under verbal descriptions.
This is important because it is a precondition on the account offered in chapter
one that our verbal activity be describable as intentional. Speakers could not
intentionally impose certain linguistic features on their utterances if uttering was
not an intentional activity.
Heck (2006:2) agrees that speaking is an intentional activity, but notes that
“[s]aying that speech is a form of rational (or intentional) action leaves open the
question under what descriptions it is intentional.” A single speech event could
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be described as telling a student they’ve passed a test, saying the words ‘you’ve
passed,’ using pulmonary pressure to vibrate the focal folds, etc. The question is
where to draw the line between the intentional and the unintentional aspects of
speech. Heck argues that speech is rational under verbal descriptions such as
saying the words, ‘it’s raining.’ In this sub-section I’m going to follow Heck’s
argument for this conclusion.
In the first part of his paper, Heck argues that speech is typically intentional
under a propositional description:
[S]peech—or, more generally, our use of language—is intentional
under propositional descriptions, such as: saying that p. So, to
return to the example I used earlier, when I tell my wife that I love
her, saying that I love her is something I do; my utterance is
intentional under that description. (Heck, 2006:12)
In the second part he goes after a different claim, that speech is intentional under
a verbal description:
But this description of the action is not the only one under which
it is intentional. It is also intentional under verbal descriptions, such
as: uttering the sentence “I love you”. Heck (2006:12)
To argue for this Heck introduces a thought experiment involving people who
are just like us except that their speech is not intentional under any verbal
description (although it is intentional under a propositional description). What
we have to do is imagine people who are as much like us as possible except that
their speech is not intentional under any verbal description. If the people who
are like that are not like us, the argument presumably goes, then our speech is
intentional under some verbal description. That is, if in order to clearly imagine
people whose speech is not intentional under such a description, we have to
imagine people who are different from ourselves, then our speech must be
describable under intentional descriptions, because otherwise we would have to
have whatever feature it is that the imagined people have which means that their
speech cannot be described that way (or lack the feature they lack).
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Heck thinks that such people would be quasi-telepaths. A quasi-telepath can tell
someone it’s raining just by intending to tell them. That’s all they have to do.
After that some non-intentional mechanisms trigger various events in the
subject’s vocal apparatus which emits a sound which sounds to you and me just
like the words ‘it’s raining’ but the quasi-telepaths are stone deaf to the
frequencies of human speech, so they don’t hear anything, but it doesn’t matter
because quasi-telepaths don’t need to hear the acoustic signal. They have auditory
organs which process the sound below the level of consciousness and simply
deliver to the subject the thought that it’s raining. They have no awareness of
moving their mouths to utter words, nor of hearing any utterances.
Communication between quasi-telepaths, Heck (2006:13) tells us “would be like
telepathy: it would seem to them as if communication were purely between their
minds.”
We’re clearly not quite like the quasi-telepaths. One difference is that their vocal
and auditory apparatus doesn’t work like ours. We can hear our own utterances
and those of our interlocutors, and speakers recognise that they and their
interlocutors have uttered certain words. So it feels different to be a telepath, and
being a telepath means lacking some knowledge of one’s environment – the
words being uttered in it – which we ordinarily take ourselves to have. Heck is
claiming that one of the key differences between us and the telepaths is that they
are not conscious of their verbal behaviour. It is because of this that the quasi-
telepaths’ verbal behaviour is not intentional. How could they intend to produce
an utterance of ‘cat’ when they have no experience of utterances and no
conception of the role they play in communication? The role played by
utterances in communication is as epistemically hidden from them as the role of
the antibodies in our immune systems is hidden from us. What do you have to do
to turn a quasi-telepath into a normal speaker? Roughly, you have to give them a
conscious awareness of their utterances and their linguistic properties and the
ability to decide how to use words.
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On the basis of these kinds of contrasts with the quasi-telepaths, Heck
concludes that:
These reflections suggest that speech is not only intentional under
verbal descriptions but that it is by uttering a sentence that we say
something. This remark is not intended simply as one about the
causal structure of communication. Taken that way, it would apply
equally to the quasi-telepaths I discussed above: Communication as
they have it also depends upon the production and reception of
sound; in a purely causal sense, they say things by uttering things,
too. What distinguishes us from them is that, in a rational (not just
a causal) sense, we say things by uttering things. (Heck, 2006:14)
The key notion here is that we can rationalise speakers’ behaviour under verbal
descriptions: the speaker says the words ‘it’s raining’ because they want to say it’s
raining and know that ‘it’s raining’ means it’s raining. But we can’t do that for the
quasi-telepaths because they aren’t even aware of their utterances.13 For Heck,
the key contrast between us and the quasi-telepaths is that we are aware, as they
are not, of the meanings of our word utterances, and we have rational control
over the utterances we produce. For us then, uttering a word is something that
can be evaluated from a rational point of view. If a speaker utters a word we can
expect that they mean something by it and that they want to express the thing
that the word means.
The conclusion of the argument is modest: language users know things about
words, principally – for Heck – what they mean. We might add that people also
know other things about words, such as how they should sound, what makes a
good rhyme, and how to use them in combination with other words. And people
do things with words, like describe things, think out loud, make promises, give
orders, cajole, reassure, entertain, name ships, cause offence, abuse other people,
etc. The conclusion may be modest but its significance for the theory of
13 (Heck (2006:15) also notes that the quasi-telepaths “do not utter sentences at all (though noises do get
made)” Is Heck claiming – like me – that having certain word-features by intention is essential to being an
utterance of a word? He repeatedly states (Heck, 2006:4,13) that the connection between intentions and
word utterances is something he is defending on empirical, observational grounds. But the empirical
claim that we have intentions towards our word utterances does not entail that the natures of our
utterances depend constitutively on those intentions. On my view, the reason why the quasi-telepaths do
not produce utterances at all is that since they have no intentions regarding their word utterances (being
congenitally unaware of their existence), their utterances do not have any intended features.
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communication is great. Dressing it up in slightly grandiose language we might
express the idea as follows: our verbal behaviour – unlike the behaviour of our
immune systems – is person-level behaviour; it is in the realm of human
intentional activity, free will and rationality.
The worry mentioned earlier can now be appreciated in full relief. Heck is telling
us that saying words is an intentional activity requiring conscious knowledge of
the meanings of words and their possibilities for combining with each other.
Some people will worry that this is implausible. After all, speech is often very
speedy, spontaneous and unreflective, and small children are good talkers. The
idea behind the objection is thus that it requires too much cognitive
sophistication on the part of ordinary language users. If a reply cannot be found,
then there is no room to extend the ECA account of artefacts to words, because
the kinds of intentions which are characteristic of artefact production are simply
not available.
I think the solution to this problem is to allow that the sense of intention which
is required for artefactual creation may be less full-blooded than the intentions
we ascribe to a great chess player moving a pawn. That full-blooded notion of
intention may be correctly applicable to the intentions of the chess player putting
their opponent in check in a prestigious match, or a surgeon removing a kidney.
Such activities are highly deliberate and involve conscious decisions and
inferences. But many things we would be prepared to call actions don’t have
those features, or, at least, not in quite such a full blooded way.
People sometimes report a sensation of realising that they have been driving on
‘autopilot’, as if they were not consciously, intentionally controlling the car.
Though there may be a contrast between the mentality of such a driver and that
of the chess player, it would be too much to say that the actions of turning the
car around corners and stopping at traffic lights are entirely unintentional. Even
in the case of the surgeon or the chess player, their actions will likely be guided
by beliefs and desires which they are not fully conscious of. For example, the
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surgeon is presumably so experienced that they may avoid certain pitfalls and
errors with the scalpel without consciously thinking about those dangers. That
doesn’t mean that their skilful moves with the scalpel are unintentional.
Even more illuminating analogies are to be found in the form of playing the
piano, slip catching in the sport of cricket or touch typing. (Happily, the last
example here is one which involves producing tokens of words, albeit written
ones.) The actions of a proficient pianist, sportsperson or typist have the
spontaneity and rapidity which is characteristic of speech. They do contrast with
the deliberate actions of the chess player or surgeon, but they contrast yet more
sharply with events in the immune system such as selecting an antibody to deal
with a certain microbe. The cricketer catches the ball intentionally, even though
they only had a split second in which to react. If they dropped it, they were
nonetheless trying to catch it. Did the typist deliberately hit the keys in a certain
sequence? The natural answer to this is ‘yes’. Did they deliberately select a certain
antibody to fight off a microbe? Of course not. Catching a ball, and hitting
certain keys on the keyboard of a piano or typewriter are things that people do.
They are not events over which they personally have no control. I think speech is
the same. The way speakers use words may be spontaneous and speedy and may
not involve conscious deliberation, but it is intentional activity nonetheless.
In an attempt to characterise the nature of the mental states underlying actions
which are intentional, though perhaps less than fully conscious, Heck selects an
example from ordinary life:
If I walk to the refrigerator and open the door, what explains my
doing so may be my wanting a beer and my believing that there are
beers in the fridge. And if someone asks me why I opened the
refrigerator, that is just the sort of thing I might say: I and others
explain my actions by adverting to such beliefs and desires; we do
so rightly, even if my mind was elsewhere at the time. The point is
one that ought to be familiar: The correctness of this sort of
rational explanation does not depend upon the agent’s awareness
of his own practical reasoning (though it may depend upon his
having conscious access to his reasons). (Heck, 2006:9)
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He explains that a similar point applies to verbal behaviour:
[I]f one asks why Smith uttered the sentence “The meeting begins
at 4pm”, the question may be answered as follows: Smith wanted to
say that the meeting began at 4pm, and he knew that the sentence
“The meeting begins at 4pm” meant that the meeting began at 4pm
and so that, if he uttered that sentence in that context, he could
thereby say that the meeting began at 4pm…[I]n offering this sort
of explanation of Smith’s utterance, I do not mean to suggest that
Smith must consciously have engaged in any such reasoning.
Sometimes we do; more usually, we do not. That fact does not
undermine the claim that what explains Smith’s uttering what he
did is his having the sorts of beliefs and desires mentioned. (Heck,
2006:15)
Heck’s suggestion seems to be that the notion of intentional action may require
conscious access to one’s reasons without requiring conscious, occurrent
knowledge of them at the point of acting. Heck remarks that:
[T]he word “conscious” is significant. It is notoriously slippery, as
well, and I would gladly use an alternative if only I could think of
one. I use it mainly in contrast with “tacit”. (Heck, 2006:10)
In other words, the appeal to conscious accessibility should not be taken to imply
full-blooded consciousness on the ordinary understanding of the word. Instead
the role of the requirement that one’s intentional activity be guided by reasons to
which one has conscious access is mainly to steer clear of the notion of tacit
knowledge, a notion which has picked up technical connotations in philosophy.
‘Tacit knowledge’ and ‘implicit knowledge’ are pieces of philosophical jargon.
Sometimes they get used to talk about phenomena which are only distantly
related, if at all, to common sense understandings of knowledge. For example,
Evans (1981), accepts that speakers have tacit knowledge of a semantic theory
for their language, but denies that this involves attributions of genuine
propositional knowledge of the theory. Evans’s account requires only that the
inferential structure of a theory mirror the structure of the causal states
responsible for meaning attributions:
85
Tacit knowledge of the syntactic and semantic rules of the
language are not states of the same kind as we identify in our
ordinary use of the terms ‘belief ’ and ‘knowledge’… Such
concepts as we use in specifying it are not concepts we need to
suppose the subject to possess… There is thus no question of
regarding the information [as] being brought by the subject to bear
upon speech and interpretation in rational processes of thought.
[The notion that knowledge of the syntactic and semantic rules of
the language] is a real species of belief, but with all the relevant
inferential processes made by the subject somehow taking place
outside his ken…is certainly a mysterious and confused position.
(Evans, 1981:133-134)
In short, what seems to be characteristic intentional action, on Heck’s view, is
that an event be explainable in terms of a genuine propositional attitude, a
contentful mental state, on the part of the agent. Such a state need not be fully,
occurrently conscious, but it should be the kind of thing that one could bring to
consciousness if prompted in the right way. To say that we have knowledge of
language in this sense is a much stronger claim than to say we have tacit
knowledge of language is Evans’s sense. That kind of tacit knowledge is far too
weak to enter into an account of intentional action.
It is still possible to dispute the idea that verbal behaviour is intentional and
based on conscious knowledge in the way Heck suggests. As noted, small
children and people who have never heard of a noun can be competent speakers
and word producers. How can such people intend that an utterance be
recognisable as a e.g. singular count noun? However, the fact that someone lacks the
vocabulary to express their reasons cogently doesn’t prevent them from being
the reasons which explain their actions. The idea that we have propositional
attitudes and intentions regarding words which are consciously accessible (and
much richer than ‘tacit’ attitudes) does not entail an ability to articulate that
knowledge.
2.2 Mental representation in linguistics
In the previous sub-section I worked up a kind of deflated sense of intention
which seems to be sufficient for intentional action and which seems to accurately
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characterise our verbal behaviour. This means we can now pursue Barber’s
suggestion that the states posited in generative linguistics can be leveraged in an
intentionalist account of words. Is it plausible that, as Barber suggests, speakers
intend an utterance to feature an instance of PRO? In line with the previous sub-
section, if the suggestion is to work, the PRO-regarding intention will have to be
contentful and accessible to conscious though not necessarily easily articulable. (I
don’t think Barber would contest this. Recall that he says the mental states which
imbue externalia with linguistic properties must be “representations properly so-
called.”)
Bromberger and Halle (2000) tell us that a phonologist’s theoretical
representation of the phonological event which occurs when a speaker utters a
token of ‘the merchant sold shelves’ is a description of a set of intentions on the
part of the speaker. For example, in the derivation which Bromberger and Halle
provide, each letter of the International Phonetic Alphabet which features in the
final line of the derivation stands for a cluster of articulatory intentions.
Bromberger and Halle
(2000:23)
They write:
My production of event (1) [an utterance of ‘the merchant sold
shelves] was an action. Like other actions, it was therefore brought
about by a distinctive kind of mental set – something we will call
an INTENTION. But this term, as we use it, is not to be taken
altogether literally. We use it to refer to a familiar kind of purposive
mental stance… The uttering of [the sentence ‘the merchant sold
shelves’], like the aiming of a rifle, also required a distinctive mind-
set, distinctive intentions on my part, intentions that I could not
have formed without certain pre-existing intellectual capacities…
We construe [a structural description of a string in terms of
phonological features] as standing for a series of intentions that
generated [certain articulatory] movements. Each letter…stands for
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such an intention, and each of these intentions called for an
arrangement of articulators in the expectation of distinctive
auditory effects. The m [in a theoretical description of the cognitive
state associated with an utterance of ‘the merchant sold shelves’]
represents an intention to act so as to produce a specific
ENGLISH SPEECH SOUND. (Bromberger and Halle, 2000:23-
24)
The parallels between, on the one hand, Bromberger’s and Halle’s conception of
the role of phonological intentions in the production of speech, and the kinds
of mental activity which underlie musical or sporting performance are striking: as
noted above, such mental activity is speedy and spontaneous, and less than fully
conscious; Bromberger and Halle (2000:35) observe in relation to phonological
behaviour, “speakers are not aware of performing such actions. But then we
perform many actions like zombies.” Bromberger and Halle hint that they might
share my view that speakers’ linguistic intentions play a role in fixing the
linguistic properties of utterances, shaping them not just causally but also
constitutively:
Spoken or subvocally produced tokens are transitory events that are
finite in number, that occur in time and space, that can be
perceived, that are shaped by their speaker’s occurrent intentions,
and that are subject to norms fixed in their speakers’ mental make-
up. (Bromberger and Halle, 2000:20)
Such a view would harmonise with and enrich the intentionalist proposal
recommended in this thesis. One problem is that what Bromberger and Halle
and Barber call ‘intentions’ are rather unlike intentions as they are ordinarily
conceived. As discussed above, there is a sense in which one can act intentionally
without any conscious awareness of one’s intentions, but the idea that speakers
could intend for their utterance to instance PRO seems to stretch the point too
far. Though the insights of generative linguistics are sometimes presented via
slogans which talk about ‘knowledge of language,’ Chomsky and others
(Jackendoff, 2002, Pylyshyn, 1988, Collins, 2005, 2008, Egan, 2003, 2012, 2014)
have asserted that such talk is loose talk, suitable only for informal presentation
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of the view.14 A grammar drawn up by a linguist is intended to model an aspect
of cognitive competence, but the relation between the grammar and the
cognitive states themselves may be more abstract than many philosophers have
thought. It may be no part of the theory to claim that a grammar is known to
language users or that the concepts of the grammatical theory are concepts
which individual speakers possess. To model a cognitive capacity of an individual
using a theory described in terms of phonemes, for example, is not necessarily to
say that the individual has the concept phoneme, or has thoughts or beliefs about
phonemes.
Rey (2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006b, 2012) stops short of insisting that the
theoretical posits of generative linguistics are ordinary knowledge states (on the
grounds that knowledge is not a sufficiently robust notion to enter into serious
scientific theorising), but he defends an interpretation of generative linguistics in
terms of a “computational representational theory of thought”, or CRTT:
CRTTs can be regarded as proposals to treat thought processes as
causal/computational processes defined over representations that
are encoded in our nervous systems on the model of processes in a
computer. Various propositional attitudes, whether they be
knowing, believing, thinking, or cognizing are to be distinguished
by the different causal relations they bear to those representations
as they are processed in the brain’s cognitive architecture. In this
way CRTT promises to provide the “mechanism” many have
sought to link mental and physical phenomena, providing a
mentalistic explanation of rational – as well as of much non-
rational – behavior. (Rey, 2003b:4)
This would mean that the mental states posited by linguists have representational
content. The job of the linguist is to understand what the contents of these
representational states are, how it is that ordinary language users conceive the
14 Not all linguists, it would seem, share this scepticism about the representationalist interpretation. Smith
(1999:139-140) writes that “[a]t the heart of [the Chomskian] account is a computationalist view that
postulates the existence of different kinds of representation and argues that cognition consists in carrying
our computations over them… As with his realism, Chomsky’s representationalism and
computationalism are both construed literally. He talks of “what is actually represented in the mind of an
individual” and writes that “the brain uses such notations as …,”… He further makes the general claim
that the mental systems allow “something akin to deduction as part of their computational character,” a
position which presupposes both representation and computation.”
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linguistic signals around them. However, even this is vigorously denied by
Chomskians. In short, one might object to the attempt to leverage the kinds of
states posited in generative linguistics in the ECA account of words on the basis
that the states posited in linguistic theorising are too thin to be properly
considered as intentional.
This means that Barber’s account is not adequate as it stands. He wants to take a
proposed grammar (a linguist’s theory of an individual’s linguistic competence,
including semantic, syntactic and phonological components) and treat it as a
theory of a speaker’s intentions. But so much of what is studied in linguistics is
completely inaccessible to consciousness and scarcely describable as a person-
level. A person doesn’t consciously obey a C-command constraint any more than a
person produces immunoglobulin to neutralise some pathogen. A lot of linguistics
is about things which just happen in an individual’s mind/brain, rather than being
about what people do.
2.3 Intending and cognizing
Instead of foisting a marginal interpretation on to linguistic theory, forcing I-
language states into the mould of intentions, I suggest we take the posits of
linguistic theory as they are. One thing is for sure, people do have person-level
beliefs and intentions regarding linguistic externalia. Some use of language is
highly conscious, deliberative, even ponderously so. People who write speeches
for presidents, or write novels or PhD theses spend hours agonising over the
precise words and sentences to employ. Also, consider looking a word up in the
dictionary, rehearsing it in your mind to solidify the memory, racking your brains
the next day to recall it, carefully dropping it into a conversation in order to
impress one’s interlocutors, etc. Similarly, consider trying to parse a long sentence
in a Dickens novel, or obsessing over whether a friend’s comment was intended
to create a hurtful implicature.
Nobody who is party to the present debate is denying that such person-level,
conscious states are involved in linguistic performance. Wholesale eliminative
90
materialism about folk-psychological states is not what’s at stake here. Another
point which Chomskians will agree with is that I-language states have got
something to do with person-level beliefs and intentions. Whatever I-language
states are, they’re the kinds of things which have a causal effect on person level
intentions and perceptual states, otherwise it would be impossible to maintain
that person level judgements about utterance acceptability, synonymy, etc.
constitute evidence for the structure of I-language states, an assumption which is
ubiquitous in linguistics.
The problem is not that the cognitive processes which fall within the remit of
generative linguistic theory are unconscious, unintentional, unlike ordinary
propositional knowledge, etc. Some are undoubtedly remote from the states of
folk psychology, but others may be more familiar sounding states including
communicative intentions. Generative linguistic theory is concerned with the
human capacity to pair sounds with meanings over an unbounded range. Some
aspects of this capacity no doubt involve ordinary propositional knowledge
which is consciously accessible, inferentially promiscuous, etc. And many aspects
of linguistic performance involve communicative intentions. But in order to
make progress, theorists are obliged to, as Collins (2010:46) puts it, “fractionate
the phenomena and idealize away from the massive interaction effects that
produce our normal linguistic behaviour.” Linguists want an account of linguistic
cognition, and they make no assumption in advance of inquiry that ordinary
notions such as intention, belief, knowledge will enter into the theory.
This was the point of the old jargon which has it that speakers cognize – as
opposed to know – a language. The purpose of this is to bracket the common
sense associations of words like ‘know’ in order to pursue inquiry into a
stipulated notion which reflects the concerns of theory. The point is that saying
we are studying a subject’s linguistic cognizance is not the same as denying that part
of what we’re studying could be described as ordinary, consciously accessible
knowledge. Strictly speaking, the theory remains neutral on that.
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I think there is a tendency to picture the language faculty as a black box, cut off
from other cognitive systems. In fact, Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch allow that
language “in its broadest sense” may include most of human cognition:
[A] neuroscientist might ask: What components of the human
nervous system are recruited in the use of language in its broadest
sense? Because any aspect of cognition appears to be, at least in
principle, accessible to language, the broadest answer to this
question is, probably, “most of it.” Even aspects of emotion or
cognition not readily verbalized may be influenced by linguistically
based thought processes. (Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch, 2002:1570)
From a biolinguistic perspective, inquiry cannot proceed into “most of” the
human mind/brain. It’s necessary to idealize away from the messy detail of a
whole human mind in order to focus on questions which are precise and which
have some hope of being answered (in a way which is explanatory, rather than
merely descriptive). As Collins, writes:
Any endeavour to gain theoretical traction on this manifold is
obliged to fractionate the phenomena and idealize away from the
massive interaction effects that produce our normal linguistic
behaviour… The first move in this ‘divide and conquer’ direction
in recent times was Chomsky’s (1965) distinction between
competence and performance. A whole range of factors enter into
performance, many of them perfectly general, such as memory,
attention, and communicative intention. Chomsky’s distinction, in
part, was an effort to isolate the hypothesised unique linguistic
system that underlies certain peculiar features of our performance,
and, in the first instance, we are interested in those features simply
because they are the ones that submit to theoretical understanding.
(Collins, 2010:46)
So one way in which linguistics idealises in order to frame a tractable inquiry is to
ignore the communicative intentions which attend specific instances of verbal
behaviour. The focus is on competence – the relatively stable state which
constitutes an individual’s capacity to generate an infinite number of linguistic
expressions. Another way in which linguistics idealises is by stipulating a
distinction between narrow and broad conceptions of the language faculty. To
see this, it is really worth quoting Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch at some length:
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We…delineate two more restricted conceptions of the faculty of
language, one broader and more inclusive, the other more restricted
and narrow. Faculty of language—broad sense (FLB). FLB includes an
internal computational system (FLN, below) combined with at least
two other organism-internal systems, which we call “sensory-
motor” and “conceptual-intentional.” Despite debate on the
precise nature of these systems, and about whether they are
substantially shared with other vertebrates or uniquely adapted to
the exigencies of language, we take as uncontroversial the existence
of some biological capacity of humans that allows us (and not, for
example, chimpanzees) to readily master any human language
without explicit instruction. FLB includes this capacity, but
excludes other organism-internal systems that are necessary but not
sufficient for language (e.g., memory, respiration, digestion,
circulation, etc.). Faculty of language—narrow sense (FLN). FLN is the
abstract linguistic computational system alone, independent of the
other systems with which it interacts and interfaces. FLN is a
component of FLB, and the mechanisms underlying it are some
subset of those underlying FLB… The internal architecture of
FLN, so conceived, is a topic of much current research and debate.
Without prejudging the issues, we will, for concreteness, adopt a
particular conception of this architecture. We assume, putting aside
the precise mechanisms, that a key component of FLN is a
computational system (narrow syntax) that generates internal
representations and maps them into the sensory-motor interface by
the phonological system, and into the conceptual-intentional
interface by the (formal) semantic system… All approaches agree
that a core property of FLN is recursion, attributed to narrow
syntax in the conception just outlined. FLN takes a finite set of
elements and yields a potentially infinite array of discrete
expressions…Each of these discrete expressions is then passed to
the sensory-motor and conceptual-intentional systems, which
process and elaborate this information in the use of language. Each
expression is, in this sense, a pairing of sound and meaning… One
goal of the study of FLN and, more broadly, FLB is to discover
just how the faculty of language satisfies these basic and essential
conditions. (Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch, 2002:1570-1571)
FLN is treated as a specialised module, but one which interfaces with other
cognitive systems (sensorimotor and conceptual/intentional). One way of
thinking about this is that phonology targets the interface between FLN and the
sensorimotor system, while semantics targets the interface with the
conceptual/intentional system.
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How is consciousness distributed across such systems? Well, it’s not for a
linguistic theory to say. ‘Consciousness’ is not assumed to enter into the theory
any more than ‘knowledge’ is. It goes without saying that some FLB states will
involve ordinary, conscious knowledge and communicative intention (e.g. trying
to remember a recently-learned word, or speculating about what someone meant
when they said ‘visiting relatives can be boring’). But whether any aspect of FLN
is accessible to consciousness is difficult to know. My guess is that most of it
isn’t, but that is not something which we can read off from linguistic theory.
None of this is to deny that a competent language user has consciously
accessible knowledge regarding the correct use of an external system of signs.
Nor is it to deny that generative linguistic theory provides insights into such a
person-level capacity. It looks like some of the states targeted in linguistic theory
are impenetrable to consciousness but not all. As a point of methodology,
linguistics just abstracts away from the full detail about what people do and how
they use linguistic externalia and whether the states targeted by the theory could
be described as ordinary states of propositional knowledge.
In short, linguists do not deny that speakers have some ordinary propositional
knowledge of language, or that intention is an important aspect of
communication. Nor do they affirm that linguistics studies something which is
entirely separate from all of that. The question for the ECA account of words,
then, is this: just which aspects of our linguistic behaviour are intentional, and
which are not? This is the topic of the next sub-section.
2.4 Intentional under what descriptions?
I don’t know of any principled way of determining which parts of language use
are intentional, or which involve ordinary conscious knowledge. As noted, this
cannot be read off from linguistic theory, which remains neutral on this point.
One informal way of approaching things is to proceed by example. Drawing on
Heck (2006:13-14) we can immediately give the following examples:
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(i) We are aware that words can be misunderstood. For example, we know that
someone can intend to say that Jones is angry but actually come out with the
words ‘Jones is livid’. There might be someone in the vicinity who knows that
‘livid’ means pale and also that people sometimes get confused about this. In a
quasi-telepath conversation, one person would simply intend to convey that
Jones was angry and one’s interlocutor would grasp that that was what you
intended to convey. There couldn’t be a mismatch of meanings where one
person associates ‘livid’ with angry and another with pale because quasi-telepaths
do not associate meanings with utterances, for they are not aware of utterances.
(ii) We recognise when we and others have misspoken, perhaps by some kind of
“processing error” resulting in a spoonerism or malapropism. If a quasi-telepath
means to convey ‘loving shepherd’ but there is a physiological malfunction and
they produce a sound we would recognise as ‘shoving leopard’ the quasi-telepath
interlocutor would grasp the unintended meaning and would have no idea about
what might have gone wrong.
(iii) We are often aware that our understanding is being impeded by not knowing
the meaning of a neologism or foreign word.
(iv) Sometimes we are unable to resolve an anaphoric ambiguity. If someone
were to tell you that ‘Anne told Brian to cook Carol’s dinner and to tell her when
it was ready,’ you may wonder – quite consciously – whether Anne wanted Brian
to tell her or Carol that the dinner was ready.
(v) If someone says “fighting administrators can be distracting” their interlocutor
might wonder which of two sentences was intended. They might be able to
resolve the ambiguity by attending to pragmatic factors or just by asking. The
speaker will probably be able to say which sentence they intended.
To these examples I would add the practice of creating or choosing between
compound words (‘unputdownability,’ ‘smog,’ ‘publicity’/‘publicness,’ etc.),
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noticing ‘grammatical errors’ in the speech of politicians or second language
learners, noticing the differences in vocabulary and syntax between different
dialects of English, etc. These examples (and those in (i) to (v)) illustrate that
speakers have conscious awareness of a variety of morphological, syntactic,
semantic and pragmatic features.
A slightly different way to approach the question about which aspects of
linguistic behaviour are intentional would be to lean on debates about knowledge
of meaning. The idea that competent speakers of a language know a theory of
meaning has been widely discussed in recent decades. A great deal of discussion
has focussed on the sense in which speakers can be said to know a theory of
meaning. That is, what is at stake is whether semantic competence should be
construed as ordinary propositional knowledge, or something else (such as
Evans’s notion of tacit knowledge, discussed above). Heck (2006), as we
observed above, argues that the rational evaluability of speech acts requires
consciously accessible propositional knowledge of meanings, though in that
paper he remains neutral on exactly what is known. As Barber (2013:965)
explains, it is standardly assumed (i) that knowledge of the meanings of linguistic
expressions is necessary but not sufficient for knowing what is meant by a
particular utterance of that expression, (ii) that the theory of meaning known by
competent speakers is compositional, and (iii) that it takes the form of a
referential theory of truth. If something like this approach is right, then one
aspect of linguistic behaviour which is intentional concerns the intended
referential profile of utterances.
One aspect of linguistic behaviour which we have not broached concerns
phonology. There can be no doubt that a good deal of phonology enters into the
realm of intention and conscious awareness. This is illustrated by our sensitivity
to rhyme and alliteration, the pleasure we take in wordplay and punning, our
ability to make judgements about where someone grew up based on their accent,
or the practice of adopting a prestige accent when speaking on the phone.
Equally, we can become aware that our inability to determine what words have
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been said is due to failing to hear a certain sound. For example, if someone
coughs just when you say the ‘g’ in ‘I’ve bought a goat,’ I may be aware that my
uncertainty about whether you’ve said you’ve bought a goat or a coat stems from
not knowing whether the first sound in the word is a ‘g’ or a ‘c’. Jackendoff adds
the following examples:
[N]otice first of all that we experience language as perceived sound.
We can intuitively divide utterances into words and syllables with
ease (children can count syllables on their fingers by three years of
age). Without too much training, we can even divide the speech
stream pretty well into individual speech sounds; this is an essential
part of learning to read. We have pretty good intuitions about stress
patterns as well: most people can easily say where the main stress of
a word lies, though they may be uncertain about subsidiary stress.
Note however that not all aspects of phonological structure result
in discriminable qualia: the decomposition of speech sounds into
distinctive features is experientially opaque. (Jackendoff, 2007:81)
In sum, it appears plausible that much – but not all – phonology involves
conscious, intentional action on the part of speaker/hearers. Jackendoff is right
to caution that the phonological features which compose phonemes are not
consciously detectable. These do not qualify as intended features of utterances,
though stress, rhyme, and phonemic structure plausibly do.
Heck suggests that once we get to the level of describing speech in terms of
movements of the vocal organs we are not describing intentional activity:
[I]t is not intentional under the physiological description, nor under
the acoustical one: Neither moving my tongue and lips in that
particular way – physiologically described – nor making that
particular noise – acoustically described – was something I did
intentionally... [E]xactly how my mouth moves, and exactly what
sound emerges, are not things under my rational control. (Heck,
2006:2-3)
It is true that the precise frequencies of the vibrations of one’s vocal folds are
not something one has control over. However, there is no sharp line here
between the intentional and the unintentional. I think that the physiological
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articulations of words are intentional in a very real sense. In his play Le Bourgeois
Gentilhomme, Molière captures the experience of learning some basic phonetics:
PHILOSOPHY MASTER: The vowel U is formed by bringing the
teeth nearly together without completely joining them, and
thrusting the two lips outward, also bringing them nearly together
without completely joining them: U.
MONSIEUR JOURDAIN: U, U. There's nothing truer. U… Ah!
Why didn't I study sooner in order to know all that!
Like Monsieur Jourdain, when it is pointed out to students in an introductory
phonetics class that to say ‘food’ you have to round your lips and push them
outwards they are often surprised and intrigued. I suggest that the intrigue which
attends the realisation that saying ‘food’ involves pushing one’s lips forward is
due to the fact the one is becoming fully conscious for the first time of
something that one has been doing intentionally all along. Quasi-telepaths would
experience the phonetics lesson in Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme quite differently from
the rest of us. For them there would be no moment of realisation like that when
Monsieur Jourdain tries the vowel out for himself and feels the positions
adopted by his lips and tongue. They would be learning about phenomena which
are as impenetrable to them as the workings of our immune systems are to us.
I have not mentioned orthography so far. That literate people have conscious
knowledge of orthographical systems, and that they use them intentionally is, I
think, beyond question. Indeed, that inscriptions are ECAs is probably the most
secure part of the present theory.
What this discussion yields is an informal characterisation of the kinds of
linguistic properties which enter into the conceptions ordinary language users
have regarding linguistic externalia. These can include orthographical,
phonological, morphological, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic features of
words. The upshot of this is that ordinary speech can be regarded as intentional
for the purposes of the ECA theory of words. What this doesn’t tell us is which
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of these properties are individuative of word types. This is a difficult topic, and it
is the focus of the next section.
3. TYPES OF WORDS
3.1 Word pluralism
One obstacle in providing a theory of words is that common sense and
theoretical discourse have yielded a multiplicity of word conceptions. Julien
(2006:617-619) distinguishes phonological words, lexical words and grammatical words.
Further senses of ‘word’ are distinguished in McArthur (1992:1120-1121), but
these are the three conceptions – along with that of the orthographic word –
which crop up again and again in morphology textbooks.
An orthographic word is a sequence of letters with a space on either side. This is the
notion of word which is often used by word-processing programmes to count
the number of words in a document. According to this conception word-
processing is a token of a single orthographic word while word processing
features two tokens, each of a different orthographic word;
fysujhjdgoksonfdmgl is a legitimate token of an orthographic word, while
processing and processsing are legitimate tokens of different orthographic
words. These are reasons enough to draw the conclusion that the orthographic
conception of words is not what we’re after.
Sentences are typically produced as a continuous stream of sound. Pauses are not
usually employed to mark boundaries between different words (and pauses
frequently occur in the middle of words, such as before a plosive consonant.)
Still, there is a notion of a phonological word, which consists in discrete domains for
phonological effects such as stress. On this conception of word, utterances of
‘I’ll’ (or other contractions such as ‘won’t’) will not be utterances of two words,
but of a single word. Even larger phrases such as ‘to the shop’ may count as a
token of a single phonological word. Moreover, a slip of the tongue may result in
an utterance which is not a genuine utterance of any English word despite being
a perfectly good phonological word (perhaps one never tokened before). Again,
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this is not the conception of word which is of interest to philosophers. One
problem with the orthographic and phonological conceptions is that we are
looking for a sense of word in which both an utterance and an inscription can be a
token of that word. Adopting only the orthographic and phonological
conceptions of words would not allow us to maintain a sense in which a word
can have both spoken and written instances.
One prominent conception of words in theoretical linguistics is that of the lexeme.
A lexeme is an abstract unit underlying a set of words which differ from each
other only in their grammatical forms. Intuitively, the lexemic conception
corresponds to items which would be grouped together under a single listing,
either in a speaker’s mental lexicon or – from the point of view of a
lexicographer – a dictionary. For example, there is a sense in which the words
‘be,’ ‘am,’ ‘is,’ ‘are,’ ‘was,’ ‘were,’ ‘been,’ and ‘being,’ are different grammatical
forms of the word ‘be’. But there is another sense of ‘word’ according to which
each of these is a different word. This is the notion of the grammatical word. This is
the perspective which emphasises the properties of words which are relevant to
morphological and syntactic processes. In this sense, ‘be,’ ‘am,’ etc. are different
words. They would be considered as the various grammatical words
corresponding to the lexeme associated with the citation form ‘be’. Similarly,
using the notion of grammatical word we can distinguish between two different
‘being’ words, one of which is the gerund, the other the past participle. The
distinction here is grounded in syntax.
The grammatical word is characterised in terms of a position in the structural
hierarchy of linguistic categories between morphemes and phrases. A morpheme
is typically defined as the smallest unit of language with its own meaning. A word
is made up of one or more morphemes. Julien (2006:620) canvasses two criteria
to distinguish words from morphemes. The first is that “an expression that can
stand alone as an utterance [aside from in metalinguistic discourse] is normally no
smaller than a word.” So, for example, ‘that’ is a word, since it could stand alone
as an answer to the question ‘what do you want to eat?’. In contrast, the
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morpheme ‘un-’ would be dispreferred by native speakers as an answer to the
question ‘are you happy or unhappy?’. (Someone who answered this way would
be making a kind of linguistic joke.) The second criterion concerns “freedom of
position, or independent distribution.” For example, the word ‘the’ can appear
next to a noun in the phrase ‘the linguist’, but it does not have to be attached to a
noun in this way. It can appear before an adjective in the phrase ‘the famous
linguist.’ In contrast, the morpheme ‘un-’ can’t be so easily separated from
whatever word it is bound to: we cannot say ‘un-very-happy’. Additionally, as
Hawthorne and Lepore (2011:456) note, “words are self-contained phonological
units; morphemes are not [always]. Words have at least one syllable, their own
stress, and so on. Morphemes need not.” Clitics such as plural ‘-s’ in English
illustrate this point. ‘-s’ is a morpheme, but not a word.
To distinguish words from phrases, Julien proposes the criterion of “indivisibility
or internal cohesion… [E]ven if both words and phrases can be built from
words, with phrases it is normally the case that they can be broken up by
additional words and phrases, whereas words that consist of words cannot be
interrupted in this way.” For example, the phrase ‘a black bird’ can accommodate
an insertion to yield ‘a black and beautiful bird’ while the word ‘blackbird’ in ‘a
blackbird’ cannot accommodate any such insertion.
Julien (2006:618-619) suggests that “the core meaning of the term ‘word’” is the
grammatical word, an assumption which is fairly common, I think (see also
Matthews, 1991:24-31). For Julien, this is because this is the notion that “has to
do with the role that the word plays in the morphology and in the syntax,” and it
is also the concept of word which is salient to ordinary language users.
Something about this seems right. The notion of grammatical word does seem to
track the common sense conception reasonably well. However, if the correct
understanding of grammatical words involves the idea that they are individuated
purely in terms of grammatical properties, then this would seem to be too narrow
to capture the ordinary notion of word. Plausibly, speakers make word type
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judgements which are sensitive to phonological and semantic properties as well
as syntactic ones (as I argue in the next sub-section).
3.2 The intuitive basis for word type discriminations
Kaplan (1990) wanted an answer to the following question: what makes two
utterances utterances of the same word? I should say from the outset that my
answer to this question is far from comprehensive. It’s thin on detail in certain
places. But the answer I have to this question is not empty either. I think it gives
the structure of an account of word individuation. What the present account
amounts to is a framework within which to understand word individuation, a
framework which is common to non-linguistic artefacts and which was outlined
in the first chapter. As I will argue in chapters two and three, the accounts
offered by Cappelen (1999) and Kaplan (1990) don’t even offer an adequate
framework within which to pursue these questions.
In a slogan, the ECA account of words holds that individual utterances are
tokens of a given word type because they are intended to be. Of course, this is
the provocative way of expressing the view. As discussed in chapter one (§3.3),
this should only be construed as loose talk. If not, the view has a nasty kind of
self-referentiality. Wetzel (2008) objects to the intentionalist approach as follows:
Any account of what an intention-to-utter-‘cat’ is will probably
presuppose some account of what the word ‘cat’ is… [This] is like
defining ‘the’ as “anything the community accepts as ‘the’.” We
haven’t gotten anywhere. Wetzel (2008:69-70)
The response to this objection parallels that given in chapter one. To be sure,
defining the word ‘the’ as anything which is intended to be the word ‘the’ is no
more informative than defining a surf-board as anything which is intended to be
a surf-board. The correct response is the one canvassed in the first chapter. We
have to give an account of the content of speakers’ linguistic intentions in a way
which breaks a word concept (e.g. the concept of the word ‘cat’) down into its
component features. The speaker’s intention is not best construed as the
intention to say the word ‘cat’. Rather the speaker associates a range of properties
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with a given word. Some of these properties relate to the forms of utterances and
inscriptions, others concern the meanings of words and their possibilities for
combination with other words. It’s by successfully intending to produce
something which has (at least some significant cluster of) these properties that
the speaker produces a word.
The previous section (especially §2.4) tried to catalogue some of the intended
linguistic properties of utterances. These included orthographical, phonological,
morphological, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties. This is in keeping
with the idea that a word pairs a form with a meaning and can combine with
other words in specific ways. Plucking an example from a nearby book, the word
‘chapter’ is a singular count noun; according to the Oxford English Dictionary, it
has nine different senses (and numerous sub-senses) including a “main division
or section of a book” and a “branch of an organization or society.” In the minds
of speakers, ‘chapter’ is associated with one or more pronunciations specified in
terms of phonological structure, and possibly with one or more spellings. Now,
this is no doubt oversimplified, but it gives a good enough idea of the kinds of
properties which are potentially individuative of word types.
What kinds of linguistic properties are individuative of words? Meanings
sometimes seem to enter into word type discriminations. This, presumably, is
what explains the intuition that there are two different ‘bank’ words while
‘chapter’ is regarded as polysemous. After all, the two bank words are
indistinguishable from the point of view of syntax, phonology and orthography.
However, meanings do not appear to be treated as essential features of words.
Centuries ago the word ‘meat’ meant food in general, rather than referring
exclusively to flesh. As long as the pronunciation hasn’t changed too much, the
judgement that one and the same word used to mean food but now means meat
is sustainable.
Nor are syntactic properties of words generally regarded as essential properties:
the phenomenon of turning nouns into verbs is ubiquitous in English (e.g. ‘to
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table a proposition’), and the result is intuitively not a new word but a new usage
of it15; the word ‘that’ can be used as a pronoun, a determiner, an adverb or a
conjunction, but a given occurrence of ‘that’ will have only one of these syntactic
properties.
Phonological and orthographic forms are clearly relevant to judgements of word
type. Suppose (somewhat implausibly) that the Old English word ‘scyrta’ has the
same semantic and syntactic profile as its modern descendent, ‘shirt’ but that its
pronunciation is very different. I suspect this makes them different words. Or,
suppose that English speakers take a shine to a Russian word whose meaning has
been widely misunderstood, so that it is used in English with a very different
meaning and perhaps a completely different syntax. What explains the judgment
that English speakers are using the Russian word? One answer is a certain kind
of historical continuity, which is Kaplan’s view, a view I criticise in chapter four.
But amongst the synchronic, linguistic properties of utterances, the only
explanation of the judgement is (near) sameness of form. There are, however,
formidable difficulties in supposing that words are individuated in terms of their
forms. This is the topic of chapter three so I won’t say too much here. Problems
include: the fact that a word can be articulated in either speech or writing; the
existence of dialectal variation in pronunciation (and orthography) both
synchronically and diachronically; tolerance to imperfect word production;
problems of formal coincidence (e.g. there are two ‘bank’ words).
In light of the above, the prospects for definitions of words in terms of necessary
and sufficient conditions do not look bright.16 These problems echo those
encountered in chapter one (§3.4). There, I discussed Bloom’s observations that
both the form of an artefact and its function seem relevant to the categorisation
of artefacts and yet neither the form nor the function typically associated with an
artefact kind need be regarded as essential to that kind. There is no single form
15 This seems to be in tension with the claim that the ordinary conception of word is that of the
grammatical word.
16 See Wetzel (2008:58-71) for a full length defence of this conclusion.
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associated with boats and yet form is not irrelevant since the rubber sphere
pulled by dolphins is judged not to be a boat despite having the function of
transporting people over water. Nor can we state any function which is either
necessary or sufficient for being a boat: the boat shaped device intended for
unmanned retrieval of marine biological data is typically judged to be a boat.17
A further analogy with certain kinds of artefacts is that some utterances are
regarded as imperfect instances of a given word type. We can recognise a
drunken slur as an instance of a word, but a marginal one. Similarly, we might
judge that a modern word was in use in Chaucer’s England, though utterances
produced back then are marginal instances of our word. These kinds of
judgements suggest that words are associated not with necessary and sufficient
conditions, but with some cluster of significant properties.
When these problems arose for artefacts generally, I was obliged to consider that
many artefact kinds are not strict artefact kinds in Thomasson’s sense (§3.4).
Instead, for many artefact kinds, the best we can do is to characterise them in
terms of Thomasson’s “Dependence Principle” for loose artefact kinds:
Necessarily, for all x and all artifactual kinds K, x is a K only if x is
the product of a largely successful intention that (Kx), where one
intends (Kx) only if one has a substantive concept of the nature of
Ks that largely matches that of some group of prior makers of Ks (if
there are any) and intends to realize that concept by imposing K-
relevant features on the object. (Thomasson, 2003b:26)
Assuming, then, that words can only be characterised as loose artefact kinds, the
kind of account we can provide of word individuation is rather limited. What we
can usually do is provide a set of sufficient conditions for tokening a given word.
Suppose I produce an utterance which is a successful realisation of my intention
to say something which is recognisable to English speakers as being intended to
have the following properties: singular count noun; refers to a main division of a
book; pronounced /ˈtʃaptə/ with stress on the first syllable. In that case I will
17 Bloom thinks the function of providing transport over water is too general to distinguish boats from
other kinds of artefacts.
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have succeeded in saying the word ‘chapter’ Or, take the word ‘cat’. Anything
which is successfully intended to be recognisable by English speakers as a
singular count noun referring to cats and has a pronunciation which starts with
an aspirated velar plosive followed by a short, near-open, front, unrounded
vowel and then an apico-dental plosive…is an utterance of ‘cat’.
It is much harder, however, to say which, if any, of these properties is necessary to
being an instance of ‘cat’, but – shadowing Thomasson’s account of loose
artefact kinds – we can impose the same kind of necessary matching constraint
which was discussed in the previous chapter. Having established a set of
sufficient conditions for being an instance of a given word, we can insist that
anything which is an utterance of ‘cat’ must be the product of a successfully
realised intention whose content largely matches that just elaborated. In short,
the present account of word individuation does not offer a characterisation of
word types beyond indicating a kind of family resemblance structure.
I confess that this account is barely satisfactory. It’s easy enough to state
sufficient conditions, and the idea that making something of the same kind
means enacting an intention with roughly the same content is intuitive enough.
But nothing that has been said so far allows us to pin down any of the details of
a theory of word individuation. After all, my utterance of ‘cat’ might be intended
to be very loud or to be said in a singsong voice. Nobody has to match my
intentions in these regards in order to count as saying ‘cat’. The account so far is
quiet about just which properties are relevant to word individuation, except
insofar as I fall back on plausible assumptions relating to semantic, syntactic and
phonological properties. A further problem is that the account relies on the
notion of a family resemblance concept, or cluster concept, notion which raises
difficult issues in cognitive science which I don’t propose to resolve.
Nonetheless, I think there are three things we can say in defence of this part of
the theory:
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(i) In keeping with observations made above, the formal properties of words
(especially phonological but also orthographic properties) seem to be accorded
more weight than syntactic or semantic properties in speaker’s word type
discriminations.
(ii) It is quite typical of artefact kinds that we are unable to provide definitions of
them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. So the fact that we have to
put up with characterisations in terms of family resemblances, and the problems
of vagueness which ensue, is precisely what you’d expect if words are artefact
kinds.
(iii) What we can do is show how a theory of word individuation should go.
What the ECA theory of words does is provide a description of the metaphysical
framework within which questions about word individuation can be pursued.
Rival theories of words fail to do even this much. As I will argue in the next two
chapters, not only do the theories of Cappelen and Kaplan fail to yield adequate
theories of word individuation, their accounts are fundamentally unable to
provide any such account. For example, by forcing words into a framework
inspired by Searle’s XYC schema, Cappelen incurs a requirement that we be able
to provide two independent type descriptions of a given word. And Kaplan’s
account in terms of shared origins can’t explain the very fact that words have
vague boundaries. (These two points will be explained fully in chapter three §4
and chapter four §1.5, respectively). In short, though I’m not offering a detailed
and realistic account of word individuation, or a way of adjudicating hard cases, I
do at least have the resources to describe how a theory of word individuation
should go. Vague boundaries are inconvenient, and I can’t tell you where the
borders are, but when we have clear cut judgements of word type identity or
non-identity, I can explain those by pointing to the intended linguistic profiles of
the various utterances.
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4. ILLUSTRATIONS, HARD CASES, OBJECTIONS
The ECA view regards the association of intentions and words not as a mere
empirical generalisation but as a matter of conceptual necessity. Such a view
naturally invites criticism by counterexample. If it can be shown that genuine
word utterances can be produced where no appropriate intentions are present
then the theory is in trouble. In this section I will consider numerous potential
counterexamples to the view, along with other kinds of objections.
4.1 Malapropisms and other errors
I read a text recently where the writer used the phrase “to dissuade a fear”.
Presumably they meant “to assuage a fear”, but that is not what they wrote. They
appear to have written ‘dissuade’. This creates a potential problem for the ECA
view because one might think that the person wrote ‘dissuade’ despite not having
the right kind of intentions: how can the utterance be a token of ‘dissuade’ if
there is no recognisable intention to produce a thing which means dissuade?
My preferred way out of this problem is to maintain that the speaker did intend
to say ‘dissuade’, it’s just that they had some false beliefs about what that word
means. Though they have some erroneous beliefs about the meaning of
‘dissuade’ (they think it means assuage) they still count as largely matching the
conceptions other people have of the word dissuade. There is, after all, more to a
word than its meaning.
An alternative response could be that the utterance was a token of ‘assuage’
despite looking like ‘dissuade.’ I find this option very unappealing. It would be a
kind of Humpty-Dumpty-ism. It would be to ignore that there are
conventionalised ways of signalling one’s linguistic intentions. A final option
would be to deny that the utterance was an utterance of any word. Such a point
of view is not indefensible: one could argue that the speaker does not know how
to make the ‘assuage’ intentions recognisable, and that they are don’t have an
accurate enough conception of ‘dissuade’ to produce a token of that word either
(because they’re wrong about the meaning). This account finds intuitive parallels
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in the realm of non-linguistic artefacts. If a mason intends to produce a slate tile
for a roof but slips and ends up with shards of slate which are intrinsic duplicates
of arrowheads, the shards of slate are not arrowheads.18 Still, in the case of the
clumsy mason, the shards of slate are produced by a genuine accident. The
mason had no intention to produce the shards. The intrinsic similarity to
arrowheads was a freak accident. The utterance of ‘dissuade’ is not like that. It is
the product of the same “targeted gymnastics” (to use Bromberger’s (2011)
phrase) which characterises normal speech. Moreover, the speaker’s intentions
concerning the syntactic and phonological properties of ‘dissuade’ may be
assumed to match other speakers of the language closely. I therefore prefer the
first response: the speaker did say ‘dissuade’ in virtue of a successfully realised
intention whose content largely matches that of other competent speakers of the
language. (That the speaker also manages to convey to their interlocutors the
content that some fear has been assuaged seems to me compatible with their
having uttered the word ‘dissuade’ and not the word ‘assuage’. See Predelli (2010)
for discussion.)
Similarly, suppose someone believes that ‘cat’ is spelled ‘catt’ (example due to
Predelli (2010). Their inscription of ‘catt’ presumably counts as a token of ‘cat’.
Though the writer has a conception of the word which partially diverges from
that of other ‘cat’ users, their conceptions are probably similar enough.
Competent users of ‘cat’ will easily recognise the linguistic intentions of the
writer.
A different kind of case occurs where a speaker is well apprised of the various
norms of use for the relevant words but where some kind of mental or
physiological malfunction intervenes. These can include slips of the tongue such
as spoonerisms or drunken slurring, as well as typing errors.
For example, someone who knows perfectly well how to spell ‘representation’
might slip while typing and end up writing representatyion. This, I take it is a
18 Although they could become arrowheads through a process of minimal creation.
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token of ‘representation’. Competent users of this word will easily recognise the
intended word, and understand how the typo may have occurred. Successful
communication of speaker intention is largely unhindered.
Take the case of the Sheriff of Nottingham who (in a Mel Brooks film) says
“Struckey has loxed again” instead of “Loxley has struck again.” The speaker’s
knowledge of the linguistic properties of ‘Loxley’ and ‘struck’ is impeccable, and
they intended the utterance to be recognisable as intended to feature instances of
‘Loxley’ and ‘struck’. Now, suppose it was so recognisable (in virtue of context
and background knowledge). In that case, I think we should allow that the sheriff
really did say “Loxley has struck again” despite the utterance’s slightly atypical
form. Why should we allow this? Why not just say that to be an instance of a
given word speakers have to signal their linguistic intentions via one of the
accepted (possibly local) forms?
The reason I don’t think we can say this is that much of ordinary speech is so
rapid and garbled that the resulting acoustic streams cannot be easily separated
into word utterances closely resembling any conventionally accepted form. On
the ECA view, this will not preclude their garbled utterances from being tokens
of the intended words, as long as competent speakers are still able to recognise a
speaker’s intentions. So, we either have to allow that the recognisability of a
speaker’s linguistic intentions by non-canonical means is good enough for producing
an instance of the intended word, or we have to deny that much ordinary speech
features genuine tokens of words (or at least allow that there are frequent gaps).
Taking the latter option would not be catastrophic (see the discussion of Rey’s
folie à deux view in chapter five, §1.1), but it would be somewhat counter-intuitive.
But then, if recognisability by non-canonical means is good enough, then saying
(what sounds like) “Struckey has loxed again” can be good enough for saying the
words ‘Loxley’ and ‘struck’ as long as the speaker’s linguistic intentions were
recognisable by people familiar with the intended words.
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This tolerance to error has limits. When Donald Trump tweeted despite the
negative press covfefe it would appear that the physical form of the inscription
combined with generally known aspects of the utterance context do not suffice
for recognition of intended word type. One might suspect that the intended word
was ‘coverage’, but this cannot be inferred with a high enough degree of certainty
to count as a successful token of that type. (Intuitions about these cases will no
doubt vary. It doesn’t matter too much if we disagree about specific decisions
pertaining to borderline cases as long as we agree on the kinds of criteria which
establish the vague boundaries.)
A further tricky case concerns the Reverend Spooner’s alleged utterance of
something which sounded like ‘shoving leopard’ (though he intended ‘loving
shepherd’). The options here are to say (i) he says ‘loving shepherd,’ (ii) he says
‘shoving leopard,’ and (iii) he produces non words. Against (i), it would be nice
to say Spooner really says ‘loving shepherd’. But in fact, here (unlike in the
‘Struckey’/‘loxed’ case) the process is blocked by the fact that the tokens closely
resemble forms used to signal a different word. Against (ii), the present case is
unlike that of the ‘dissuade’/’assuage’ example. Here there is a more kind of
catastrophic error. The speaker really did intend to say ‘dissuade’ despite their
slightly skewed conception of that word. In contrast, Spooner was perfectly well
apprised of the linguistic properties of ‘shoving,’ ‘leopard,’ ‘loving,’ and
‘shepherd’. And he seems to have ended up saying a word he really didn’t intend.
My inclination here is to say that in such a case the speaker does not in fact say
‘shoving leopard’ even though it sounds like they do. This case is a bit more like
the clumsy mason, though not exactly like it. As in the case of the clumsy mason,
one suspects that the process of artefact creation has gone wrong. Control has
been lost and the results have more to do with accident than intention. That
Spooner’s utterance sounds like ‘shoving leopard’ is just a hazard of the English
language. Given his particular struggles with speech, Spooner would have ended
up saying something that sounded like ‘shoving leopard’ even if ‘shoving’ and
‘leopard’ had not been words of English. The point is that the kind of accident
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which creates spoonerisms is not generally likely to produce things which sound
like genuine words except when entirely independent circumstances happen to
obtain. The fact that Spooner says something that sounds like ‘shoving leopard’
is really just a freak coincidence.
Perhaps some production errors are what get called ‘Freudian slips’ reflecting
some underlying thought on the part of the speaker. For example, perhaps the
deformation which results in an utterance of ‘it is kisstomary to cuss the bride’
was triggered by the vicar’s underlying dislike for the bride. In that case the
phenomenon is akin to cases of involuntary speech considered below, and the
solutions provided there will be apt. The vicar may have produced a genuine
utterance of ‘cuss’, but that is explicable in terms of some real intention to say
‘cuss’ which, let’s say, surges suddenly and displaces the intention to utter the
word ‘kiss’.
Finally, a sports journalist said of an athlete at the recent Olympic Games that “it
is hard to underestimate their achievement.” There’s a sense in which the
journalist did not intend to say exactly those words. This, however, is easily
explained. What is clear is that the journalist did not intend to say that the
athlete’s achievement is hard to underestimate, but it can nonetheless be
maintained that the journalist did intend to say the words “it is hard to
underestimate their achievement” (though perhaps that wouldn’t have been their
intention if they had had a bit more time to think about it.)
4.2 Automation and accidental productions
In chapter one (§5.1) I discussed an alleged class of counterexamples to
intentionalism about artefacts. These concerned the existence of automated
machines for the production of artefacts, and the fact that such machines make
possible a kind of accidental production of artefacts. (Recall the bolt-making
machine which produces one bolt too many.) Since we have word producing
machines similar objections are encountered by the ECA view of words. The
solution in this case has the same pattern as in the general case.
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The mere fact that production of word tokens involves technology is no obstacle
to their being appropriately related to the linguistic intentions of the person who
operates the machinery, or who orders it to be operated. As I type, many
processes are occurring in my laptop which are not intended by me, but that
doesn’t mean that the words appearing on my screen are not the products of my
linguistic intentions. I know how to make the computer produce items with a
certain form which will be recognisable as tokens of specific English words, and
I am intentionally causing the machine to produce just those words. The use of
machines need not introduce any difficulties not already present in cases where
someone uses a pen or their mouth to produce words. Still, there are cases which
require additional discussion.
First, it is no doubt true that the people who operate printing presses are often
unaware of the words they are printing. Similarly, I sometimes print out
philosophy articles and then never read them. On the spoken side, a monolingual
English speaker can produce Russian words by playing a CD. In such cases the
person operating the machinery may or may not intend the printing press, printer
or CD player to produce tokens of words, but they certainly don’t have specific
intentions about which words. These are cases of ignorant artisans. Here I think
we need to appeal to the intentions of the original authors and speakers. Their
intentions at the moment of typing or speaking are the important ones. The
authors’ intentions impose linguistic properties on tokens on their personal
computer screens but these will get passed on to tokens which have been
reproduced from the originals via a reliable enough process. Each time the CD is
played, the acoustic event can be traced back through a causal lineage which
connects up at some point with the intentions of the original speaker.
Second, suppose the staff of some newspaper decide to print 1000 copies of the
paper, but that due to a mechanical fault the press continues running and
produces further unintended copies. The resulting papers still feature genuine
tokens of English words (even if one of the papers falls down a crack and is
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never seen by anyone.) Similarly, suppose the ringtone on my mobile phone is a
spoken-word poem. I mistakenly think I’ve put the phone on silent but when
someone calls me (who doesn’t know about my ringtone), my phone produces
genuine tokens of English words that no one ever intended to exist. But the fact
that the productions are accidental does not undermine the fact that they have
been created via a reliable process which takes words produced by some author
and reproduces them automatically, preserving the original linguistic intentions.
A different kind of case is the scenario in which a monkey hammering on a
typewriter happens to produce something which looks like the complete works
of Shakespeare. My intuition is that a monkey couldn’t type out a Shakespeare
play, quite apart from the statistical improbability. If by coincidence a monkey
hammering away on a typewriter happened to produce an intrinsic duplicate of a
copy of Hamlet – something that would fool a reader into thinking they were
reading Hamlet – I think it would nonetheless fail to be an instance of Hamlet.
In that sense, this is just another swamp word case. On the other hand, some
people may have the intuition that the monkey really could type out a
Shakespeare play. I want to explain that intuition away. One way to do that is to
point out that the typewriter has been designed with various intentions in mind.
Specifically, it is intended to produce a letter ‘e’ whenever the typewriter is in a
certain state (one of the keys is in the down position). If that is right, then the
monkey can cause an ‘e’ to be produced by unintentionally putting that
typewriter in that state. We can thus maintain that the new object is a token of ‘e’
only because someone intended the typewriter to produce an ‘e’ under those
circumstances. So we can allow that the monkey produces letters, but can we
allow that it produces words? I think we cannot. Though the typewriter may have
been intended to produce words, it was not intended by its creators to create
specific words. So we have to deny that the monkey produces a copy of Hamlet,
but we can at least explain the intuition that it does so by allowing that it does
produce sequences of letters; these are real linguistic objects and, of course, when
arranged in certain sequences they will look for all the world like the words of
Hamlet.
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4.3 Ignorant artisans
Another objection canvassed in the first chapter (§3.2) concerned the alleged
possibility of ignorant artisans. A blacksmith in a country without horses could
faithfully duplicate a horseshoe without knowing what a horseshoe is. I argued
that in such cases we have to appeal to the intentions of the client rather than the
intentions of the blacksmith.
The same problem can be raised against the ECA account of words, and the
solution is again the same. If Anne, who is ignorant of Arabic, learns from
Bahira, a native speaker of Arabic, to imitate the pronunciation of some Arabic
word, then she can plausibly be said to have uttered the Arabic word. Since she
has no conception of what the word means, whether it’s a noun or verb, etc., this
possibility apparently undermines the claim that an utterance is an utterance of a
given word partially in virtue of the speaker’s intentions. The obvious reply is to
appeal to Bahira’s linguistic intentions when she provided exemplars for Anne to
copy. We can consider Anne as a faithful replicator. She hears Bahira’s utterance
and reproduces the same sound as faithfully as she can. In that sense she is like
the blacksmith who is ignorant of horseshoes. Anne can be treated in the same
way as we treated printing presses and CD players. The person who operates the
machinery need not intend to produce words: they just need to know how to
operate the machinery. Anne is the technical operator of her vocal apparatus, and
Bahira knows how to get Anne to utter the relevant sound.
One objection to this (exactly paralleling the case of the Frisbee and the plate
from chapter one) would be that Bahira’s intentions don’t matter: Anne hears a
token of an Arabic word and faithfully reproduces it. Isn’t that enough for saying
the Arabic word? The response to this is just that the original tokens Anne hears
are only tokens of Arabic words because of Bahira’s intentions. Moreover, if
Bahira teaches Anne using a recording of what she thinks is an Arabic word but
is actually a different word from another language which happens to sound the
same, Bahira still teaches Anne to say the Arabic word. Here we cannot appeal to
the fact that Anne has heard an Arabic word and reproduced it. The word she
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heard was not Arabic at all, but the one she utters is, and this is explicable only
by appealing to Bahira’s intentions to get Anne to produce an Arabic word.
4.4 Involuntary speech
Coprolalia is a phenomenon which involves involuntarily uttering certain words,
often taboo words, or words which are likely to offend those who are present.
(In popular imagination it is one of the key symptoms of Tourette’s syndrome.)
Another phenomenon which introduces similar problems (for our purposes) is
that of somniloquy (sleep talking). In both cases it appears that word tokens may
be produced unintentionally, thus undermining my claim that having the right
intention is a necessary condition on uttering a token of a given word. Finally,
Wetzel (2008:68) argues that intending to utter a word is not necessary for
uttering that word, since a speaker might “intend to remain silent, but against her
will utter ‘cat’ because a neurosurgeon is stimulating a nerve in her brain.”
Anyone should be wary of speculating about the mental processes involved in
cases like these. Wetzel’s case, in particular, involves assumptions about the
relations between neurophysiology and cognition, matters which are still poorly
understood. How can we be sure that what the neurosurgeon does is not to
create an intention in the subject to utter the word ‘cat’? If, on the other hand,
that is not how things go, how can we be sure that the subject really has uttered a
token of ‘cat’? If the neurosurgeon simply causes an electric charge to be fired
through the subject’s vocal apparatus – without the mediation of a distinctively
mental event such as an intention – then how is the case any different to one in
which I seem to say ‘cat’ by pure coincidence as a result of being punched in the
stomach? Such occurrences are not genuine word tokens at all.
The case of talking in one’s sleep is also delicate. Could such phenomena be
explained in terms of intentions ‘within a dream’? Such a possibility is hard to
assess, but just as hard to rule out. I once shared a dormitory with a group of
British friends and our newly found New Zealand companion. The latter became
quite vocal once he was asleep, referring to the rest of us as a “bunch of greasy
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cricket playing x’s”, where x was an expletive noun. Rightly or wrongly, we took
this to be revelatory of a genuine state of mind.
What should we say about coprolalia? A complication for cases like these is that
it is at least coherent to describe them as involving a genuine intention on the
part of the speaker to utter the words in question. The sense in which these
actions are unintended could be explicated in terms of conflicting intentions,
sudden changes of mind, or perhaps even higher order intentions that a first-
order intention be ineffective. As argued above (§2.1), intentions need not be
fully conscious.
4.5 The causal efficacy of swamp words
Cappelen (1999) objects to the notion that it is necessary for some concrete item
to be an instance of a word that its creator be in a certain mental state (a notion
he calls the ‘necessity thesis’) as follows:
Suppose I find the following token on the street:
CAN YOU SPARE A QUARTER?
I pick it up and use it (rather than my voice) to ask people whether
they can spare a quarter. When I do this, I use a token of the
English sentence “Can you spare a quarter?”. Now, suppose I find
out that the token was produced with the wrong intentions or
maybe with no intentions at all (it might be the result of an
accidental spilling of ink). A proponent of the necessity thesis
would have to say both that the ink mark isn’t a token of an
English sentence and that I never used it to ask anyone to spare a
quarter (because I can’t ask a question in English without using
tokens of English words). Both claims are preposterous. I have
used a token of an English sentence, whatever its production
history might be. (Cappelen, 1999:95)
Let’s focus on the case where the found piece of paper was produced with no
intentions at all as a result of some ink being spilled. Cappelen thinks that the
proponent of the necessity thesis is committed to two absurd theses. The first is
that the found ink marks are not instances of English words. The second is that
Cappelen’s fictional counterpart did not use the piece of paper to ask people to
spare a quarter.
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With respect to the first, I agree that the proponent of the necessity thesis is
indeed committed to the view that the ink marks (at least while they’re still lying
undiscovered on the pavement) are not instances of English words. On the
intentionalist view, they might look like English words but that just isn’t enough.
That was what the swamp word cases like the thought experiment about the
eroded rock on a distant planet were supposed to show. If Cappelen wants to
count the ink marks as instances of words, then he ought also to count swamp
belches and eroded extra-terrestrial rocks. I suppose he probably would. We
appear to disagree on this point, but the intentionalist view is not
“preposterous.”
What about the second claim that the proponent of the necessity thesis is
supposedly committed to, the claim that Cappelen’s counterpart did not use the
piece of paper to ask people to spare a quarter? Cappelen considers the following
possible reply on behalf of the necessity thesis:
An entity is a token of a sign only if it is either produced
intentionally or is used in the performance of a speech act. Call this
the Modified Necessity Thesis (MNT)). (Cappelen, 1999:95)
This has an obvious ad-hoc feel about it. Thankfully, better solutions are
available. I’ll consider two. The first avoids MNT by maintaining that the found
ink marks never become instances of English words. The second avoids MNT by
characterising Cappelen’s counterpart’s actions as genuinely creating a new
artefact.
Cappelen’s reason for saying that his counterpart did not, according to the
proponent of the necessity thesis, use the piece of paper to ask people to spare a
quarter is that one cannot ask a question in English without using English words.
But one could argue that it is possible to ask a question – even a question in
English – without using English words. As long as the ink marks look the part
and Cappelen’s interlocutors believe that they are genuine tokens he could be
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said to have asked a question in English without using concrete tokens of
English words. If everyone thinks of the ink marks as tokens of English words,
then they will have the right English question in mind, as it were. We can all
agree that the ink marks on the found piece of paper look like English words. We
are assuming that the ink has been spilled so felicitously that the resulting marks
are good enough to dupe any competent user of English into believing that they
were created by a careful and competent act of English handwriting. So what’s to
stop someone using them to do what they look like they’re supposed to do? No
doubt Cappelen believes that if something looks like a given word, then it is that
word, but to make that point here is to beg the question against the view he is
criticising. The intentionalist has a coherent way of describing the scenario, so
this particular objection can be met.
An alternative response maintains the view that Cappelen did ask the question
using real, concrete, English words by explaining how swamp words can become
English words in virtue of a process of minimal creation. This second option is
closer in spirit to Cappelen’s MNT. It consists in the claim that picking up the
piece of paper and forming the intention to use it in a speech act is a kind of
artefact creation. There’s nothing ad-hoc in this idea: cases of minimal creation are
familiar from the literature on artefacts and have been amply illustrated above. I
can pick up a rock and make a paperweight merely by forming a certain
intention. Similarly, I can pick up a serendipitously ink-stained piece of paper and
make it into an English inscription by forming the intention the use the object in
a certain way.
4.6 Cappelen’s nested intentions objection
Cappelen suggests that it should fall out of any broadly Gricean story of
communication that speakers usually intend to utter the words they do. Suppose
then, that a speaker intends to say ‘cat’. If the word ‘cat’ is defined as, say,
‘something which is intended to be a noun and refer to cats’ then S’s intention
could be unpacked as ‘intending to produce an entity which is intended to be a
noun and to refer to cats.’
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Cappelen seems to think there is some kind of pernicious regress here. He notes
that intentions to act have eventually to bottom out in a description of the action
to be performed in non-intentional terms. This is correct, but in the present case,
that is exactly what appears to happen.19 There would be a regress if ‘cat’ were
defined as ‘something intended to be an instance of ‘cat’. Then we would have an
intention to produce something which is intended to be an instance of ‘cat’. But
this kind of circularity was flagged and defused above. In the present case we
appear to have nested first and second order intentions, but it’s not clear why
that should be problematic. Perhaps the objection should be that it is simply
implausible that we have these nested intentions. It does seem a clumsy way of
describing speaker intentions, but this kind of nesting is not impossible.
4.7 What public?
Philosophers often say that language is a public phenomenon. What does this
mean? In the previous chapter I distinguished some of the senses in which an
artefact can be said to be public in character. These were:
(i) The artefact belongs to a kind which is widespread.
(ii) The artefact kind is the work of many hands. In other words, there is no
single inventor of that kind of artefact. Rather, it is the product of successive
modifications over time.
(iii) People agree (even if the agreement is never expressed) about roughly what
it takes to be a member of that kind. This is more or less the idea that the
concept corresponding to the artefact kind is one which is shared.
(iv) The artefact is subject to agreed norms, conventions or laws.
19 Of course, it’s bottoming out in contentious stuff like meanings, but that seems okay. We don’t need a
naturalistic reduction of meaning. We’re attending to the ways meanings are conferred on a substrate.
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(v) The character of the artefact is determined relative to an activity which
requires the participation of at least two people. For such artefacts, that they be
successfully intended to be recognisable by at least two people becomes a
constitutive requirement.
I think words are typically public artefacts in all these senses, though perhaps the
most important sense is the last one. According to my account, the publicness of
language consists in the existence of conventionalised ways of signalling clusters
of linguistic intentions. Words hang around and have the properties they do
because they have some useful function which causes speakers to intentionally re-
use them. Stable public signs emerge because one of the functions of
externalised language is to co-ordinate with other people. The upshot of this is
that one can’t be like Humpty Dumpty and insist that some utterance means
whatever you want it to. Ways of signalling linguistic intentions are established
not by any single individual, but through the activities of many users of a given
linguistic artefact. This creates norms which individuals can infringe but not
override.
According to my story, utterances count as tokens of a given word because it
makes a certain set of linguistic intentions on the part of the speaker recognisable
to a certain audience. But how to specify that audience? It can’t be all speakers of
English since an utterance in British English might not be recognisable to a native
speaker from Texas. Moreover, utterances using a local slang might be explicitly
intended to be recognisable by only a small subset of English speakers.
Difficulties specifying the boundaries of a linguistic community within which a
language is shared are an often remarked upon pitfall of theories of public
language. Indeed, there is probably no way of zooming in on the community
relative to which a word is intended to be recognisable, other than by stating that
an utterance of a word is intended to be recognisable (in principle) to all and only
the past and present users of that word. More generally, a public artefact is
intended to be recognisable in normal conditions by people who are experienced
in using that kind of artefact.
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Echoing a discussion in chapter one (§4.3) one might point out that not all
symbolic artefacts are intended to be recognisable by anyone other than the
artisan. Why, then, can someone not have a private way of saying ‘cat’? Suppose
that someone intends blarg to be recognisable by themselves (and only
themselves) as a noun referring to cats. Would that inscription then count as an
inscription of ‘cat’? One option here would be to deny that blarg is an
inscription of any word at all. I reject this option. Though we won’t find private
words in the dictionary, dictionaries are not authoritative arbiters of word
existence. Moreover, some words are introduced from scratch and then become
widely used. Was the first apparent utterance of the word not a genuine utterance
of the word? Are only later uses genuine tokens? Does the first utterance become
a genuine token retroactively as use of the word takes hold? Better to allow that
there can be private words. I even think that ‘blarg’ is an English word in the
scenario described even though it is known by only one speaker of English. What
other language could it be a word of, assuming the speaker is a monolingual
speaker of English? Perhaps it could be a word of no language; against this, note
that ‘blarg’ has English phonology and syntax. For example, the plural – let’s say
– is ‘blargs’. The speaker is also likely to use the word in English sentences.
So blarg can be a token of a word meaning the same as ‘cat’, and this can even
be a word of English, even if it is known only to one person. But in the scenario
described it cannot be an utterance of ‘cat’ because whether something is an
utterance of ‘cat’ depends the activities of the many users of that kind of artefact.
According to convention, ‘cat’ is associated with a limited range of signalling
devices (utterance forms, and inscription forms). It makes perfect sense to
imagine private English words which are intended to be recognisable only to the
speaker. For example, in writing this thesis I have created a number of personal
abbreviations and pieces of jargon which I use in my notes. After all,
communication between individuals is only one of the uses to which we put
linguistic externalia. They can also be used for private rituals and games, or as a
kind of scaffold for thought (e.g. repeating a phone number out loud in order to
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memorise it, writing out a sum on a blackboard). Still, communication is one of
the uses to which language is routinely put, and an important one. As a
consequence, words typically reflect the exigencies of co-ordination between
different speakers. In other words, ways of signalling linguistic intentions become
widespread, and norms about the correct ways of using a word will emerge as
part of communal linguistic practice.
4.8 Unrecognisable in context
Suppose we’re talking about the river bank. Without signalling a change of topic,
I say “I’m going to the bank,” intending to communicate that I’m going to the
(financial) bank. My utterance is not recognisable by the intended audience as
(financial) ‘bank’. Intuitively I have said (financial) ‘bank’. We don’t want to say
that I actually said (river) ‘bank’. Fortunately the view doesn’t push us to say this.
Though the token sounds like (river) ‘bank’, there was no intention to utter
(river) ‘bank’, and therefore no such intention can be recognisable. But an
uncomfortable result is looming: since my linguistic intentions are apparently
unrecognisable, I may have failed to say either ‘bank’ word. I think this has to be
resisted. Perhaps the thing to say is that my utterance is recognisable as an
utterance of (financial) ‘bank’ despite the fact the few people would actually
recognise it. For example, within relevance theory approaches in pragmatics
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995) we could describe the case as follows: when I make
my announcement, the audience will quickly settle on an interpretation which fits
their expectation of relevance. Unfortunately, in the case at hand there is a readily
available interpretation which makes perfect sense right up until the moment
when I head off in the direction everyone was least expecting. That most people
will be blocked from actually recognising my linguistic intentions, does not,
perhaps, entail that my intentions were unrecognisable.
5. CONCLUSION
In this chapter I’ve suggested that the ECA view of words is supported by a
fairly deep analogy between words and other kinds of essentially communicative
(though not strictly linguistic) artefacts. The general theory which was developed
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in chapter one fits the case of words very neatly. Similar problems arise and take
similar solutions. The view explains intuitions about minimal creation, swamp
words, and exaptation. It harmonises nicely with theorising in generative
linguistics, helping to make sense of the fact that externalia are invested with
linguistic significance. In response to worries that linguistic behaviour is too
spontaneous to count as genuinely intentional, I’ve described a slightly deflated
notion of intention which is rich enough to do service in a theory of artefact
production, and which seems applicable to typical cases of language use. Finally,
I’ve put a bit of a dampener on the idea that we can read off a person’s word-
regarding intentions from a generative linguistic theory of competence, but I’ve
emphasised that many aspects of our linguistic behaviour are intentional, and that
we have at least some ordinary conscious knowledge regarding the phonological,
syntactic and semantic properties of words. I’ve also explained how questions of
word individuation are settled on the ECA account and I have responded to a
number of objections and potential counterexamples.
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CHAPTER 3: THE FORMS OF WORDS
This chapter reprises a question broached in the previous one: what makes two
utterances utterances of the same word? One answer to this question is what
Kaplan (1990) called the form-theoretic account, FT. This approach seeks to explain
sameness of word in terms of physical resemblance. It is something of a default
view, sometimes tacitly assumed, sometimes explicitly defended. Adherents
include Stebbing (1935), Hardie (1936), Lewis (1983:163), Davidson (1984:90),
Devitt and Sterelny (1999), Cappelen (1999), Alward (2005), Predelli (2010), and,
arguably, Searle (1995:83).
In §1 I present Cappelen’s (1999) version of FT, and show how it is implemented
within Searle’s (1995) framework for social ontology, which involves his well-
known XYC schema. On this view, words depend on conventions which are
maintained within linguistic communities. These conventions involve collective
acceptance that things of type X (things with a certain form) count as things of
type Y (having linguistic properties such as being a noun, referring to cats, etc.).
In §2 I argue that FT’s appeal lies in a tempting but misleading conception of the
processes involved in word recognition. The intuitive motivation for FT starts
from the observation that competent language users are very good at working
out what word types are tokened in the speech and writing to which they are
exposed, and concludes that each word in the language must be associated with a
distinctive acoustic (and orthographical) profile.
In §3 I make the case against FT and respond to the argument based on word
recognition. As well as the usual empirical arguments against FT (such as formal
variation between tokens of a given word, and formal coincidence between
different words), I explain the error behind the word recognition argument for
FT. Its mistake is to assume that word type recognition is entirely a matter of
observing the form of utterances and inscriptions. Against this ‘bottom-up’
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conception of speech perception – according to which word type must be
detected on the basis of formal features of the linguistic signal before knowledge
of syntax and semantics can be consulted – I argue that the forms of linguistic
signals are highly unruly and not reliable indicators of word type; language users’
success in word type recognition relies additionally on such things as their
grammatical competence, background knowledge, and guesswork. Word
recognition is therefore not a discrete first step towards understanding what is
said in a context, but is accomplished simultaneously with semantic
interpretation. Thus, our epistemological success in word type recognition does
not require that all recognisable tokens of a word instantiate a specific form
associated with that word. In addition, I raise a problem for the notion of form
as it is usually employed in stating FT.
In §4 I argue that the demise of FT throws up a problem for anyone hoping to
use Searle’s XYC schema to give a social ontological theory of words. Briefly, the
XYC schema requires two ways of specifying the membership of a social kind.
Cappelen assumes that the X slot can be filled in with a form-theoretic
description of a certain kind of utterance, while the Y slot is filled in with
syntactic and semantic properties. If, as I argue, no appropriate form-theoretic
description is available, the XYC schema begins to look poorly suited to
explaining the social construction of words. (Establishing this firmly would
require ruling out other ways of filling in the X slot. In this chapter I gesture to
what these other ways might be, and express scepticism about their prospects.)
Finally, though having a certain form is neither necessary nor sufficient for being
a token of a given word, a theory of words ought to say something about the
formal features of utterances and inscriptions: Kaplan (1990) was wrong to think
that form was irrelevant to word type. In §5 I explain the role played by form in
the ECA theory of words: I argue that the forms of utterances are localised ways
of signalling word-type without being in any sense constitutive of it.
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1. THE SEARLE-CAPPELEN VIEW OF WORDS
For Cappelen, words can be defined in terms of the formal properties of
utterances and inscriptions. So, for example, there is an acoustic form and an
orthographical form associated with the word ‘cat’. All and only the things which
instantiate either of those forms count as an utterance of ‘cat’. Of course, it is not
a brute fact about the world that those things are tokens of ‘cat’. According to
Cappelen, what makes it the case that a person producing a certain kind of
utterance is producing an instance of ‘cat’ is that they belong to a community in
which certain linguistic conventions are maintained. He writes:
It is a matter of convention that what you look at right now are
tokens of words. They would not be word tokens if it hadn’t been
for the presence of certain kinds of conventions. Such conventions
are upheld by intentional linguistic activity. So, there can be word
tokens only if there is intentional linguistic activity. It’s a mistake to
infer intentionalism from this. The conventions we have are, very
roughly, of two kinds:
(C1) Entities with such-and-such properties count as tokens of the
same sign.
(C2) Entities with properties P (where entities with P count as
tokens of the same sign according to some C1-type convention)
count as tokens of the same sign as tokens with properties P´
(where P´ entities count as tokens of the same sign according to
some C1-type convention.) (Cappelen, 1999:99)
The role of C1 conventions is to determine classes of utterances or classes of
inscriptions, respectively. According to Cappelen, the ‘such-and-such properties’
locution can be filled out with terms which refer only to formal properties of
tokens. C2 conventions relate form-theoretically determined classes of utterances
with form-theoretically determined classes of inscriptions. Further C2
conventions could be introduced for Braille, Semaphore, etc. C2 conventions can
serve not only to bridge different media of communication, but also to bind
differing physical types within a single medium (something Cappelen doesn’t
point out): after all, we can’t have a single C1 convention which binds together a,
A, and a. If there is no single physical description that describes all three of
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these shapes at the right level of detail we’ll need a separate C1 convention for
each of them, and a C2 convention to bind them together.
Cappelen doesn’t say much about what he means by ‘convention’, nor what is
involved in being tokens of the same sign beyond having a shared form. We can
fill in the gaps with a little imagination, and by drawing on Searle’s approach in
social ontology, (an approach within which Cappelen’s suggestion is clearly
based). Searle (1995) proposes to explain the existence of social and institutional
facts in terms of features which are conferred on existing objects via collective
acceptance of constitutive rules. The form of these rules is:
X counts as Y (in context C)
So for example, if we are in a community that collectively accepts that certain
pieces of metal have a monetary value of one dollar, then those pieces of metal
count as one dollar. There are a few infelicitous features of this schema. For one
thing, the parenthesis is dispensable, since any contextual specifications can just
as easily be inserted under the X slot. Thomasson (2003a:274) and Epstein
(2013) criticise various other aspects of the XYC schema, and Epstein offers the
following reformulation:
For all objects z, if z is X then there is an object u such that z
constitutes u and u is Y. (Epstein, 2013:6)
Epstein’s reformulation of the XYC schema, and his associated distinction
between grounding and anchoring are helpful sharpenings of Searle’s view, but we
don’t really need to go into these details here. The problem I’m going to outline
afflicts the view whichever way it is formulated. I’ll continue to refer to the view
informally as the XYC schema.
What should we make of the notion of collective acceptance? Searle (1995:23-
26) insists that collective acceptance involves a kind of collective intentionality
which is not reducible to individuals’ first-person beliefs, desires and intentions.
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His account of this is enigmatic: it has to do with individuals having beliefs and
intentions which can be characterised as first-person plurals. So collective
acceptance of a rule would involve a plurality of individuals whose acceptance
of the rule consists in an attitude towards the proposition we accept that X counts as
Y in C. As Searle himself notes, this is no more than a trivial notational
manoeuvre, not a rich account of what collective intentionality is supposed to
involve. Thomasson (2009:546-547, 2014:55-56) leaves open whether public
artefacts require an account of a distinctive kind of intentionality, a kind of
collective intentionality. I propose to do the same.
Applying the Searleian schema to the case at hand, Cappelen’s view is that the
existence of words depends on the maintenance of conventions according to
which things of acoustic type X count as Y. Cappelen doesn’t indicate what kinds
of Y features are relevant to words, but they presumably include things like being
a noun, referring to cats, etc. On this view, it would be misleading to say that
words are just kinds of sounds and shapes in just the way it would be misleading
to say that money is just paper. The kind of social construction which the XYC
schema models should be understood as an ampliative process. We start off with
some things which are X and we add some Y properties by convention. In the
case of money, we start off with pieces of paper with a certain form and
provenance, and we impose on such pieces of paper some extra properties to do
with their monetary value. In the words case, we start off with sounds and shapes
with a certain pre-agreed form, and we impose upon them a set of linguistic
properties. Thus, it would not be quite right to say that words are just sounds and
shapes, on Cappelen’s view, although things which have the right shape or sound
do constitute word tokens.
On such a view, the forms of words play an epistemological role: the form of a
token is what enables it to be recognisable as having its various syntactic and
semantic properties. But word forms also play a constitutive role: having a certain
acoustic form is constitutive of being a token of a given word. How do these two
roles fit together? In some instances of the XYC schema, the X properties make
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a direct causal contribution to an object’s ability to perform a certain Y function.
Taking a non-linguistic example, suppose we have a convention which
establishes that a certain kind of knife is a fish knife. The items singled out under
the X description have a certain form and structure which makes them effective
tools for eating fish. Those very same features also serve to indicate that the
knife is supposed to be used for fish.
Sometimes, however, the properties picked out under the X term have a purely
communicative role. They serve merely to indicate what Y properties have been
agreed for the things which have the X properties. For example, there is nothing
about the form or structure of traffic lights which makes them good at stopping
traffic. Traffic lights are communicative artefacts whose appearance serves to
indicate that cars are supposed to stop. In the case of purely communicative
artefacts, having the form which signals a certain Y property is necessary and
sufficient for having that Y property.20 Applying this to the case of words,
Cappelen’s view is that having the form which signals ‘cat’-ness is necessary and
sufficient for being an instance of ‘cat’ (by convention). We are, at this point,
very close to the underlying motivation behind FT. Articulating that motivation
is the purpose of the next section.
2. THE RECOGNISABILITY ARGUMENT FOR FT
The appeal of FT lies in a tempting story about linguistic communication. The
story can be told as follows. Suppose Anne wants Brian to know that Carol is
hungry. Humans are not telepathic so Anne has to perform some action which is
observable by Brian: she says the words, ‘Carol is hungry’. This works because
Anne knows that Brian knows that Anne knows that those words express the
proposition that Carol is hungry.
On this story, word tokens are visible or audible aspects of the environment.
Working out which word types have been produced is a matter of looking and
20 Clearly, this part of the Searle-Cappelen account of words is tracking the same phenomenon as my
notion of ECAs. But the characterisation of the phenomenon is not equivalent, as I explain in §§4-5.
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listening. Interpretation is thought of as a bottom-up process: the first thing the
hearer has to do is work out what words have been uttered; then and only then
can they use their knowledge of language (and background knowledge) to work
out what proposition is being expressed in the context. This bottom-up picture
of interpretation is at the heart of the appeal of FT, I submit.
Someone tempted by this story might propose the following argument:
(P1) All word tokens produced in a language L are recognisable as tokens
of a single word type by competent speakers of L.
(P2) If (P1) then each word type in L is associated with a description in
terms of detectable, formal properties which all and only its tokens
satisfy.
(C) Each word type in L is associated with a description in terms of
detectable, formal properties which all and only its tokens satisfy.
Call this the ‘Recognisability Argument’ (RA). (C) involves both the idea that
having a certain form is necessary for being an instance of a given word (‘the
necessity thesis’), and the idea that form is sufficient for being an instance of a
given word (‘the sufficiency thesis’).
(P2) is initially plausible. Suppose Anne sorts 100 marbles into ten sets of ten
then mixes them up. Brian is asked to sort them into the same ten sets, and
succeeds. This seems to require that Anne and Brian are categorising the marbles
on the basis of detectable properties of individual marbles. Suppose, now, that
Anne makes a recording of ten utterances of each of ten different word types.
Brian has to recover the ten sets corresponding to word type. He’s likely to do
well. How is this possible? When he considers each token utterance there have to
be detectable, formal features which reliably indicate that that utterance is of a
certain word type.
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Brian’s task in the word-guessing game is unlike real instances of linguistic
communication in ways which turn out to be important. I’ll clarify and tweak
(P2) in the discussion of RA in §3.4, before eventually rejecting it altogether. For
now I grant it for the sake of argument.
(P1) might sound far too strong, but note that (P1) does not require that
competent speakers never make mistakes: tokens don’t have to be recognised as
tokens of a given type; they just need to be recognisable. Someone might classify an
utterance wrongly due to tiredness, but this doesn’t mean the utterance isn’t
recognisable. Nor does (P1) require that any competent speaker be able to
recognise every token produced in their language. The phrase ‘by competent
speakers’ could be taken to mean (i) by a certain proportion of competent
speakers, (ii) by a certain proportion of competent speakers who are linguistically
similar to the producer of the token, or (iii) something else.
Even with these hedges, (P1) might still sound too strong. Some word tokens
might be completely unrecognisable by anyone, due to sloppy handwriting or
slurred speech. If so, then even if all and only recognisable tokens satisfy a
certain formal description, we cannot infer that all tokens of a given word type
do so.
The defender of RA could insist that there just aren’t any tokens of a given word
which are not recognisable as such by (at least some) competent speakers of the
language; being recognisable as a token of a given word type is essential to an
utterance’s status as a token of that word type. This is not obviously true: many
things are reliably identifiable without being essentially so. Suppose tokens of the
bird species, oystercatcher, are recognisable by the fact that all and only
oystercatchers have a long orange beak, mostly black feathers and a white stripe
along the wing. But being recognisable is not essential to being an oystercatcher: a
featherless, beakless, unrecognisable oystercatcher is still an oystercatcher.
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Nevertheless, on the Searle-Cappelen view, words just are conventionally agreed
detectable signs. The form of a word signals that it has certain Y properties
precisely because that is the form that has been stipulated as having the Y
properties. The features of words which indicate their Y properties are precisely
those which ground its having the Y properties. If something is not recognisable
as a Y (by someone experienced with Ys), that can only be because the X
properties which signal the Y properties are not present. But if they are not
present, then the item is not a Y. If this is right then an utterance which is
unrecognisable by anyone would fail to be an utterance of the intended word
type. If it doesn’t have the acoustic profile which makes it recognisable as an
instance of ‘cat’, then it isn’t an instance of ‘cat’. So, anyway, I imagine the form-
theorist arguing.
Suppose (P1) is accepted. The objection might now be that even if word tokens
are essentially recognisable as tokens of a given word type, and even if all tokens
are recognisable in virtue of their detectable, formal properties, that doesn’t
show that words can be defined in terms of those formal properties. However,
this objection is unfair. Given the theoretical concerns reflected in RA, the
properties which drive word type recognition are exactly the ones we’re interested
in; that is the way of carving linguistic reality which answers to the context in
which RA is offered. There are no doubt other ways of classifying utterances, but
this way of doing it reflects an interest in certain phonetic kinds, recognition of
which is hypothesised to be the take-off point for interpretation.
If my rejection of RA is to seriously undermine FT, we ought to have some
assurance that RA is a key motivation for FT. My version of RA is intended as a
worked-out version of an argument which appears in nascent form in the
literature. Devitt and Sterelny write:
Tokens are dateable, placeable parts of the physical world… The
obvious examples of word tokens are inscriptions on a page or
sounds in the air… Inscription types and sound types are
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identifiable by their overt characteristics and so we might call them
“physical types”. (Devitt and Sterelny, 1999:71, emphasis added)
An argument in the spirit of RA was made by Cappelen (1999), who objected to
views according to which a speaker’s intentions could be essential to the word
type of an ensuing utterance:
[A] necessary condition for being in a position to interpret u [an
utterance of ‘Alice is asleep’] is knowledge of semantic facts such
as (s):
(s) “Alice” refers to Alice
To use (s) in interpreting u, it must be possible to identify the first
token of u as a token of “Alice”. How is that done? …[Y]ou look
at it. If you recognise its features as being those of tokens of
“Alice”, you make use of (s). This is how interpretation gets off the
ground… Had intentionalism been true, looking at the first token
of u would not enable you to determine whether it is a token of
“Alice” and hence wouldn’t tell you whether to employ (s) in your
interpretation… Only someone with knowledge of the intentions
and history of the utterer of u is in a position to tell which word
the first token of u is a token of. (Cappelen, 1999:97)
Cappelen’s point seems to be that there can’t be any essential properties of words
which are undetectable, for if there were, one could never be certain which word
one was faced with because one cannot exclude the possibility that there is an
essential property which the utterance lacks. In other words, having a certain
form must be sufficient for being an instance of a given word. Alward (2005:180)
echoes Cappelen’s argument.21 This argument is weak. After all, it is possible to
identify an object as a member of a given kind without observing that all
necessary conditions associated with the kind are met. Having a certain genetic
profile could be a necessary condition on being an oystercatcher, but you can still
identify them reliably without checking for this. In a further argument, Cappelen
writes:
21 “Our ability to understand the utterances/inscriptions of speakers is underwritten by our knowledge of
the meanings of the words contained therein. And our ability to utilize this knowledge depends on our
further ability to recognize occurrences of the words in question. But [FT’s alleged falsity] robs us of the
ability to do so on the basis of observed features of utterances/inscriptions: the fact that an
utterance/inscription looks or sounds like an occurrence of a given word, or fails to do so, does not
decide the issue one way or the other” (Alward, 2005:180).
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The identity conditions for sign tokens were developed by us for a
reason. We should expect the distinction between things that are
sign tokens and things that are not, to be a distinction that says
something about how those entities can be used (something about
the function they can perform for us). These two ink marks:
Can you spare a quarter?
Can you spare a quarter?
are, for all linguistic purposes, functionally equivalent. Whatever
you can do linguistically with the first, you can do with the second.
(Cappelen, 1999:95-96)
This fact about the two ink-marks holds true whether or not they were produced
with the same intentions in mind, or even if they are swamp words. Here is my
take on Cappelen’s argument. Two tokens are tokens of the same word type if
and only if they are functionally equivalent. Two tokens are functionally
equivalent if and only if they are intersubstitutable without disrupting
communication. Cappelen’s idea is that linguistic categorisation should only be
sensitive to the causal roles which utterances and inscriptions are able to play in
virtue of their physical makeup. What matters are the detectable, formal features
of utterances and inscriptions which language users are able to recognise as
belonging to a conventional linguistic category. Since creator intentions are not
detectable aspects of physical signals, they have no impact on the causal roles a
token is able to play. Thus, three recent defences of FT draw on an argument
like RA.
3. AGAINST FT
In this section I first consider three well known objections to FT. Each attempts
to provide counterexamples to either the necessity or the sufficiency claim
embodied in (C), above. The first can be easily responded to, while the others are
more problematic. I go on to discuss the flaws in the word recognition argument
just presented before presenting a further objection to FT, one which questions
the form-theorist’s focus on the intrinsic formal properties of word tokens.
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3.1 Multiple media
Words can be written as well as spoken, but acoustic and inscriptional instances
of a word do not share a common form. Call this the Multiple Media Argument. I
will show that the problem is not as insurmountable as Hawthorne and Lepore
(2011) and Kaplan (2011) have concluded. Stebbing considers the problem:
Spoken words are sounds; written words are shapes. The same
word may be spoken or written… Sounds and shapes are quite
unlike; the sound is not identical with the shape, nor have they any
kind of similarity. (Stebbing, 1935:3)
Her own solution is to deny that inscriptions genuinely instantiate words. Instead,
as discussed in the introduction, she suggests that inscriptions are mere
representations of spoken words. If that is the case, then the fact that ‘cat’
inscriptions do not resemble utterances of ‘cat’ is beside the point. However,
given that it is part of common sense that words can be tokened in writing, and
that philosophers typically share this assumption, defenders of FT may wish to
find a different response than Stebbing’s, especially in light of the fact that there
is a perfectly good one available.
On Cappelen’s account, there is an easy answer to the Multiple Media argument:
his C1 and C2 conventions are tailor made to resolve the problem. As noted
above, we can have a C1 convention which determines that certain kinds of
sounds are tokens of a word, a further C1 condition to determine that certain
kinds of marks are tokens of a word, and then a C2 convention which
determines that all these sounds and shapes are tokens of the same word. In fact,
the nature of this response emerges much more perspicuously when one frames
it in terms of the XYC schema. We simply note that for any given Y property, we
can perfectly well have more than one convention. That is, we can have two
conventions, thus (where: X1 refers to a kind of sound and X2 to a kind of
shape):
X1 counts as Y
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X2 counts as Y
Moreover, we do not need to buy into Cappelen’s conventionalist account in
order to exploit his essential insight. We can remain neutral on the question of
what makes it the case that certain inscriptions and certain utterances are tokens of
the same word and simply modify (P2) of RA as follows (changing (C)
accordingly):
(P2´) If (P1) then each word type in L is associated with one or more
descriptions in terms of detectable, formal properties such that all and
only things satisfying exactly one of those descriptions is a token of the
type.
3.2 Diversity
Kaplan’s (1990) principal complaint against FT was that a single word can be
pronounced or written in different ways, thus undermining FT’s necessity thesis.
Millikan (2003), Wetzel (2008), and Hawthorne and Lepore (2011) concur. Call
this the Diversity Argument. Some kinds of variation can be accommodated: just as
we can appeal to separate conventions for the written form and the spoken form
of a word, we can also have separate conventions for the different
pronunciations or different spellings of the word. Similarly, that ‘r’ takes different
forms in upper and lower case is secured by having multiple conventions (of the
form X1 counts as Y, X2 counts as Y, etc.). Unfortunately, there is simply too
much variation for this approach to work generally. Multiplying conventions to
deal with this variation would amount to imposing an implausibly large cognitive
burden on speakers. In other words, though some variation can be plausibly
chalked up to the existence of multiple conventions, there remains a large
amount of unconventionalised variation.
It bears emphasis from the outset that much of the variation between
productions of a given word is irrelevant to word-type recognition. It doesn’t
137
matter what colour an inscription is, or what it’s made of. To the form-theorist,
what matters is the shape. Moreover, we don’t care how deep the ink seeps into
the paper or whether the grooves carved into gravestones are triangular or square
in cross-section. It’s the two-dimensional shape the object presents from a certain
position which counts. On the speech side, it doesn’t usually matter whether an
utterance is loud or quiet, fast or slow, high or low pitched, etc. Soprano singers
know there are limits to this: by the lights of FT, some intended utterances of
words are too high pitched to replicate the formant pattern associated with
certain vowels. Nevertheless, very different waveforms could instantiate a shared
formal pattern described in terms of formant frequencies and stops, say.
However, the idea that there is an acoustic commonality between all the
utterances of a given word faces some significant empirical challenges.
For one thing, there is variation across linguistic communities. Chaucer, Hume
and Harper Lee can be said to have used an overlapping set of English words,
but they pronounced them in very different accents. Similarly, colour and color
are inscriptions of the same word despite being constituted by different letter
sequences. Wetzel (2008:5) notes that ‘colour’ has eighteen known additional
spellings: “collor, collour, coloure, colowr, colowre, colur, colure, cooler, couler,
coullor, coullour, coolore, coulor, coulore, coulour, culler, cullor, cullour.”
However, the existence of inter-community variation is not decisive. While there
is a familiar sense of ‘word’ according to which we can describe a single word as
occurring in modern English, Old English and even Proto-Indo-European
despite formal variation beyond the point of mutual recognisability, if we press
this objection we are saddling words with an explanatory responsibility which the
form-theorist never promised to fulfil. FT may be best construed as marking out
one important theoretical conception of words among a plurality of differing
conceptions. Though it may be part of historical linguistics and even common
sense (at least sometimes), to think of words as individuated by their histories,
the form-theorist is not doing conceptual analysis or historical linguistics. The
form-theorist is just interested in the formal types which putatively play a certain
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role in communication within a language community. An etymologist may say
that some utterance made by Chaucer is of the same word type as some modern
utterance. The form-theorist need not deny this, but if Chaucer’s utterance is
unrecognisable by members of our community, they can legitimately deny that it
is an utterance of one of our words – at least not in the form-theorist’s sense of
‘word’ which pertains only to recognisable form-theoretic units. The form-
theorist is interested in finding the word types which RA requires, not what some
other explanatory project requires, and if it tramples on folksy intuitions about
etymology then so be it. They never set out to vindicate folksy intuitions either.
More problematic is the fact that variation exists within linguistic communities,
however locally construed, not to mention within a single individual over time.
For example, sloppy handwriting can lead to unconventionalised diversity in the
forms of letter tokens. Also, fluent speech is rapid and full of short-cuts: Wetzel
(2008) notes that ‘extraordinary’ can be pronounced with six, five, four, three or
even two syllables (/strornry/). A word can be spoken at a high or low pitch,
lisped, enunciated theatrically, sung, whispered, etc. Such factors ensure that two
utterances of a word may vary wildly from an acoustic point of view.
The form-theorist need not seek formal similarities between word instances
directly; they can treat word instances as sequences of segments (where the
smaller segments are defined in terms of their form). We can call the finer-
grained segments of written words graphemes (or ‘letters’) and those of spoken
words phonemes. For present purposes, phonemes are to be thought of as kinds
of acoustic chunks instances of which can be assembled into sequences to make
words. (This use of terminology is not universal: many linguists use talk of
phonemes as a way of describing internal aspects of an individual’s mind/brain
at a certain level of abstraction. There is no expectation that these should be
mappable to acoustic properties.) Appealing to phonemic segments may filter out
some of the noise, but in the end the acoustic signal is just too messy to be
carved into chunks. A single phoneme can be pronounced differently by a single
person on different occasions. Bromberger (2011:492) gives the example of ‘in’
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which is pronounced [in] before ‘New York’, [im] before ‘Boston’, and [ing]
before ‘Cambridge’. Jackendoff (1990:58) notes that the vowel sounds in
utterances of ‘tap’ and ‘back’ differ from an acoustic point of view since they are
modified by a speaker’s articulation of adjacent consonants. Rey (2006a:247)
mentions that speakers of American English hear utterances of ‘rider’ and
‘writer’ as containing a /d/ and a /t/ respectively, despite being identical from an
articulatory or acoustic point of view. (The difference in perception is related to
the lengths of the preceding vowels.) Such effects undermine the idea that an
acoustic blast can be considered as instantiating a sequence of acoustically
defined phonemes.
This point is widely recognised in linguistics (Chomsky and Halle, 1968, Fodor,
Bever and Garrett, 1974, Laver, 1994, and Liberman 1996). Sapir’s pioneering
essay “The Psychological Reality of Phonemes,” compares phonemes to an
artefact such as a club:
[N]o entity in human experience can be adequately defined as the
mechanical sum or product of its physical properties… To say that
a given phoneme is not sufficiently defined in articulatory or
acoustic terms…is, at bottom, no more mysterious than to say that
a club is not defined for us when it is said to be made of wood and
to have such and such a shape and such and such dimensions. We
must understand why a roughly similar object, not so different to
the eye, is no club at all, and why a third object, of very different
colour and much longer and heavier than the first, is for all that
very much of a club. (Sapir, 1933/1985:65)
It goes without saying that I find the analogy to be entirely apposite. The fact
that clubs cannot be defined in terms of physical features is something we are
well-placed to understand in light of the theory of artefacts presented in chapter
one.
3.3 Formal coincidence
Where the previous point was addressed to the fact that having a certain acoustic
form is not necessary for being an instance of a given word, the present sub-
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section concerns the fact that having a certain form is not sufficient for being an
instance of a given word either. Call this the Formal Coincidence Argument.
It is frequently observed that English contains at least two ‘bank’ words (one of
which refers to a feature of river geography, the other to a financial institution).
FT’s sufficiency thesis provides no grounds for any such distinction. There would
just be one radically polysemous ‘bank’ word. In addition, an utterance of ‘at all’
may contain a string of sounds which duplicates the sound of an utterance of
‘tall.’ We surely do not want to say that the word ‘tall’ has been uttered, but FT
appears to require that we say exactly that.
A further uncomfortable consequence is that the form-theorist may be obliged
to say that a foreign language word which sounds just like ‘bank’ (but which has a
different meaning and an unrelated etymology, let’s say) is the very same word as
our ‘bank’ word. Taking a real world example, there is a Swedish word which is
written like the English word ‘god’, but which is etymologically unconnected to
the English word ‘god’ and which means good. Suppose it is pronounced just the
same as the English word ‘god’. Since utterances of the Swedish word are
intersubstitutable with utterances of the English word without disrupting
communication, it looks like Cappelen is committed to there being a single word
here, which just happens to be used independently with different meanings in
two different languages. Cappelen could perhaps try to say maintain that there is
a Swedish ‘god’ word as well as an English ‘god’ word, even though they share all
the same tokens. When an English speaker talks about god, they produce an
utterance which is a token both of the English word ‘god’ and the Swedish word
‘god’. This won’t do, however, because Cappelen’s notion that words are defined
in terms of brute causal potential means that he has no leeway for a distinction
between the Swedish and English words. To make that distinction, he’d have to
appeal to something other than the brute causal powers which the tokens have in
virtue of their intrinsic physical make-up.
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Finally, these kinds of problems apply not just at the level of the word but also at
the level of the sentence. For example, an utterance of ‘visiting relatives can be
tiresome’ can realise two different sentences.
At least some of these problems can be resolved within the XYC approach to
words by importing a little bit of intentionalism. After all, we can put whatever
we like in the X descriptions of our XYC conventions. We can very well specify
that it is (all and) only things produced intentionally by a speaker of English (and
which have a certain form) which count as Y. Cappelen (1999) doesn’t like this
option, but it is a coherent position which avoids some of the problems afflicting
Cappelen’s account. In any case, the present proposal still leaves the problem of
the two ‘bank’ words.
I think Cappelen just wants to bite the bullet here. He could modify his account,
insisting only that having a certain form is necessary but not sufficient for being
an instance of a given word. Unfortunately, this would at least partially
undermine the form-theorist’s appeal to RA: if form is not sufficient for
instantiating a given word, then observing an utterance with a given form cannot
get the interpreter all the way to knowing what word has been uttered.
3.4 The problem with the recognisability argument
In this sub-section I’m going to show what’s wrong with the word recognition
argument for FT, thus further undermining the view. Recall that the argument
says our success in word recognition requires that each word type be associated
with a distinctive acoustic profile. How else could we succeed? Updating the
argument in light of the discussions above, RA is as follows:
(P1) All word tokens produced in a language L are recognisable as tokens
of a single word type by competent speakers of L.
(P2´) If (P1) then each word type in L is associated with one or more
descriptions in terms of detectable, formal properties such that all and
only things satisfying exactly one of those descriptions is a token of the
type.
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(C) Each word type in L is associated with one or more descriptions in
terms of detectable, formal properties such that all and only things
satisfying exactly one of those descriptions is a token of the type.
If the argument is good the form-theorist has something to say in response to
the Chomskian challenge. As noted above, (P1) is not obviously true, but I’ve
argued that it is defensible in the light of Cappelen’s background assumptions.
My rejection of (C) will be based on a rejection of (P2´).
In §2 I tried to explain the appeal of (P2´) by using an analogy with Brian’s task
of recovering Anne’s ten sets of ten marbles, but the analogy is misleading. As
we saw in §4, the linguistic signals which interpreters have to attend to are highly
variable and unruly. Speech, for example, is often rapid and slightly garbled (e.g.
‘strornry’ instead of ‘extraordinary’). Spoken utterances exist only fleetingly and
words run into each other without pauses. Were we to excerpt individual
utterances of words from a recording of a fluent passage of speech and play
them to a test subject there is no guarantee that the subject would achieve a high
level of success in recognising the words. In normal circumstances, word
utterances appear in a context: they’re uttered by a particular person in a
particular physical and social environment, and they usually occur not in isolation
but in association with other words in sentences and conversations. This kind of
context provides additional clues to the word type of a particular utterance, in
addition to any formal clues.
How can you tell a word by the company it keeps? One way is as follows.
Linguistic competence consists partly in an internal computational capacity
which constrains the range of acceptable sentences in the language. Suppose
someone says ‘I think she’s studying’ but a loud noise obscures the first sound of
the word ‘she’. What people hear is ambiguous between ‘I think she’s studying’
and ‘I think cheese studying,’ but syntactic competence alone rules out the latter
interpretation.
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In addition, a whole host of pragmatic factors and background knowledge can
be brought to bear. Indeed, there don’t appear to be any constraints on the kinds
of information that can feed into the process of word-type recognition. In
deciding whether one’s interlocutor has said ‘I’ve bought some chips’ or ‘I’ve
bought some ships,’ one does not have to rely purely on acoustic information,
which may be ambiguous. Knowledge about the speaker and context will usually
make one or the other interpretation vastly more probable.
The processes underlying word recognition are still a subject of controversy in
psycholinguistics, but many theoretical approaches to this issue allow that such
things as background knowledge and syntactic competence play a significant role
in performing the mapping from acoustic blasts to mental representations of
words. For example, Marslen-Wilson (1987) presents data suggesting that words
are often recognised before the whole word has been heard. For example, an
utterance of the word ‘trespass’ can be identified as soon as the /p/ is heard
because the sequence /tresp/ can be completed in only one way in English. The
sequence /tres/ is compatible either with an utterance of ‘trespass’ or of ‘trestle’,
so hearing just that initial sequence is not sufficient for word recognition. We can
thus talk of the recognition point for a word. This is the point at which the acoustic
cues are sufficient to determine a single possible word type. However, Marslen-
Wilson also argues that there is evidence of a phenomenon he calls early selection,
in which words heard in context are identified before the recognition point. This
suggests that people routinely draw on extra-acoustic information in word
recognition.
Other studies indicate what kinds of extra-acoustic information are employed.
The McGurk effect illustrates that even language users with good hearing lip
read. Warren and Warren (1970) discuss the phenomenon of phonemic restoration.
Subjects are played recordings of words in which a single phoneme is replaced by
a cough. In the context of sentences talking about shoes, [*eel] (where ‘*’
signifies a coughing sound) is heard as ‘heel’ while in sentences about cars it is
heard as ‘wheel’. This suggests that knowledge of the meanings of words heard
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earlier in a sentence plays a part in word recognition. Finally, Miller and Isard
(1962) presented subjects with strings of spoken words against a background of
white noise. Under these sub-optimal acoustic conditions, they found that
subjects were better able to recognise the words if they constituted a grammatical
sentence (such as ‘accidents kill motorists on highways’) than a grammatically
correct but anomalous sentence (such as ‘accidents carry honey between the
house’). The subjects performed even worse when what they were hearing was
just a random string of words.
These kinds of phenomena suggest that hearers are able to exploit their
background knowledge, syntactic competence and even visual cues to make word
recognition judgements which are not licensed by the purely acoustic
information available. If this is right, then (P2´) is false: recognisability as an
utterance of a given word does not require recognisability solely on the basis of
formal features of individual tokens. So even if (P1) is true, and it is essential to
a word utterance that it be recognisable, this does not require that all and only the
tokens of a given word share a distinctive form-theoretic profile.
It is worth reflecting on a system of communication developed for use by deaf-
blind individuals, known as Tadoma. The Tadomist places their hand on the face
of the speaker in order to feel the movements of the lips, the jaw, and the
vibrations of the vocal cords. The linguistic signal to which the Tadomist has
access is presumably severely impoverished compared to that which is available
to language users with good hearing. They receive some formal clues – a lip-
rounding here, a temporary ceasing of vocal cord activity there, etc. – but on the
assumption that these clues do not suffice for word recognition, the Tadomist
must have recourse to other kinds of clues, including background knowledge,
etc.
The form-theorist might query the significance of this, arguing that however
Tadomists identify word types, language users who have good hearing rely
exclusively on formal features of utterances; the Tadomists have to identify word
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types using a non-standard method but this is just because they do not have
access to the rich formal clues in the linguistic signal which hearing people have
access to. However, this response gets the dialectic wrong. What the existence of
Tadoma shows is that it is possible to achieve a degree of success in word type
identification even when the linguistic signal is severely impoverished from a
formal point of view. The Tadomist faces a more difficult task than hearing
people, but the difference is probably one of degree. In the words of Rey
(2006a:247), “we’re all, as it were, acoustic Tadomists.”
3.5 What notion of form?
I want to make one further contribution to the case against FT. It concerns the
notion of form which plays a role in the theory. How should the form-theorist
characterise the forms of words? FT is commonly understood as focussing on
intrinsic form of utterances, but this is not the best way of developing the view.
RA requires word tokens to be recognisable on the basis of their formal,
detectable properties. But there are intrinsic properties of tokens which are not
easily detectable and non-intrinsic properties which are: colour is a detectable
property of inscriptions which may not be intrinsic, while being formed of a
certain kind of ink is an intrinsic property which may not be detectable. Of
course, colour and ink type have little to do with word recognition. But if
intrinsic form and detectable, formal properties can come apart, we should think
carefully about whether intrinsic form is really the notion FT needs.
I suggested above that what matters to an inscription is something like two-
dimensional shape. Now, suppose that concrete objects can instantiate two-
dimensional shapes intrinsically. The fact that an observer can only perceive that
an object has a given two-dimensional shape by getting themselves into the right
position does not entail that the object fails to instantiate that two-dimensional
shape intrinsically. The trouble is that many inscriptions get to count as genuine
word inscriptions (by the lights of RA) on the basis of a two-dimensional shape
which they only appear to have relative to some observer. This suggests that what
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should matter to the form-theorist is not the intrinsic two-dimensional form of
tokens, but something more observer-relative.
To see this, consider Utopia, an artistic installation by Georges Rousse (figure 1).
The work consists in a painted room in which it appears to a correctly positioned
subject that the word ‘UTOPIA’ is floating in mid-air. What is painted on the
walls might be a genuine instance of ‘utopia’, but if that is so in virtue of its
form, as FT says, then it is so most immediately in virtue of the form it appears
to have from one perspective. It shouldn’t matter to RA whether the paint
patches on the walls have the right intrinsic shape. They might or they might not.
This image has been removed by the author for copyright reasons.
Figure 1
Marcus Raetz’s sculpture, ‘Yes or No?’ could be described as being simultaneously
an instance of the word ‘yes’ and the word ‘no’, in virtue of the way it appears
from different positions (figure 2).
This image has been removed by the author for copyright reasons.
Figure 2
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Someone could insist that what matters is the intrinsic two-dimensional shape of
an inscription and deny that the above creations really instantiate words (or
letters/graphemes) at all, claiming that they are non-words which merely happen
to look like words. However, even mundane inscriptions might fail to have the
relevant two-dimensional shape intrinsically. For example, if the ink from a pen
seeps unevenly into the page there might be no two-dimensional slice of it which
is letter shaped. Engravings in a bulging rock face might also be problematic.
If FT is motivated by RA then the form-theorist should only care that an
inscription would appear to an appropriately situated observer to have a certain
two-dimensional shape. What is required is a certain kind of phenomenological
salience. To be sure, objects can meet this criterion in virtue of their intrinsic
shapes, but what matters to RA is not the intrinsic shape which grounds its having
the right apparent shape relative to an observer: non-intrinsic-duplicates can
ground the same apparent two-dimensional shape just as a single object can
ground multiple apparent two-dimensional shapes (see the Raetz example above).
If FT is driven by RA then it is the way inscriptions look – not what grounds the
way they look – which should matter.
On the face of it this applies only to inscriptions, and not to utterances.
However, language users deploy a variety of cognitive resources in speech
perception. The McGurk effect – in which subjects are played a recording of
someone saying ‘ba’ laid over footage of someone mouthing ‘va’ and what is
heard is either ‘ba’ or a third, intermediate sound – reveals that auditory
perceptions of speech sounds are influenced by visual perceptions of lip
movements (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976). If the acoustic form of an
utterance and the way it sounds can come apart in this way, then what should
matter to the form-theorist is not the intrinsic form of the acoustic blast, but
something like the way it appears (or would appear) to hearers who are
competent in the language and appropriately sensitive to e.g. visual cues. This
phenomenon – where sound and apparent sound come apart – is not restricted
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to exotic cases like the McGurk effect. We will encounter everyday examples
below.
There is a weaker and a stronger version of this objection. The weaker version
just says that there is an issue here for the form-theorist to address: just what is
the notion of form which features in the best version of FT, given that it can’t
just be an object’s intrinsic properties, as most form-theorists tend to assume?
The stronger version of the objection insists that results in linguistics call into
question the very idea that the forms of utterances can play the epistemological
role the form-theorist wants them to. Someone who wanted to press this
objection might note that perception of word form is apparently cognitively
penetrable. Recall the cases, discussed above, of the McGurk effect, the
equivalent pronunciation of ‘writer’ and ‘rider’ in American English, and the
variation in pronunciation of ‘in’ depending on what follows it. Most people
would be surprised that ‘in’ is pronounced differently before ‘New York’, ‘Boston’
or ‘Cambridge’. That’s not an acoustic effect which is usually phenomenologically
salient. Similarly, Rey’s point was that speakers of American English hear
apparent differences between the coronal consonants in ‘writer’ and ‘rider’ even
though there is none from an acoustic point of view. What such cases suggest is
that the way a word sounds is influenced by our expectations, background
knowledge, linguistic competence, etc., something which seems in tension with
the bottom-up view. To a certain degree, the perceived form of a word is
something which we impose upon it.
4. BAD NEWS FOR THE XYC SCHEMA
The unavailability of a form-theoretic criterion for word membership has a
deeper consequence for the Searle-Cappelen approach to words. While the XYC
schema yields a compelling story about some instances of mental/social
construction, it has some severe limitations if it is intended as a general account
of social phenomena. I’ll argue that the account is inapplicable to some kinds of
artefacts, before making the specific argument that it is inapplicable to words.
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Recall that Searle holds that status functions are imposed on existing objects via
collective acceptance of constitutive rules. The form of such rules is given by the
schema ‘X counts as Y in C’. In the XYC schema, X can be either a particular
object or a kind:
“We collectively agree that that log is a goalpost.”
“We collectively agree that banknotes with a specific form and provenance count
as five pound notes.”
For the words case, the X term has to be a general description of a kind. We
can’t have collective attitudes towards every last word token. Setting aside cases
where the X property picks out an individual object, the XYC schema requires
two ways of typing artefacts. For example, suppose we explain the monetary value
of a one pound coin in terms of a constitutive rule that certain round pieces of
metal issued by the Royal Mint have a value of one pound Sterling. That rule
presupposes that we have a description of all and only the pound coins in terms
of their shape and provenance, as well as a description of them in terms of their
value. The two descriptions have to be separable because the X properties are
taken to be metaphysically prior to the Y properties, the instantiation of the
former grounding the instantiation of the latter.
If the XYC schema is to explain the characters of all public artefacts, then for
any public artefact kind, we have to be able to provide two independent
intensional descriptions which are extensionally adequate. Searle says as much:
The bifurcation of the imposition of status-functions into the X
and Y components has some important consequences for our
investigation. First, the status expressions admit of two definitions,
one in terms of the constitution (the X term) and one in terms of
the imposed agentive function (the Y term). Thus currency can be
defined in terms of its origin and structure: certain sorts of paper
issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (X term) are US
currency. But currency can also be in part defined as, and indeed is
described on the face of US currency as, ‘legal tender for all debts,
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public and private (Y term). A touchdown is when you break the
plane of the goal line with the ball in your possession while the play
is in progress (X term), and a touchdown is six points (Y term).
(Searle, 1995:87)
The trouble is that, for many artefact kinds, we just can’t provide the double
description. For example, suppose a chess pawn is defined in terms of the moves
it can legally make on a chess board. If these facts about pawns attach to certain
objects in virtue of an XYC convention then we need an independent way of
characterising the kinds of objects which count as pawns. Such a description is
unlikely to be available because pawns are so multiply realisable. (This is where
pawns contrast with one pound coins whose production is mechanised;
additionally, damaged coins are removed from circulation, ensuring physical
uniformity).
The problem is not just that no physical description is available to fill in the X slot:
it’s hard to imagine any double description of pawns. In the absence of a physical
description of pawns, how could we fill in the X term in the schema? In order to
identify all and only the pawns, we will inevitably have to specify that we’re
interested in the things which can move in a certain way on a chess board. So if
we pack enough into X to pick out all and only the pawns, then we will already
have pawns, and there will be no need to impose any additional Y features.
Since pawns are artefacts, there are at least some artefacts whose existence does
not depend on any rule with the structure of Searle’s XYC schema. Similar
reasoning applies to words. The XYC schema requires that we can characterise a
word both in terms of its X properties (form, according to Cappelen) and in
terms of its Y properties (syntax, reference, etc.). Just as Searle needs to fill in the
X slot, Cappelen needs to fill in the ‘such and such properties’ slot. Searle implies
he expects a form-theoretic fix on the X entities, while Cappelen commits to this
explicitly.
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But the argument of this chapter has been that no single physical description can
be provided which applies to all and only the tokens of a given word. Linguistic
properties such as being a noun or referring to cats just don’t line up neatly with
independently describable types of sounds or shapes. It is always an option to
introduce extra conventions, one for each attested variant pronunciation or
orthography for a given word. But I have suggested above that there is
unconventionalised variation which cannot be accommodated in this way.
Besides, given the sheer physical variety across tokens of a word, Cappelen’s
proposal can only be made to work by positing a huge number of conventions.
Not everyone would need to be in tacit agreement with all these conventions, but
the cognitive burden on individuals would nonetheless be excessive.
I’ve said the X slot cannot be filled in with physical descriptions of kinds of
utterances. An alternative would be to say that the X entities are picked out by
some historical criterion or casual-historical lineage. I argue against this in
chapter four, although I recognise that this does not constitute a decisive
repudiation of the role of the XYC schema in a theory of words. Still, until some
alternative way of fixing the X properties (or the “such and such” properties) is
forthcoming, the Searle-Cappelen view of words looks to have some very severe
limitations.
To be clear, the objection just made is not the complaint that the X slot
shouldn’t be filled in with a description referring to an artisan’s intentions. There
is nothing to stop us putting intentions into the X slot. On my view of artefacts
we do precisely that when, for example, we seek to explain the fact that Frisbees
are banned in certain parks. On my view, Frisbees are intentional artefacts. What
makes something a Frisbee is that it is the product of a successful intention to
make something recognisable as a Frisbee. Nonetheless, when we agree to ban
Frisbees in parks, what happens can plausibly be modelled using the XYC
schema. The X slot will be filled in with a description of Frisbees (which on my
view will mention artisans’ intentions) which are singled out for the Y property
of being banned in parks. The trouble is that we can’t explain what makes
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something a Frisbee using the XYC schema. There is no pre-agreed convention
which stipulates that all and only things with a certain form are Frisbees.
Similarly, though the XYC schema may be appropriate when we’re trying to
explain the fact that some word is taboo, it appears wholly inadequate to the task
of explaining the word’s existence in the first place.
5. THE ECA ACCOUNT OF FORM
Cappelen assumes that the intentionalist shares his background assumptions
about the role of XYC conventions in grounding the tokening conditions of
words:
The disagreement between intentionalists and non-intentionalists is
over what to put in for “such-and-such” in “such-and-such
properties” in C1. The intentionalist says this should include
reference to the intentional production history, the non-
intentionalist denies this. (Cappelen, 1999:99)
This is wrong. To be sure, there could be an intentionalist position which stands
to Cappelen’s view in the way he describes. I mentioned such a view in §3.3, and
Epstein (2009) speculates that such a position could be attributed to Devitt. But
that is not my version of intentionalism. Here, I want to distinguish my account
from the XYC approach, showing that my view evades problems which afflict
Cappelen’s while also solving the following puzzle.
Kaplan (1990) was wrong when he said that form didn’t matter to word
individuation at all. Take the problem of failed word utterances. Suppose
someone intends to say ‘biology’ but says something which sounds like
‘philosophy’, or just grunts. Intuitively, they have failed to say ‘biology’. The
problem is this. We want to say that form is neither necessary nor sufficient for
being a token of a word, and we want to confine forms to a purely
epistemological role. But we need to explain why having the wrong form is
sometimes a deal-breaker.
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On the account I have provided, words are artefacts whose characters are
constitutively related to their creators’ intentions. One way in which my account
differs from the Searle-Cappelen view is that there is no need for collective
acceptance of constitutive rules. Another difference is in the structure of the
view. Recall that the XYC schema requires two ways of typing words. That is not
the case for my alternative account. Let us return to the example of the chess
pawn. The artisan intends their production to be recognisable as intended to
have a certain functional role in games of chess. If that intention is recognisable
(and acceptable), then they have made a pawn. There are many ways of making
the intention recognisable: it can be done by giving it a certain characteristic
pawn shape, but it can equally be done by making an explicit statement or merely
by placing the object (a penny say) in the pawn position on the chess board.
From a physical point of view, pawns are multiply realisable in a way which
defies an XYC account of their characters. There simply is no way of specifying
all and only the pawns by means of a physical description. There are too many
ways of making a pawn for each of them to be conventionalised through
collective acceptance of constitutive rules.
My view of artefacts offers a mechanism of social construction which only
requires one way of typing artefacts (one set of K(ind)-relevant features). These
K-making features get attached to a physical substrate, not in virtue of anyone
having an independent type-theoretic description of the physical entities that are
intended to be Ks, but in virtue of an authorial relation between an artisan and
their product. On this view, creator intention is what secures the substrate via a
kind of demonstrative relation. We don’t need an independent type description
of the things which are to be pawns, something which is agreed in advance. We
can turn any number of things into pawns on the fly just by successfully
signalling our intentions to each other.
Similarly, the ECA view of words seeks to explain how linguistic properties are
imposed on a physical substrate, but it is not committed to anyone having a
general description of the substrate. The physical entities (utterances and
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inscriptions) which have linguistic features imposed on them are picked out not
by a general description but by a kind of quasi-demonstrative relation between
individual speakers and individual tokens. The fact that a certain utterance counts
as being an utterance of ‘cat’ is not down to its having a certain independently
specifiable acoustic profile which everyone agrees is necessary and sufficient for
being a token of ‘cat’. Instead, the concrete entities eligible to be instances of ‘cat’
are picked out by being the focus of some agent’s intention that it be an
utterance of ‘cat’ (where this means ‘is intended to be recognisable as intended to
be a noun, refer to cats, etc.). Of course, such intentions are not by themselves
sufficient for an utterance to be a token of ‘cat’. Those intentions have to be
largely successfully realised. But the presence of these recognitional features does
not entail that all and only the tokens of a given word can be described in form-
theoretic terms, still less that any language user need be apprised of such a
description.
A speaker’s intentions have to be recognisable, but they do not have to be
recognisable by any canonical means. The formal properties which contribute to
word recognition are not themselves essential features of the word. The form of
an utterance provides clues, but many different forms can be clues to the same
word, and words can also be recognised by the company they keep. In light of
this, we don’t need a general agreement about the acoustic form that the Y
utterances must take. The entities which are candidates for being Y are picked
out not via a pre-agreed general description, but by the authorial relation between
a speaker and an utterance.
It’s a central part of my account of ECAs that they have a kind of
communicative function. Typically this involves structural features of an artefact
which can indicate what the creator’s intentions were regarding that object. So,
how do structural objects communicate Y properties? Doesn’t this require
something like Searle’s XYC schema? I do not think so. In the case of the chair
or wheelbarrow, the structural features which aid recognition are also the features
which enable it to perform its central function. It’s enough to be acquainted with
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a few exemplars in order to pick up on the visual cues which tell you it’s a chair.
We don’t need any kind of convention to explain this. In the case of the chess
pawn, the Y properties are typically signalled by structural features which are only
arbitrarily related to the pawn role. These structural features serve no other
purpose than to indicate that the piece is a pawn. Similarly, the red pole outside a
barber’s shop indicates you can get your hair cut for money. In these cases,
structural features are arbitrarily associated with Y features. This, to be sure,
requires something like a convention in the sense that there has to be some fairly
widespread understanding that such and such a structural feature indicates a
certain kind of intended function. But notice here that we have X features which
indicate Y features. They do not ground Y features. For something to be a pawn, it
has to be recognisable as having various intended properties (such as moving
forward only one square at a time). This will have to be indicated somehow, and
this may be grounded in a convention of some kind, but the features which make
pawns recognisable vary. In individual cases, having a certain shape makes
something recognisable as a pawn, and being thus recognisable is part of what
makes it a pawn, but there are no universal generalisations about the kinds of
things which make pawns recognisable.
Thus, my account of artefacts enables us to tell a story about the mental/social
construction of words which is a distinct rival to the Searleian XYC theory.
According to my view, there can be localised conventions about the correct way
to signal linguistic intentions. These conventions enable local forms to signal
word type without being in any way constitutive of it. In sum, the conventions
Cappelen needs are not available (see previous section), and my account does
away with the need for conventions.
Finally, the above account enables a solution to the failed word problem alluded
to earlier: if form is neither necessary nor sufficient for being an instance of a
given word, why is it that having the wrong form sometimes a deal breaker (as in
the case of intending to say ‘biology’ but just grunting, or perhaps uttering
something which sounds like ‘philosophy’)? Kaplan (1990) denies that this is in
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fact a deal breaker, but that seems a tough bullet to bite. On my view, the forms
of utterances contribute to the recognitional mechanism which bestows
wordhood on a token. Utterance forms are (local) ways of signalling clusters of
intended Y properties, but no one form is essential to being a token of a given
word type. But if your utterance fails to meet the signalling standards of any local
language community, then your linguistic intentions are unrecognisable, and no
on-the-fly agreement about word type can be arranged.
6. CONCLUSION
Form-theoretic accounts of words are species of externalism in the ontology of
language. They focus on formal features of utterances and inscriptions because
they expect these to play a distinctive role in a tempting, bottom-up story about
linguistic interpretation.
I raised a number of objections against FT. There was an easy answer available to
the Multiple Media problem, but the Diversity and Coincidence arguments show
that the form-theoretic way of categorising tokens cross cuts other theoretically
important ways of carving linguistic reality, ways which take into account, e.g. a
word’s syntactic or semantic properties. From the point of view of a syntactician,
a semanticist, or an etymologist, the categories identified by the form-theorist
appear gerrymandered: there is no obvious way of mapping the word types
which are relevant in those explanatory contexts onto formal properties of the
linguistic signal. I also raised a worry for the common assumption that what
matters to the form-theorist is intrinsic, acoustic form, suggesting that what is
needed is something more observer relative.
One major contribution of this chapter has been to articulate and then debunk
what I take to be the main motivation for the form-theoretic view: the word
recognition argument. My criticisms of that argument show that word
recognition does not require interpreters to be able to fix on stable, readily
identifiable formal features of utterances. Word type identification is an aspect of
the general task of working out what has been said, not a precondition of it. If
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the word recognition argument is the main argument for FT, then FT should be
considered to be thoroughly undercut. The form-theoretic way of carving
linguistic reality yields categories which are of no obvious interest in relation to
any pressing theoretical endeavour.
A further major contribution has been to show how the unavailability of a form-
theoretic characterisation of word types creates a problem for anyone wanting to
deploy the Searleian XYC schema in a theory of words. Finally, I have explained
how the forms of utterances enter into the ECA theory of words.
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CHAPTER 4: TWO OTHER
INTENTIONALIST THEORIES
In this chapter I criticise two other intentionalist theories of words, due to
Kaplan (1990, 2011), and Szabo (2000).
Kaplan’s (1990, 2011) common currency theory of words is well known, influential,
and contrasts sharply with my ECA theory, so in §1 I set out his view and
respond. Kaplan attempts to answer the question about what makes two
utterances utterances of the same word not in terms of formal similarity, but in
terms of a causal/historical connection between them, where this involves a
constitutive role for human intentions. Kaplan’s view is therefore a kind of
intentionalism, but the account has some serious flaws: the problem is not just
that his account does not capture the nature of linguistic expressions; it has
general flaws which can be appreciated on the basis of the account of artefacts
presented in chapter one.
In §2 I discuss Szabo’s (1999) idea that utterances and inscriptions should be
regarded not as instances of words, but as representations of them. On this view,
words, properly so-called, are abstract particulars. These abstracta are not eternal,
Platonic forms, but created abstracta, things which would not exist if not for the
activities of humans. This second part of the chapter thus addresses issues which
stand somewhat apart from the rest of the thesis. I initially became interested in
Szabo’s view because it chimes with aspects of my intentionalist approach, and it
seemed to offer a new way of thinking about word individuation, one which
would deal smoothly with the failure of form-theoretic aspirations.
Unfortunately, Szabo’s arguments for this alternative conception of the relation
between a word and its tokens are not persuasive.
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1. KAPLAN’S COMMON CURRENCY ACCOUNT
1.1 Outline of the view
Kaplan (1990) rejects the form-theoretic view of words which assumes that what
makes utterances utterances of a given word is the fact that they have a certain
form. He takes the demise of the form-theoretic view to entail an abandonment
of the type-token conception, which he views as unnaturalistic:
It seems to me in many ways that this is a sort of updated version
of the Platonic notion of abstract forms. The eternal, unchanging
Platonic forms (shapes, perhaps) are the types, and their physical
embodiments, which reflect these abstract forms, are the tokens. I
think that the token/type model is the wrong model for the
occurrence/word distinction (i.e. the utterance/word distinction or
the inscription/word distinction). The token/type model best fits
what I call the orthographic conception of a word, the typesetter’s
conception. (Kaplan, 1990:97-98)
In its place he elaborates what he calls the common currency conception of words.
Kaplan proposes that we understand the relation between a word and utterances
of it in the terms of his stage-continuant model.
I propose a quite different model according to which utterances
and inscriptions are stages of words, which are the continuants
made up of these interpersonal stages along with some more
mysterious intrapersonal stages. I want us to give up the
token/type model in favor of a stage/continuant model. This is
not, I think, simply another way of doing the metaphysics of types
under the old token/type conception, but a quite different
conception of the fundamental elements of language. I think of my
conception of a word as a naturalistic conception. Because the
interpersonal transmission of words is so central to my conception,
I adopt a phrase of Kripke’s, and I call my notion the Common
Currency conception of a word. (Kaplan, 1990:98)
On this view, words are ‘made up’ of physical objects such as utterances and
inscriptions, as well as mental events, including whatever it is about the mind
which accounts for ‘thinking’ a word and storing it in memory. A word is an
earthbound object spread out continuously in a branching pattern through space-
time. The career of a word is taken to begin with some baptismal event. People
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who encounter the word store it in memory and then go on to use it, thus
transmitting it to other people. Two utterances are utterances of the same word
just when they are connected by a continuous path of transmission. Crucially, for
Kaplan, what is stored mentally is not a mere representation of the word, but a
segment of the word itself. He thinks this is necessary to secure the continued
existence of a word even when no one is currently saying it. He writes that
“continuity comes about (in part) from links between storage in a mental lexicon
and utterances that draw upon that very stored lexical item” (Kaplan, 1990:514,
emphasis added). Given that we could all stop saying ‘Hamlet’ for a day and then
start saying ‘Hamlet’ again – the very same word - the next day, Kaplan thinks
this requires an unbroken chain of contact with the original baptismal event in
which ‘Hamlet’ was introduced:
Do things like Hamlet and ‘Hamlet’ have a continuous existence?
We do continue to think and talk about Hamlet, but not
continuously. We pause, sleep, eat, talk about other things, and
perhaps later return to Hamlet. How do we manage to return to
Hamlet after a gap? Storage! This is why I insist on including the
quiescent periods of storage of a word—inscribed, recorded, or
stowed away in a mental lexicon—as among the stages of the word.
There are performances of a word (events when a word is in
performance, when it is on the move): titterings, auditions,
inscribings, readings, and then there are quiescent stages of a word
as it lies unread in a dusty manuscript in a dark archive. If the word
‘Hamlet’ were “ended” by our not only ceasing to perform it but by
destroying these stages of storage, I do not see how that very word
could be rediscovered. The “end” of ‘Hamlet’ comes about when
there can no longer be a continuous path from the name’s creation
to a performance of it. (Kaplan, 2011:513)
What determines that an utterance is an utterance of a given word? That is, given
that a subject has been exposed to many thousands of words w1, w2…wn (via
utterances and inscriptions) what makes it the case that some utterance produced
by the subject is a continuation of wi? According to Kaplan the connection is
secured via the process of intentional repetition:
The identification of a word uttered or inscribed with one heard or
read is not a matter of resemblance between the two physical
embodiments (the two utterances, the two inscriptions, or the one
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utterance and one inscription). Rather it is a matter of intrapersonal
continuity, a matter of intention: Was it repetition? (Kaplan,
1990:104)
So a word is a continuous chain with links which are mentally stored and then
intentionally extended. The form of an utterance has nothing to do with word
individuation: the difference between two words can be “[j]ust about as great as
you would like” (Kaplan, 1990:102). What makes all the utterances of
‘omnishambles’ utterances of ‘omnishambles’ is not their shared form or any
shared linguistic properties, but rather a kind of historical continuity. The word
‘omnishambles’ just is this continuous, branching concrete object:
It is this continuity of earthly embodiment that makes two
utterances utterances of the same word, not some form of
phonological or orthographical resemblance to an ideal form.
(Kaplan, 2011:509)
Words are…like the Kaplan family. We are a disparate bunch; we
don’t look or sound much alike. But we are all members of a single
family, a single kind, if you will. What connects us are certain
relations, but they are historical in nature and not apparent to
perception… What makes two utterances utterances of the same
word is that they descend from a common ancestor. This no more
requires them to resemble or replicate that ancestor than my children
are required to resemble or replicate their parents in order to be
members of my family. (Kaplan, 2011:509)
Kaplan does not deny that the forms of utterances guide language users to a
solution to their epistemological problem of working out what word their
interlocutor intended to utter. But the metaphysical question about what makes
an utterance an utterance of a given word is settled entirely by the speaker’s
intention:
We depend heavily on resemblance between utterances and
inscriptions…in order to divine these critical intentions. If it
sounds like “duck”, it probably is “duck”. But we also take account
of accent and idiolect and all the usual clues to intention. It is the
latter that decides the matter. (Kaplan, 1990:104)
Now that we have Kaplan’s view on the table, it ought to be clear that his view
of word individuation can be easily accommodated within a background
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metaphysics of kinds and instances. Kaplan (1990) assumes that the type-token
conception requires a commitment to a mysterious world of types as ideal
Platonic forms whose tokens have their status in virtue of a resemblance to the
Platonic ideal. In reaction against this, and in order to provide an “earthly”
conception of words, he takes words to be spatio-temporal individuals. But in
doing so, he has overlooked a more natural option, which is to construe types
and tokens in terms of kinds and instances (as I have done throughout this
thesis). To be sure, the metaphysical status of kinds is one of the battlegrounds
between nominalists and Platonists, but the point is, one doesn’t have to have a
settled view on these matters in order to legitimately employ the machinery of
kinds and instances. Kind-instance talk is everywhere, both in everyday thinking
and in scientific theorising. Moreover, Kaplan’s idea that what unites the tokens
of a word is some kind of historical connection between them can be embedded
within the kind-instance approach to words. To say that some entities are
members of a kind is merely to say that they share some salient property. There
is obviously no commitment to their sharing the same physical form. On what
grounds do we group certain wines and sitcoms together with the other
Australian things? Not in virtue of a shared form. Moreover, there’s no reason to
think that the grouping of certain objects into kinds should not proceed on the
basis of those objects’ causal histories or their relations to human intentions.
Perhaps it is the case that for an animal to be an ostrich is for it to be born of
two ostriches. If so, that should not prevent us from saying that Struthio Camelus
is a kind of animal, and that a given ostrich is an instance of that kind. Perhaps
Frankenstein is a member of the kind, gothic novel, in virtue of Mary Shelley’s
intention to write a book which continued the tradition of The Castle of Otranto.
That is not an incoherent metaphysical scenario.
McCulloch (1991) makes a similar point:
Here we might represent him simply as having pointed out that
type-identity among token words is not determined by geometrical
or phonological criteria… Use of the type/token
vocabulary…merely implies that the tokens are bound together by
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some relevant resemblance or similarity. And if we adopt this usage
of ‘type’ and ‘token’, then, similarly, we can say that Kaplan’s point
is that token word-occurrences are bound together into word-types
by criteria which are neither geometrical nor phonological. This
leaves the type/token vocabulary apparently without strain, in
place. (McCulloch, 1991:74-75)
In sum, the adoption of the type-token conception is neutral with regard to any
account of the criteria by which utterances are grouped into word kinds.
Kaplan’s reasonable rejection of the strict form-theoretic view led him to an
unreasonable rejection of the kind-instance conception. Happily, he later
dropped his opposition to the kind-instance conception:
I have now concluded that the token-type terminology is too
powerful and too useful metaphorically to make it the focus of
attack. I never meant to attack the abstract notion of a kind versus
an instance of that kind. This is a useful idea, although there is an
interesting literature on whether types are kinds. What I wanted to
attack was the idea that the type was an ideal, Platonic form…and
that what made a token a token of that type was that it resembled it.
(Kaplan, 2011:509)
Unlike Cappelen’s account, the common currency account is not troubled by the
problems of diversity and coincidence. Instances of a word may vary enormously
but they will count as instances of that word just in case they are connected by
the right kind of causal-intentional chain. And there is no problem treating
‘bank1’ and ‘bank2’ as different words: the chains of intentional repetition reach
back through independent historical lineages to distinct baptismal events. That
some utterance of ‘bank1’ is a close intrinsic match of some utterance of ‘bank2’
is beside the point. The account is also intended to make sense of the fact that a
word can be manifested in speech, writing and other media. Presumably the
thought is supposed to be that since nothing in the account commits us to the
idea that there is a particular form essentially associated with an
utterance/inscription of any word, there’s no obvious reason why a speaker
cannot repeat an utterance by writing it down or repeat an inscription by saying it
out loud. However, there are some serious problems afflicting the common
currency account, as I will go on to show.
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1.2 Cognitive implausibility
Suppose Anne says ‘I’ve bought a goat’ and I mishear and later quote her as
saying ‘I’ve bought a coat.’ Wouldn’t Kaplan’s account yield the result that the
word I actually pronounced was ‘goat’? That counter-intuitive result would seem
to follow from the fact that I intended to repeat Anne’s very words. However, I
think a reply could be made here on Kaplan’s behalf. Although there was some
intention to repeat what Anne said, there need not have been any intention to
repeat Anne’s utterance. When I quoted her as saying ‘I’ve bought a coat’ the
crucial intention may have been the intention to repeat some other utterance of
‘coat’ which I encountered on a previous occasion. When I heard Anne speak I
mistakenly took her utterance to be an instance of the same kind as some earlier
utterance I encountered in the past, and it was this latter utterance that I intended
to repeat when I quoted her. Given this possibility, Kaplan could avoid the
counter-intuitive result that I was actually saying ‘goat.’
More broadly, Kaplan is not committed to the idea that when a speaker says a
word there is any particular utterance of the word which they intend to repeat.
Such a view would be deeply implausible. In response to Hawthorne and
Lepore’s (2011) suggestion that he is committed to this view Kaplan protests:
It’s hard for me to believe I said this; it is so manifestly false…
[W]e hear (or read) the word from someone else, store it in our
mental lexicon, and on a later occasion draw it from the lexicon
and use it. (Kaplan, 2011:518)
As noted above, Kaplan’s view is that when we encounter a new word, a copy of
it is literally stored in the mind. Thus, there need be no particular utterance of a
word which a speaker intends to repeat. Instead what they intend to repeat is the
bit of the word which is stored in the mental lexicon.
However, this view comes with its own problems. Kaplan doesn’t really explain
what he means by his suggestion that a word is literally stored in someone’s
mind. It is tempting to object that words cannot be in human minds any more
than unicorns can: unicorns, of course, have horns, and there are no horns in
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human brains. But that kind of argument is less persuasive in the case of words.
We can’t just point to some essential property of words which could not be
instantiated inside a brain since what properties words have is precisely the thing
at issue. Does a word have to be made of sound waves or ink? That would beg
the question against Kaplan. Also, the idea that the mind contains word-like
things has become familiar from work on the language of thought hypothesis.
Finally, one might be sympathetic to the idea that a word could be tokened in
interior monologue. In short, the idea that an instance of a word could be literally
inside a mind is not nearly as far-fetched as saying that an instance of a unicorn
could be.
Still, the idea that knowing a word (even when one is not thinking of it) consists
in having it literally stored in the mind seems too much of a stretch. A more
natural account would hold that what minds contain are representations of
words, where this is understood descriptively, and as imposing certain
satisfaction conditions. To take an (admittedly slightly flippant) analogy, consider
the activity of a professional baker: when making croissants, the baker does not
intend to replicate any particular croissant that they have encountered in the past.
They just know what counts as a croissant, and they have access to a kind of
recipe which tells them how to bring the ingredients together in the croissant
way. To my mind, this is roughly how word production works. Speakers have,
stored in memory, a representation of the linguistic profile of a word. They have
a substantive conception of what it takes to produce a given word, and they can
do so without referring back to any particular utterance/inscription of it.
1.3 Good intentions are not enough
On Kaplan’s view, a speaker selects a word from their mental lexicon and intends
to reproduce it acoustically. The successful realisation of that intention
apparently consists entirely in selecting the right word from the lexicon. After
that, there are apparently no more constraints. This means that our word
producing intentions are more or less self-fulfilling. What this means is that it
doesn’t matter if something goes horribly wrong from a physiological point of
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view. The view entails, for example, that the Reverend Spooner, when he said
something that sounded like ‘shoving leopard,’ was actually saying ‘loving
shepherd’ (Kaplan, 2011:520). To my mind, this is not quite right, and I have
provided my own account of these kinds of cases in chapter two (§4.1). But
perhaps just what to say about these kinds of malapropisms should be
considered as spoils to the victor. However, Kaplan’s account also predicts that a
drunken slur can be a successful utterance of ‘otorhinolaryngologist’ however
unintelligible it is, even if, say, the utterance only has one syllable and no
consonants. This is surely a step too far. Citing Hawthorne and Lepore (2011),
Kaplan claims to have a nice response to this worry:
Suppose someone has a terrible accident. We ask him for his name
and telephone number. He has the name and telephone number in
mind and strives to speak it; he intends to be uttering his name and
telephone number. But all that comes out is a monosyllabic grunt
that sounds a bit like the word ‘row’. Does my view that the
intention makes it so imply that the grunt is, in fact, an utterance of
the name and telephone number? It need not, because we can take
advantage of Hawthorne and Lepore’s excellent suggestion that the
right thing to say in this case is that the injured person cannot
speak. He didn’t say ‘row’, and he didn’t say what he intended to
say, namely, his name and telephone number, he didn’t say
anything at all. He cannot speak. (Kaplan, 2011:519)
As it stands, this response won’t do. What the person in Kaplan’s example
cannot do is say words. The effect of their injury is that they are no longer able to
do whatever it is one is required to do to say a word, over and above having the
right intentions. Saying words clearly requires the speaker to do something in
addition to intending to say the word. On my view, what they have to do is
produce a structured sound which adequately signals one’s linguistic intentions.
On Kaplan’s view, a speaker selects a word from the lexicon – an instance of the
word literally stored in the mind – and intends to use that word. But this is not as
straightforward as selecting a hammer from a toolbox and using it intentionally.
If there really is a mental instance of the word stored in the lexicon, that is not
the instance of the word which is then employed in speech. Rather some acoustic
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copy has to be made of the mental item. But then the question arises, given that
some attempts to make acoustic copies of mental words go awry (as in Kaplan’s
example), what makes the difference between a successful copy and an
unsuccessful one? Kaplan might object that talk of copying misrepresents his
view. The point of Kaplan’s stage-continuant model was to allow that two
utterances (or mental articulations) could be utterances of the same word even if
they do not in any way resemble or replicate each other. What is key is that they
have a shared common ancestor and are part of a continuous, branching, spatio-
temporal object. So on Kaplan’s view, an utterance is not in any sense a copy of a
mental item but the continuation of one. Still, the same question arises. Given
that speakers’ intentions to produce a continuation of a word can go awry, what
makes some utterances successful continuations while others are unsuccessful?
As far as I can see, there is no way of providing a satisfying answer to this
question without appealing to specifically intended linguistic properties of words,
as in the ECA account.
1.4 Transparent intentions
In chapter one I suggested that an artisan has to have a fairly rich conception of
the kind of artefact they are trying to make. But on Kaplan’s view, there is no
way for a speaker to conceptually latch on to a word via a description of its
linguistic properties. There is no cluster of linguistic properties which is
characteristic of that word since different spatio-temporal chunks of the word
may have radically different linguistic properties. They are all chunks of the same
word not in virtue of linguistic commonalities but in virtue of their being part of
the same network of transmission and repetition. On Kaplan’s view, when the
speaker retrieves a word from the mental lexicon what they have to do is to
intend to make another one of those things. We can think of such intentions as
transparent since they need not involve any substantive conception of any
phonetic, semantic or pragmatic properties associated with the word.
However, reprising Bloom’s example of the chess pawn, note that someone who
does not know the rules of chess can’t make a penny (or a shell) into a pawn just
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by intending it to be ‘one of those’ (pointing at an ostended pawn). For this to
work, you have to know what pawns can do in a game of chess. Similarly, Bloom
suggests that a “madman” might create a pile of dirt intending to make ‘one of
those’ (pointing to a chair) and regard their efforts as entirely successful. The
reason we don’t want to say that this is a genuine chair is that the creator seems
to be employing a concept which is dramatically different from our own
substantive conception of chairs.
What this suggests is that is that successfully realising (from one’s own
perspective) a transparent intention to make one of those is not generally sufficient
for making an artefact of the kind of which the ostended sample was an instance.
In chapter one (§3.3) I discussed the possibility of ignorant artisans, such as the
blacksmith who successfully makes a horseshoe from an exemplar despite having
never heard of horses. But this requires that someone (the person commissioning
the horseshoe) has a rich conception of horseshoes.
What Kaplan’s account gets wrong is that it rules out the possibility that
someone could in good faith intend to make one of those, and judge themselves to
have succeeded, and yet be wrong about that. Bloom’s artisan intends to recreate
an ostended chair and is satisfied with their pile of dirt. To the extent that they
consider their production successful, the artisan must have some criteria by
which to measure their success. And to the extent that we nonetheless judge
them to have been unsuccessful, we must have different criteria for what it
would take to successfully recreate an ostended chair.
Bromberger (2011) records a conversation he had with his two year old
granddaughter which illustrates the point in the case of words:
Eliza: Me play.
Sylvain: Eliza, sweetheart, say “I play.”
Eliza: Me play.
Sylvain: No, no, not “me,” “I.” OK? Say “I.”
Eliza: Me.
Sylvain: Say “ayayayay.”
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Eliza: Ayayayay.
Sylvain: Say “bye bye.”
Eliza: Bye bye.
Sylvain: Great! Now say “I.”
Eliza: Me.
It would appear that Eliza intended to repeat Bromberger’s utterance of ‘I,’ and
that she judged herself to have been successful in this regard, but the word she
actually pronounced was not ‘I’ but ‘me.’
All of this suggests that there is something fundamental missing from Kaplan’s
account. When an artisan creates a new artefact, it is an inadequate
characterisation of what is going on merely to say that they intend to make
another artefact of the same kind as some ostended artefact. Whether something
is a successful reproduction of an artefact can only be measured relative to some
descriptive criteria which establish conditions for success.
1.5 Common ancestor not sufficient
On the common currency view, to be an instance of a given word is to be part of
a causal-intentional chain branching out from an initial baptismal event. Kaplan
says that for two utterances to be utterances of the same word is for them to
share a common ancestor. This suggestion rapidly runs into problems. As Kaplan
well recognises, words change their forms, meanings and other linguistic
properties over time. The Proto-Indo-European word kind, ‘swésor’ can be
considered the common ancestor for the English word ‘sister’, the French word
‘soeur’, as well as many other words in modern Indo-European languages. This
case illustrates not just that utterances which are connected together historically
in the right way can be just too different to be considered utterances of the same
word, but also that words can be subject to fission.
One might be tempted to wave this objection away, noting that all ordinary
objects are subject to worries about vagueness and persistence. That is, after all,
the kind of reply I make on behalf of the approach to artefacts endorsed in this
thesis. But there is a sharp difference between Kaplan’s account and my own
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which means that he can’t wave these problems away so easily. On my account, I
can recognise that language change often happens in a gradual way such that we
can’t see where to draw any precise boundary between, say, a word of Old
English and its modern descendant. But I can tell you on what grounds we make
such distinctions. The Proto-Indo-European word ‘swésor’ is not the same word
as the English word ‘sister’ because they have radically different linguistic
properties: they are associated with different sounds, different phonological
systems and enter into different grammatical relations. That’s why we don’t treat
certain Indo-European utterances as utterances of modern English words.
Kaplan, on the other hand, has eschewed any appeal to the linguistic profile of
utterances. Being an instance of a given word just is being on the chain of
intended repetition. End of story. Such an account offers no way of
distinguishing between a Proto-Indo-European word and its English descendent,
no explanation of a boundary, vague or otherwise.
1.6 Multiple invention
Some artefactual kinds can be multiply invented. Knives, axes or hammers may
have been invented many times by disconnected individuals or groups. There
may be radios and boats on distant planets. Can words be multiply invented?
That is, could two completely isolated groups share a word? If they can, then we
have a counterexample to Kaplan’s claim that being part of a certain causal-
intentional chain is necessary for being an instance of a given word.
There are real examples of pairs of words which take similar forms and meanings
but which are not etymologically related. These include ‘much’ (English),
‘mucho’ (Spanish) and dog (English), ‘dog’ (Mbabaram). Intuitively, these are
pairs of distinct words despite their similar forms and meanings. This might be
thought to suggest that tokens of the same word have to be etymologically
related, that being a token of a word involves being part of a branching, concrete
individual, and that word types cannot be multiply invented.
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My view is that words could be multiply invented, but for reasons we can well
understand, this hardly ever happens. The examples just mentioned are not
genuine cases of synchronic linguistic coincidence. ‘Mucho’ is not written or
pronounced exactly like ‘much’, nor does it behave in the same way syntactically
(e.g. it’s marked for gender). I think the desire to hold that they are not the same
word reflects a sensitivity to the fact that they have different linguistic properties.
We might say that they are similar words, but not that they are one and the same.
So my claim is that the perceived distinction between ‘mucho’ and ‘much’ is not
based on a conception of words which requires a shared etymological origin but
on our sensitivity to the fact that these words have different linguistic properties.
In further support of this explanation, note that ‘banana’ (English), ‘banan’
(Norwegian), ‘banane’ (French) can be considered to be different words despite
sharing an etymology as well as many synchronic linguistic properties. There’s a
sense in which they can’t be quite the same words because they are embedded in
different languages and this inevitably means that they have slightly different
pronunciations, orthographies, syntactic properties, etc. If this explanation of the
distinction between ‘banana’-like words is right, then the distinction between
‘mucho’ and ‘much’ can be explained the same way, without recourse to an
etymological constraint on word-individuation.
The actual rarity of genuine synchronic linguistic coincidence is what drives the
intuition that multiple invention of words cannot happen. But it could happen.
According to a Wikipedia article on cross-linguistic onomatopoeia, the following
languages have very similar words for expressing pleasure in eating food (‘yum
yum’ in English):
Batak, nyaum nyaum
Catalan, nyam nyam
Danish, nam nam,
Estonian, näm näm
Hungarian, nyamm nyamm
Indonesian, nyam nyam
Korean, nyam nyam
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Tagalog, nam nam
I have no idea if these words share a common ancestor. It is at least conceivable
that similar sounding words emerged independently to express the same thing
(perhaps because saying these words resembles a sort of chewing action).
Suppose these words don’t have a common origin, and suppose that they are
pronounced exactly the same, and that they are employed in similar ways. I
would want to say that a single word had been invented multiple times.
One way you could get a genuine case of multiple invention of words would be a
scenario like the following. Suppose that a wall is built along the banks of the
Seine, isolating inhabitants of Paris’s left and right banks. Suppose that by pure
chance the populations of both the left and right banks independently come up
with a word with the same pronunciation, spelling, meaning, syntax, etc. In that
case I think we should say that a single word has been multiply invented. If you
don’t say this, there will be costs: What happens when the wall comes down? Do
the two distinct word types fuse? My answer: nothing of any metaphysical import
happens at all; there was only ever one word type.
Gasparri (2014) alleges that a Kaplan-style causal-historical account is required in
order to explain cases like the foregoing. To see the point, suppose that an
inhabitant of Paris’s left bank finds themself on the right bank and uses the word
‘boudon’ in conversation with a right-banker. Communication is unhindered, but
there is a sense that the right banker’s true beliefs about what the left-banker said
are lucky. This can be explained, the thought goes, on Kaplan’s view: the left-
banker uses the left bank word, the right-banker assumes that the right bank
word has been uttered and attributes to it the meaning that the right bank word
has. As it happens, this is the exact meaning of the left bank word, but only by
chance. In response to Gasparri, the luckiness of this case can be equally well
explained on the ECA view. On this view, what’s lucky is the right banker’s
inference that the word ‘boudon’ had been uttered, since the left banker’s
strategy for getting the right banker to realise their linguistic intentions was only
173
successful in light of an accidental matching between their individual conceptions
of the word.
1.7 The irrelevance of historical properties
One final objection to the common currency view is that the historical properties
are largely irrelevant to the roles words play in our lives. When we ask what word
has been uttered it’s because we want to know if it was a noun or a verb, whether
it referred to cats or had a certain argument structure or pejorative force.
Whether the utterance is part of some historical chain linking it with utterances
which have quite different linguistic properties is beside the point. Moreover,
people are mostly fairly ignorant of the etymologies of words and even have
many false beliefs about etymology. Neither of these predicaments undermines
communication. In short, from the point of view of ordinary language use, or of
the disciplines which attend to our ordinary conceptions of language, what
matters are typically the synchronic, linguistic properties of utterances.
Gasparri (2014) suggests that what he calls Kaplan’s account could be defended
as just one theoretical conception of words among others, one suitable for the
purposes of historical linguistics, perhaps:
The key lies in acknowledging that [the common currency account]
and grammatical typing [i.e. an approach like my own] operate at
different levels, pursue fundamentally distinct explanatory goals,
and cannot be placed in direct competition with one
another…[The common currency account] focusses on historical
ancestry and sets out to deliver a diachronic lexical taxonomy,
whereas the theoretical labour carried out in typing word tokens
based on structural-functional equivalence falls in the scope of
synchronic linguistic analysis. (Gasparri, 2016:130)
This is fair enough. If Kaplan’s view is best construed as one complementary to
mine and not contrary to it, then I need not push any harder at this point.
Nevertheless, it remains to be shown exactly why historical linguistics should
need anything like Kaplan’s common currency conception of words. After all,
that discipline could just as easily be understood as the study not of how words
change over time, but of how they change into one another over time.
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2. SZABO’S REPRESENTATIONALIST ACCOUNT
2.1 Outline of the view
What is the relation between a type and its tokens? Whatever it is, Szabo notes
that we can get knowledge about word types even though we only ever interact
with word tokens. Thus, whatever the relation is between a type and its tokens, it
must be that it can provide an epistemological warrant for knowledge of types.
Wetzel (2008:38) also commits to a constraint of this nature. She points out that
linguists (and, I would add, the folk) typically attribute properties to word types
on the basis of encountering some of their tokens, and that they do so in a
principled way. This is something which needs to be explicable in light of the
relation that holds between a word and its utterances.
Szabo (1999:147) points out that understanding the type-token relation in terms
of that between a kind and its instances would offer a solution to his problem
about how we can obtain knowledge about types on the basis of acquaintance
only with tokens.
Predicates whose nominalizations pick out kinds are projectible, so
the move we make from properties of tokens to properties of
types is a matter of legitimate inductive generalization. This
reduces the type/token problem to the general problem of
induction. Whatever explains how we can learn about the genus
Panthera Leo by observing particular lions will also explain how we
can learn about the type 'lion' by observing particular tokens of
that type. If we accept that types are kinds of tokens, and hence
that tokens are instances of their types, we have the following
solution to the type/token problem:
Instantiation view. A type T is instantiated by its tokens, and it is in
virtue of this that empirical information about a token of T can
play a role in justifying our knowledge about T. (Szabo, 1999:147)
The idea is that finding out about the properties of a kind just is finding out
what properties its instances have. For example, finding out that Panthera Leo is a
sexually dimorphous genus just involves looking at particular male and female
lions, and noting that males and females generally look quite different. Of
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course, instances of a kind typically have many properties which are not essential
properties of the kind. Some lions have three legs or are situated less than 200
miles from a rocking chair, but these are not properties of the genus. But Szabo’s
suggestion is that the epistemic problem of determining which of a concrete
particular’s properties are projectible across the kind is just the familiar problem
of induction. There is no special epistemological problem of the relation
between a kind and its instances.
Szabo, however, thinks the kind-instance model of words should be replaced by
something else. He defends the idea that words are abstract particulars and that
their tokens (whether spoken or written) are representations of them.22 This
allows for a different kind of answer to the problem about how we get
knowledge about types on the basis of acquaintance with tokens. After all,
everything I know about blue whales is based not on acquaintance with blue
whales but on acquaintance with representations of them. Learning about things
on the basis of representations is ubiquitous. Of course, we have to be careful.
Some representations are dubious or deceitful. We have to have some assurance
that a representation is reliable before we can use it to acquire knowledge about
the thing it represents. Another issue is that representations are not generally
intrinsic duplicates of their representata. Only certain aspects of the
representatum is selected for representation (e.g. the portraitist seeks to represent
skin tone but not blood type) and the representation typically has properties
which are not intended to be representational (e.g. though the portrait is made of
canvas and paint, the subject of the painting is not represented as being made of
the same materials). But these kinds of problems are common to quite everyday
cases of finding out about things (blue whales, say) on the basis of
representations of them.
That said, Szabo’s representationalist account of words and their instances does
have a more unusual kind of problem. Szabo is assuming that we have no
knowledge of word types independently of our knowledge of tokens. None of
22 Szabo’s view is given a sympathetic hearing in Ludlow (2011:58-60).
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us do. That is just supposed to be a feature of the status of words as abstracta.
You might wonder why he wants to presuppose that. After all, we know things
about numbers and it’s not clear that numbers even have tokens. Even if you
think tokens of numerals represent numbers, it still seems that our knowledge of
numbers is not entirely based on our acquaintance with those token numerals.
Though it raises deep and difficult questions in epistemology, we do appear to
have a priori knowledge about abstract mathematical objects. Perhaps Szabo’s
thought is that we can know things about those abstracta which conform to the
Platonic ideal (eternal, necessary, etc.) via a priori reasoning, whereas this is not
the case for created abstracta like words are (on his view.) In any case, he does
make the assumption that we know nothing of words independently of our
experience of word tokens, and this assumption raises an interesting issue.
I can find out information about blue whales without being acquainted with
them directly. Acquaintance with representations of them suffices. But it only
works because some people are acquainted with whales (or because they’re
acquainted with something that gives them some reason to believe in whales). If
no one was acquainted with whales (or some tangible evidence for them) then
there would be no representations of whales that I could trust (and probably no
representations of them at all.) Once at least someone has experience of whales
(or experience of other empirical phenomena that allow them to form
hypotheses about whales) then they can start to produce the representations
which will teach me about whales. Words aren’t like this on Szabo’s account. The
only way anyone gets to learn about word types is via encountering representations
(tokens) of them. Tokens, Szabo tells us, are artefacts whose function it is to
represent abstract words. Who gives them that function? Presumably we do. But
if all our knowledge of words comes from representations of them, how do we
know enough to start producing the representations? There is apparently a
vicious regress here.
Szabo does have an answer to this kind of worry. In the case of the blue whales,
our representations of them merely aim to describe something which exists
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independently of them. On Szabo’s conception word tokens are not like that.
Tokening a word (i.e. representing it) is a creative act. It is in virtue of the
representation that the thing represented exists. He immediately anticipates a
worry here:
It seems that one cannot make something by representing it, for
what is represented must exist both before and independently of
its representations. (Szabo, 1999:161)
This, as Szabo goes on to point out, is a worry which can be answered, for it
depends on an overly restrictive conception of representation. Many
representations appear to be copies of actually existing objects. For example, a
photograph can be regarded as a copy of whatever was in front of the lens. But
not all representations are like this: for example, architects create drawings and
blueprints of buildings before the buildings exist. So an option here is to say that
the first tokens of a word represent a word that does not yet exist.
If things go well, the token will spread through replication among
speakers of the language. At some point - there is no sharp line
here - the conventions that guide the use of these tokens become
sufficiently widely known, and a new word type is born. (Szabo
1999:162)
The example of a blueprint for a new building is a nice one because it illustrates
a way in which we can have representations of things that do not yet exist. It
even goes some way to showing how we can potentially obtain knowledge about
a thing based purely on encountering representations of that thing, even when
no one has ever encountered the thing directly: arguably, if planning and
investment has reached an advanced stage one can know on the basis of
observing the blueprints that the future building will be over 100m tall, square,
etc. But the blueprint example is imperfect is various ways when it comes to
illustrating Szabo’s idea about word types and word tokens. For one thing, Szabo
thinks that representing a word by uttering and inscribing tokens of it is
(eventually) sufficient for the word to exist. So representations of words have a
creative power. But no amount of drawings or blueprints can be sufficient for
the actual existence of the building. So one might still wonder how a
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representation of a word can be creative in this way. Szabo has a further example
to illustrate how this might work. Someone with the right kind of authority can
create a new national boundary just by creating a representation of it, such as by
drawing a line on a map. The national boundary example can also help illustrate
how representations alone can furnish us with knowledge. By looking at a line
drawn on a map we can determine that the new border is 200 miles long, that it
follows a mountain range or divides homogenous cultural groups, etc.
It seems appropriate to remark at this point that drawing a line on a map is not
strictly what creates the new border. A sufficiently powerful person can draw a
line to indicate where they intend the boundary to be, but the line seems just to
indicate this intention. If the national boundary thereby comes into existence,
this is because the powerful person’s intention becomes known. What’s more,
perhaps no one individual can create a national border on their own; perhaps a
sufficient number of people need to start thinking the right way before the new
boundary actually comes into existence. In any case, all that is needed is that
people know about the intended boundary. There does not have to be a wall or a
signpost on the ground.
Much of this is, of course, broadly in line with my own approach in social
ontology, though there are some marked differences. On my view word tokens
represent a speaker’s linguistic intentions. In virtue of the recognisability and
acceptability of those intentions the utterance actually constitutes an instance of
the intended word. It’s important to me that there’s nothing unfamiliar or
unearthly in this account. Words are basically just kinds of combinations of
thoughts and utterances. In contrast, on Szabo’s view, word tokens represent not
mental states (as in my view) but abstract particulars. And utterances do not
instantiate word types at all: they merely represent them.
2.2 Representation at best necessary
One potential interest of Szabo’s proposal is that it promises to cut through
certain problems which afflict other accounts of words. Recall the objections to
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form-theoretic views of words which were discussed in chapter three (§§3.1-3.4).
The Multiple Media Argument and the Diversity Argument consist in pointing
out the formal variation between tokens of a given word type. But if tokens
represent types rather than instantiate them, then this is no problem. A
photograph and an inscription can both represent a person despite having no
significant formal properties in common. The Coincidence Argument poses no
problem either: two identical photographs can represent different people
(identical twins, say). More broadly, Szabo’s approach avoids the difficulties
associated with our inability to define words in terms of properties of utterances.
In chapter two I suggested that, for a given word, there may be no single
linguistic property which is common to all tokens of the word. Again, this is no
problem on Szabo’s representationalist account. What all and only the tokens of
a given type have in common is that they represent the very same abstract
particular.
However, representing a word type could only be – at best – a necessary
condition on being a token of that type, not a sufficient one: almost anything can
be a representation of a word. For example, I might draw a red dot on a piece of
paper and decree that it represents the word ‘cat’. We can imagine that doing so
might be useful in a discussion about linguistics. The red dot represents ‘cat’ but
is not a token of it. To take another example, if I’m testing someone’s vocabulary
by reading out a pre-prepared list of words I might keep a tally of each word
type that they recognise. The result will be a series of lines on a page, each of
which represents a word type without for all that being a token of any word. So,
not all representations of word types are tokens of those types. In that case we
may wish to ask, of all the representations of ‘cat’, what makes some of them
tokens? There is a certain kind of ‘cat’ representation whose instances are all and
only the tokens of ‘cat’. So what properties do representations have to have, in
addition to representing ‘cat’ to be tokens of ‘cat’? It’s not clear how Szabo can
answer these kinds of questions.
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2.3 Szabo’s Kilimanjaro argument
Szabo asks us to consider the following inscription:
This is the name of the highest peak in Africa: Kilimanjaro.
The name of the highest peak in Africa is not a concrete particular. But the ink
patch after to colon is a concrete particular. So the inscription cannot be true. It
is false to say that Kilimanjaro is the name of a mountain in the same sense as it
would be false to say, literally, pointing to a rhinoceros, that that is the most
endangered species in Africa. The reason is that the rhinoceros is not a species at all.
However, if the token of ‘Kilimanjaro’ is a mere representation of the name,
then we can see how the sentence could be straightforwardly true. Suppose there
are no rhinoceroses around and I say, pointing to a picture of a rhinoceros, that
that is the most endangered species in Africa. Here it is understood that I’m referring
not to the picture, but to the thing it represents. The idea, then, is that the above
sentence is true because the word ‘this’ refers not to the ink patch after the
colon, but to the abstract particular the ink patch represents.
Szabo himself helpfully provides a possible response to this argument. He notes
that instances of a kind can sometimes be used to call attention to the kind
without being considered to be representations of the kind. Using his example,
suppose someone says ‘this is the largest living cat in Africa’ while pointing to a
particular lion. The utterance calls attention to a token lion, and this lion is
supposed to make you think of the species to which it belongs, but it does not
plausibly do so by representing its species. So perhaps the token of ‘Kilimanjaro’
in the example above does not represent its word type, but only calls attention to
it.
2.4 Szabo’s robot argument
Szabo asks us to consider a machine which has been designed to imitate human
speech. It does so fairly well. Any competent speaker of English is able to
understand the machine’s utterances. But the sounds that the machine produces
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are such that no human being could ever make quite those sounds due to the
limitations of the human vocal apparatus. Szabo suggests that, in such a case, the
anti-representationalist who thinks that type-token talk should be understood in
terms of kinds and their instances would be under pressure to deny that the
machine is producing genuine tokens of English words on the grounds that the
machine is producing sounds which no human could produce. On the other
hand, the representationalist is under no such pressure. After all, it is quite typical
for representations of one and the same thing to vary wildly: perhaps no
portraitist can represent a human face in quite the way a camera can, but that
doesn’t mean they do not both represent the same face.
There is, however, an easy response to this argument on behalf of the
instantiationist. The fact that the sounds produced by the machine could not
have been produced in exactly that form by humans is beside the point. For one
thing, the instantiationist is not committed to a purely form-theoretic account of
word-individuation. So what makes two utterances utterances of the same word
need not be cashed out in purely acoustic terms. But even if the instantiationist
wanted to stick with a purely form-theoretic account of word-individuation,
there is something they can say in response to Szabo. The relevant claim would
presumably be that two utterances are utterances of the same word just when
they both have some set of acoustic properties. This would not rule out that
some genuine tokens of a word could have some extra acoustic properties not
generally shared by tokens of the same word. After all, there may be some
English speakers who have such high or low voices that I could never pronounce
their words the way they do. That doesn’t mean that either of us is failing to
produce genuine instances of English words.
2.5 Szabo’s inverted word argument
Let’s turn to Szabo’s showpiece argument for the representationalist view. He
calls it the inverted word argument.
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Karel is a seventeen-year-old who has recently began to study
English. In his book, because of a series of unfortunate misprints,
there is the following chart:
13 : thirty; 14 : forty; 15 : fifty; etc.
30 : thirteen; 40 : fourteen; 50 : fifteen; etc.
He interprets this chart as any of us would, and consequently
comes to believe that ‘seventeen’ refers to 70, and that ‘seventy’
refers to 17. The mistake is perfectly manifest in his writing. But it
is not detectable when he speaks because in pronunciation he
makes the opposite mistake: he pronounces ‘seventy’ as a normal
English speaker would pronounce ‘seventeen’ and he pronounces
‘seventeen’ as a normal English speaker would pronounce ‘seventy.’
(Szabo, 1999:153)
Szabo asks us to consider what happens when Karel utters a token of the
sentence ‘I am seventeen.’ He claims that Karel fails to know what his utterance
of ‘seventeen’ refers to. Presumably, the thought here is that Karel’s utterance
only expresses the true proposition that Karel is seventeen by sheer luck, and
Karel is unaware of the lucky coincidence which yielded that result. The
luckiness of the scenario might then be thought to undermine Karel’s claim to
know what number his utterance referred to. Szabo concludes that:
[O]ur knowledge of reference is mediated by types: not knowing
what types the tokens employed in an utterance belong to
undermines the speaker’s ability to know what those tokens refer.
(Szabo, 1999:154)
Szabo says this is just what we should expect if word tokens represent their
types. This is because word tokens only represent things like chairs and numbers
indirectly. A token represents its type and the type represents chairs or the
number seventeen. So the only way Karel could know what number he was
referring to is if he knew what word type his token represented and what thing
the type referred to (the number seventeen.)
Szabo thinks the same cannot be said for the instantiation account. On the
instantiation account all Karel does wrong is misclassify his utterance. That
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doesn’t explain why he fails to have knowledge of what he is referring to. To
underscore the point he introduces another character, Vladimir:
Vladimir’s textbook is free of typographical errors and his
pronunciation is excellent. So he has neither of Karel’s problems
with ‘seventeen’. However, he is confused about grammar; he
believes that ‘seventeen’ is a verb, and has correspondingly strange
beliefs about what it is for a word to be a verb. It seems clear that
we have to say that Vladimir does not know what verbs are, but it
seems equally clear that this confusion need not interfere with his
grasp of ‘seventeen’. He does not know what kind of word
‘seventeen’ is - or at least he does not know how to classify it with
respect to a particular important division - but he is perfectly clear
about what it stands for. (Szabo, 1999:155)
In response, some kinds of misclassification are harmless. For example, Vladimir
may think that ‘pig,’ ‘skull’ and ‘think’ are descendants of Norman French words,
and that ‘prison,’ ‘arrive’ and ‘castle’ came to us from the Celts. These kinds of
misclassifications obviously do not undermine Vladimir’s claim to know what
these words refer to and won’t interfere with communication. However,
mistaking a noun for a verb does seem to be the kind of thing that would cause
trouble. I think the most important reply to Szabo is to disagree with his
assessment that Vladimir does not know what verbs are. To be sure, he may have
been induced into confusion over the correct application of grammatical terms
(i.e. over the use of certain public language words), but this doesn’t show that he
doesn’t know what verbs are. After all, he distinguishes between nouns and verbs
every day in ordinary linguistic communication. Szabo’s argument glosses over
the distinction between fully conscious knowledge (which one has acquired the
technical vocabulary to articulate explicitly) and the kind of state which is
characteristic of linguistic competence. If Vladimir couldn’t distinguish verbs
from nouns, then he would not be a competent speaker of any human language.
2.6 Are words utterance-like or thing-like?
Szabo seems to be ambivalent about word types. At the outset he gives examples
which suggest that word types have exactly the properties we tend to find
attached to tokens:
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[T]he English word ‘water’ is bisyllabic [and] the subject of the
English sentence ‘The sky is blue’ is a definite noun phrase…
(Szabo, 1999:146)
Later on, however, he seems to be thinking about things quite differently:
If inscriptions of the word ‘lion’ are representations, it seems that
their representatum must be the eternal, unchanging archetype, a
quasi-Platonic form of lion-ness.
That is not the position which Szabo actually endorses. But he tries to get closer
to a notion of what an abstract word type would be by evoking this idea of
Platonic lion-ness and subtracting the Platonic associations to allow for the fact
that word types are created at a particular moment in time. In any case, lion-ness,
appears to have more to do with things with four legs and a mane than it does
with things with syllables and argument structure.
If word types are like their tokens (e.g. they contain syllables), then the grounds
for maintaining representationalism are weakened. If word types and their tokens
have more or less the same properties (apart from the ones they can’t share, like
being abstract or being concrete) and if tokens only represent their types by
actually having the properties they represent their types as having, then it appears
that the relation between word types and their tokens is instantiation and not
representation.
On the other hand, if word-types are not like their tokens, if they are more like
Platonic forms of lion-ness, then it is not clear how we can find out anything
about word types on the basis of encountering tokens. Szabo’s insistence that we
can learn about word-types by observing their tokens appears unfounded. What
can a patch of ink on a page or an acoustic blast teach us about lion-ness? If we
don’t have a priori knowledge of lion-ness then surely the only way we could find
out about it would be to find some tokens of lions and observe them, rather than
some tokens of ‘lion’. Moreover, if the word ‘lion’ is anything like the Platonic-
form of lion-ness then it’s not clear why the word ‘lion’ should be considered to
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be a human creation (which Szabo does consider it to be), nor why the study of
words should fall within the remit of linguistics.
3. CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have considered the merits of two intentionalist accounts of
words. Kaplan’s differs sharply from my own and is a direct rival, though I hope
to have shown that the account has serious flaws, and that these flaws become
salient in light of the discussions of artefacts and social construction in this
thesis. Szabo’s account is not strictly a rival to my view, since it is principally
concerned with the nature of the metaphysical relation between types and tokens.
Nonetheless, his interpretation of that relation provides a useful contrast to my
own, and appears at first to offer a new way of thinking about problems of word
individuation. Unfortunately, that promise is not fulfilled, and Szabo’s arguments
in favour of his view are not persuasive.
So far in this thesis I have presented my ECA theory of words, drawing heavily
on discussions of artefacts in social ontology; I have advertised the advantages of
my view, notably its connections to ideas in generative linguistics; and I have
criticised other extant accounts of words. In the next chapter, I return to the
relation between the ECA view and generative linguistic theory, in order to
articulate and defuse various sceptical worries which Chomskians have raised
against the notion of public language.
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CHAPTER 5: RESISTING CHOMSKIAN
WORRIES ABOUT PUBLIC LANGUAGE
I’ve been trying to develop an account of public language words which makes
sense of their existence as part of the fabric of the social world, and as
intimately related to human intentions. My view that public language phenomena
can be fruitfully studied within the social sciences and philosophy – and even the
very existence of public languages and words – is challenged in a large literature
in linguistics and its philosophy. Sometimes these challenges appear to
recommend a severe eliminativism regarding public language phenomena.
Sometimes they are couched in terms of a philosophy of science which regards
high-level social phenomena in general as ineligible to enter into serious scientific
inquiry. Sometimes, the worry seems to flow much more narrowly from insights
into language provided in generative linguistics. The purpose of this chapter is to
address such challenges.
The sources of these arguments include Chomsky’s own writings (Chomsky,
1993, 1995, 2000), textbooks in linguistics (Isac and Reiss, 2013, Smith, 1999) and
works by Barber (2013), Jackendoff (1990, 2002, 2006), McGilvray (1999), Rey
(2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2012), Stainton (2006, 2011, 2014),
Stoljar (2014), and others. I will not attempt to provide a comprehensive
overview of this literature. Instead, I will draw on it to reconstruct a series of
arguments starting with the most radical and controversial challenges, and ending
with those which I take to be most illuminating.
To give a sense of the sceptical views expressed by some linguists and
philosophers regarding public language phenomena, it will be useful to gather
some illustrative quotations. Consider the following passage from a well-known
textbook on linguistics in the Chomskian tradition (in which the author uses the
term E-language to refer to various possible conceptions of public language):
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Concentrating on E-language (or imagining that one is
concentrating on E-language) is like concentrating on alchemy.
There is a huge amount of data, a long tradition of scholarship
which has given rise to a wealth of apparent generalizations, and a
dead-end… [M]ost people now agree that there is no such field of
inquiry as alchemy, and Chomsky argues that there is no such thing
as E-language. He introduced the term…to cover any notion of
language that isn’t I-language, but with the caveat, widely ignored,
that there is no such thing. (Smith, 1999:34)
Elsewhere, Smith writes (in only a slightly less sceptical tone):
If such social or supra-personal constructs as E-languages were
coherent and consistent, they might be the appropriate domain for
political, mathematical or logical statements, but if they are
supposed to reflect the individual human capacity for language,
they are neither coherent nor definable. (Smith, 1999:31)
Isac and Reiss write in another introduction to generative linguistics:
If we take the mentalistic approach seriously, then we have to
admit that there is no entity in the world that we can characterise as
“English”. There is just a (large) bunch of people with fairly
similar mental grammars that they can use to communicate in a way
that is typically more efficient than between what we call Japanese
and English speakers, because the so-called English mental
grammars are more similar to each other. We will continue to use
terms like “the English language,” “Warlpiri plurals,” and “Samoan
verbs,” but bear in mind that each name is just a practical label for a
set of individual mental grammars that are identical with respect to
a given phenomenon under analysis. (Isac and Reiss, 2013:16)
Such quotations illustrate the sceptical sentiments often expressed towards
conceptions which treat language as a mind-external, public entity. One aspect of
this scepticism is focussed on the ordinary notion of word. The closest analogue
to the notion of word appearing in generative linguistic theory is that of a
linguistic expression, where this is conceived mentalistically, as a cluster of
linguistic properties which characterise speakers’ mind/brains at a specific stage
of linguistic processing. McGilvray sketches the view:
According to [a Chomskian conception of words] words are
mental objects. Think of a person as having something like a
mental dictionary. The entries in this mental dictionary constitute a
188
person’s “lexicon,” which includes various “lexical items”… [T]he
lexical items of the linguist are (ideally) defined in terms of the
innately specified features that make them up. That is, they are
defined in terms of “phonological,” “formal,” and “semantic
features.” The phonological features are those that, after mental
computations, lead to the production of a sound, represented in
the “phonetic” features at the “phonetic interface” (PHON). The
formal features (N(oun), V(erb), A(djective), P(re(post)position))
and semantic features…lead, after mental computations, to the
production of a specific meaning, represented in a configuration of
features at the “semantic interface” (SEM). (McGilvray, 1999:95-96)
Chomsky indicates that this technical conception of a linguistic expression
should be construed as an advancement over the traditional externalist
conception:
I have taken an expression to be a pair <PHON, SEM>
constructed from lexical items, LI, each a complex of properties,
including I-sound and I-meaning… [C]onceptual discussions of
the nature of meaning and reference typically regard words and
other expressions as phonetic (or orthographic) units, or as
dissociated from sound or meaning; accordingly a word can change
its meaning, perhaps even both its sound and meaning, and still be
the same word. It is not obvious that these conventions make
sense… The simplest thesis is that an expression E has no existence
apart from its properties at the interface levels, PHON(E) and SEM(E)…
(Chomsky, 2000:175, emphasis added)
In keeping with the position adopted throughout this thesis I do not intend to
question the reality of the theoretical posits of generative linguistics. That
science has yielded powerful insights and is deserving of a scientific realist
attitude. What I want to resist is the idea that admitting I-languages into one’s
ontology forces public language out of it, or that the advent of generative
linguistics should signal the end of theoretical inquiry into public language. I
should stress that although radical attitudes towards public language are
frequently expressed by generative linguists, many of them have expressed
conciliatory views similar to my own. At its most cogent, the critique of public
language boils down to signalling that inquiries into I-language or public language
reflect different explanatory concerns, involve different methodologies, have
different criteria for success and different prospects for achieving that success.
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But less enlightened critiques also persist, so it is worth setting them out clearly
and responding to them. The arguments to be considered in this chapter break
down into three kinds:
§1 addresses no such thing arguments. These aim to show that mind-external words
should be eliminated from any sensible ontology. These are radical and
controversial views, and the arguments in favour of them are not compelling, or
so I argue.
§2 addresses a more moderate kind of argument than that presented in §1. No
science arguments allege that artefacts – and in particular words – are somehow
inapt for entering into the scientific way of thinking. This raises interesting issues
in the philosophy of the social sciences, but no has no devastating implications
for inquiry into public language. I respond by pointing out that many successful
scientific disciplines do attend to public language words (and other social
entities). I also respond to the worry that since words (and other social entities)
are partially constituted by human beliefs and intentions – at least on my view –
members of a linguistic community are somehow protected from error regarding
linguistic entities, something which would seem to make scientific inquiry
pointless.
I turn in §3 to what remains of the Chomskian critique of public language,
finding a reasonable stance which justifies and explains the Chomskians’ focus
on I-language and their ambivalence about public language. One aspect of this
stance is a commitment to the idea that the significance of linguistic externalia
has its source in the linguistic makeup of speakers, a position which encourages
an internally directed, psychology-led inquiry into language. In light of this,
externalist conceptions of language simply don’t enter into generative linguistic
theorising in any significant way. Another aspect is a methodological preference
for the methods of the hard sciences which require theorists of language to
idealise away from the chaotic complexity of social phenomena. I find these
features of Chomskian philosophy to be plausible and insightful, and to have a
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cautionary value to philosophy of language. They do not entail any kind of
eliminativism regarding public language phenomena. In fact, I believe this strand
of the Chomskian critique presupposes something like my ECA theory of
words. It is by attributing this presupposition that we can interpret the sceptical
arguments most charitably. The remaining differences between me and the public
language sceptics largely boil down to differences of interest and different levels
of optimism regarding philosophical inquiry into the chaotic world of public
language.
1. NO SUCH THING ARGUMENTS
Philosophy is replete with arguments against the existence of ordinary objects,
including causal redundancy arguments, sorites arguments, problems of material
constitution, and others (see Thomasson, 2010 for a survey). It would be
impossible to discuss each of these in this thesis. In a sense, such issues are
orthogonal to present concerns since they affect non-artefacts as well (e.g.
persons). Admittedly, the range of potential solutions is not always the same for
artefacts and non-artefacts, but I will set such problems to one side. My focus
will be on sceptical arguments which bear specifically on the status of words as
human artefacts.
1.1 Rey’s eliminativism
As discussed in chapter two, Rey defends a robust representationalist
interpretation of generative linguistics, according to which the natural
phenomena which linguists are tracking with their theoretical grammars are
contentful states of individual speakers’ mind/brains. With this assumption in
the background Rey argues that sentences, words, morphemes, phonemes, etc. –
Rey calls them standard linguistic entities, or SLEs for short – are intentional inexistents
like unicorns and Sherlock Holmes. I-language states represent the
speaker/hearer’s environment as containing entities with linguistic properties, but
there are no such entities. Words and sentences are a mere illusion. The illusion,
argues Rey, is harmless: linguistic communication is a kind of folie à deux in which
speaker and hearer are both systematically tricked into interpreting acoustic
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signals as actually instantiating linguistic properties which they do not. I’ll
describe Rey’s arguments and position in more detail before offering my
response.
According to Rey’s (somewhat marginal) interpretation of generative linguistics,
the job of the linguist is to provide a grammar, where this is construed as a
theory of a cognitive system which performs computations over contentful
mental states. The output of the language faculty is thus construed as a
description which represents a speech signal as having a certain structure. For
example, a competent speaker would represent the sentence ‘John seems to Bill
to want to help himself ’ as having the structure in figure 3 (the example and the
phrase structure diagram come from Rey, 2006a:245):
Figure 3
According to this analysis of the sentence it has a specific hierarchical structure.
On Rey’s interpretation of linguistic theory, the speaker literally represents the
acoustic blast as having this structure. His eliminativist argument then proceeds
as follows: the speaker represents the acoustic blast as having the structure
shown in the diagram. But no entity in the vicinity of the speaker actually has
that hierarchical structure. Utterances of the sentence do not. Neither do
inscriptions of it. In fact, there just isn’t anything in the world which has that
hierarchical structure. So the sentence does not exist anywhere, any time.
192
The second premise – that nothing concrete has that hierarchical structure –
requires a little care. In fact, my rejection of Rey’s argument will be based on a
rejection of this second premise. But there is something which is right about it:
the properties which we represent the sentence as having are not intrinsic
properties of the acoustic signal, nor of an inscription. A Martian scientist with a
Mary-like mastery of acoustic science could determine all the acoustic facts
about an utterance, including every energy intensity at every frequency
throughout its duration. Would this exhaustive study of the acoustic properties
of an utterance allow them to recover the structure in the tree diagram? I think
not. In this sense, utterances and inscriptions do not instantiate the properties we
take the sentences they are utterances and inscriptions of to have.
Recapitulating, the sentence has a hierarchical structure. The utterance does not.
Therefore the utterance is not the sentence. In fact nothing has that structure. So
the sentence doesn’t exist. Arguments of this kind could be multiplied across an
indefinite range of linguistic properties. Let me briefly note another example
mentioned by Rey. Rey notes that the sentence in ‘John seems to Bill to want to
help himself ’ is analysed as featuring the phonologically null elements, trace and
PRO. These phonologically null elements are a well-grounded aspect of current
linguistic theory and are as real a part of the sentence as the word ‘help’. They
are essentially words with no sound properties. They are part of the structure of
the sentence. They both refer to John. But these phonologically null elements are
not present in the acoustic signal, nor are they inscribed on paper.
You might think that, even if the hierarchical structure of the sentence is not
realised within the acoustic stream, at least the phonemes – the basic building
blocks of SLEs – are. For example, ‘cat’ is made up of three distinct segments,
each a phoneme of English, and the sentence invoked in ‘John seems to Bill to
want to help himself ’ is a string of 34 phonemes. Perhaps an acoustic stream
counts as a token of a certain SLE in virtue of being a certain string of
193
phonemes. However, as Rey explains, the reality of phonemes is as much an
illusion as the reality of sentences.
There are many phenomena discussed in the literature which give a feel for this
point (Jackendoff (1990), Fodor et al. (1974)), but I’ll keep it brief, especially
since the issue was broached in chapter three (§3.2). At the phonological level of
representation, SLEs can be naturally chopped up into these discrete units,
phonemes. Acoustic blasts cannot be so chopped up. To be sure we can chop the
stream up into discrete units any way we please, but the Martian scientist
wouldn’t find anything in the physical signal which determined that it should be
chopped up in a way which corresponds to the sequence of phonemes we think
are there. Also, even we won’t find it easy to chop the stream up in the way we
want. Jackendoff (1990:58) makes the following observation: ‘tap’ and ‘back’ are
each made up of three discrete segments and they share the same middle
segment. One and the same phoneme appears in each word. But from an
acoustic point of view, there is no distinct element that utterances of the two
words share. In each case the vowel sound is modified by the consonants which
surround it. To take another example, in English, regular verbs are marked for
past tense by a suffix, ‘-d’. So ‘play’ becomes ‘played’. ‘Join’ becomes ‘joined’.
‘Hug’ becomes ‘hugged’. What about ‘kiss’, ‘pick’, and ‘hop’? These become
[kist], [pikt], and [hopt]. The words ‘kissed’, ‘picked’ and ‘hopped’ are mentally
represented as featuring /d/. It’s just that it gets transformed by the unvoiced
phonemes which are adjacent to it. When we pronounce those words, no /d/
ever gets produced.
Rey takes observations such as these to show that while representations of SLEs
play just the role in our cognitive economy which they are taken to play
according to generative linguistics, the SLEs represented do not exist. Bits of text
and bits of speech are not SLEs, nor tokens of them, for these concrete
phenomena do not in fact have the properties we take SLEs to have. Nothing
does. Natural language expressions are not tokened in speech and writing and
they’re not tokened anywhere else either. There are no words or sentences, just as
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there are no ghosts and no phlogiston. There are only representations of SLEs,
stable contents of computational states. We’re subject to a harmless but
persistent illusion that the utterances we produce have the properties which are
ascribed to SLEs. This may create the impression that we literally hear and see
words and sentences, though we in fact do not.
How, then, is human communication possible? After all, you might have thought
that communication is possible in light of the fact that a speaker actually
produces tokens of words which a hearer is able to recognise and determine the
meaning of. Here is what Rey has to say on the matter:
The hypothesis that I find implicit in at least much phonological
research is what I will call the “folie à deux” view: the human ability
to speak natural languages is based on the existence of a special
faculty that includes a system for the intended production and
recovery of SLEs. To a first approximation, instructions issue from
speakers’ phonological systems to produce certain SLEs, and these
instructions cause various motions in their articulatory systems,
which in turn produce various wave-forms in the air. These wave-
forms turn out, however, not to reliably correspond to the SLEs
specified in the instructions. All that seems to be true is that when
they impinge on the auditory system of an appropriate hearer, this
hearer's phonological system will be able to make an extremely
good guess about the intentional content of the speaker's
instructions, not about any actual SLEs, which, ex hypothesi, never
actually got uttered. Indeed, this sort of guessing in general is so
good, and the resulting perceptual illusion so vivid, that it goes
largely unnoticed, and speakers and hearers alike take themselves to
be producing and hearing the SLEs themselves. It is in this way that
it's a kind of folie à deux: the speaker has the illusion of producing
an SLE that the hearer has the illusion of hearing, with however
the happy result that the hearer is usually able to determine
precisely what the speaker intended to utter. Indeed, were SLE
tokens actually to exist, it would be something of an accident.
Their existence is completely inessential to the success of normal
communication and to the needs of linguistic theory. (Rey,
2006a:239-240)
On this view, the phenomena which constitute the physical medium of linguistic
communication are not to be conceived as realisations or tokens of SLEs, but
they still have a pivotal role in communication. Rey tells us they are like ‘clues’
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which help a hearer to infer which SLE the speaker intended to deploy, but they
are not themselves SLEs. The amount of information conveyed by these clues
may vary according as the speaker speaks quickly or slowly, articulates with more
or less precision, etc. The physical signal which hearers are required to interpret
may even be degraded by the presence of background noise, speaking over a
telephone – or in the case of a text – by intentional or accidental damage. But
even in optimal cases, the physical signal will not be sufficient to determine all
the properties of the intended SLE, for many of the SLE’s properties will not be
in the physical signal.
Suppose we accept Rey’s background assumptions about the representationalist
interpretation of generative linguistics. Suppose we also accept – as I think we
should – that properly linguistic properties are not intrinsic properties of
acoustic blasts. This does not entail that the blast is not a token of an SLE. What
Rey’s argument glosses over is the possibility that the blast could constitute an
SLE token in virtue of its relational profile.23
Consider the following line of reasoning: a contract is a legally binding
agreement between two people. But this piece of paper does not have the
property of being a legally binding agreement between two people. If the
Martian scientist inspected it they could never determine that it possessed that
property. Therefore this piece of paper is not a contract. In fact nothing is.
Contracts do not exist. What has gone wrong here? We have overlooked the
relational properties of the piece of paper. That this piece of paper is legally
binding is not true in virtue of the paper’s intrinsic properties. It is binding in
virtue of its relational properties. A similar point could be made about Marcel
Duchamp’s urinal. What makes it a work of art? Surely not its intrinsic
properties.
What is plausible in Rey’s assertion that bits of text and speech don’t have some
of the properties which we take SLEs to have, is that they don’t have them
23 This objection to Rey echoes Devitt (2006).
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intrinsically. But the premise Rey needs in order for his anti-realist argument to
go through is the claim that bits of text and speech do not have those properties
tout court. This latter claim, I suggest, can be denied. Specifically, my ECA theory
of words is one way of making good on the assertion that acoustic blasts
constitute SLEs in virtue of their relational profile. That is, in virtue of an
authorial relation between a speaker and their utterance by which the speaker
intends the blast to be recognisable as having been uttered with certain intentions
in mind, acoustic blasts can be viewed as having linguistic structure projected
onto them.
Rey thinks he can maintain his SLE eliminativism alongside a realist attitude to
ordinary objects such as his Honda. This is because while our mental
representations of utterances impose linguistic conditions which are not met, by
contrast, our concept of a Honda imposes conditions which are met (by an
object in Rey’s garage, for example). What are the conditions which have to be
met if a thing is to be a Honda? One thing is for sure, they are not purely
intrinsic conditions. Hondas have to have been made in Honda factories, or to
have been commissioned by the Honda corporation. Perhaps Hondas are things
which are made with certain intentions in mind, as in the theory of artefacts in
chapter one. So if Rey is going to allow that non-intrinsic properties enter into
the individuation of artefacts it’s not clear why he thinks our representations of
acoustic blasts impose conditions which are not met. To be sure, they do not
meet those conditions in virtue of their purely acoustic properties, but the
correct thing to say would appear to be that many aspects of our mental
representations of utterances do not impose acoustic conditions in the first
place. If we mentally represent an acoustic blast as featuring an instance of PRO,
why assume that this imposes an acoustic constraint on the blast? On the ECA
view we could argue that for PRO to be instantiated in an utterance is for the
speaker’s intention that PRO be instantiated be recognisable.
Ultimately, Rey cannot pick and choose in the way he wants. He thinks he can
deny the existence of SLEs but maintain the existence of Hondas and other
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artefacts. However, if the argument works at all, it will be too powerful and end
up ruling out just about all ordinary objects. After all, what would Rey say about
chess pawns? There are certain conditions on being a pawn. Presumably, these
relate to the moves a pawn can make on a chess board. That a particular piece of
carved wood has the relevant chess-functional profile cannot be understood in
terms of the piece’s material makeup. Does this mean that Rey should be a pawn-
eliminativist? It is hard to see what could justify such contrasting attitudes to
words and pawns. I recommend my ECA theory for both.
In short, I believe that the ECA view is preferable to Rey’s folie à deux. One
reason for this is that Rey’s argument is too strong: it ends up ruling out vast
swathes of ordinary objects. In addition, the ECA view helps avoid a further
kind of problem pointed out by Barber (2006, 2013), according to whom Rey’s
view creates a puzzle about the transmission of knowledge through linguistic
testimony.
1.2 Idealism about words?
In a popular textbook on generative linguistics, Isac and Reiss present an
argument which appears to recommend a kind of idealism about words. On this
view, it’s not that words aren’t real. They are. It’s just that they are strictly mental
entities. By way of example, they ask us to consider a Kanisza figure, an example
of which is shown below:
Figure 4
Most people have a perception of a downwards pointing triangle in the middle
of the figure. However, from a purely physical point of view we can measure the
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light reflecting off the page and determine that there is no physical distinction
between the area of white ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the triangle. Isac and Reiss
explain this by saying that the mind is organised in such a way as to impose a
triangle “on the page” (Isac and Reiss: 2013:22). However, this is just informal
talk. They do not believe that the mind imposes a genuine triangle on the piece
of paper in front of the observer’s eyes. Rather the impression as of a triangle is
a property which is imposed on the observer’s perceptual experience. In other
words, the triangle is an illusion. Noting the analogy with linguistic properties
such as word boundaries and hierarchical sentence structure they conclude:
There is no such thing as Warlpiri or the Warlpiri word for
“child”… [T]here are just a bunch of humans whose minds contain
similar kinds of rules and symbols that we informally group
together as Warlpiri. Similarly there is no triangle or rectangle on
these pages, but humans…all construct the same percept upon
exposure to this page. (Isac and Reiss, 2013:26)
Thus far the argument exactly parallels Rey’s, but where Rey explicitly embraces
SLE eliminativism, Isac and Reiss make some rather obscure remarks about the
‘reality’ of the triangle, suggesting that if we choose to deny that the triangle is
real then we are using ‘real’ according to an arbitrarily decided definition. They
also claim that it would be “uncomfortable” to describe our typical perceptual
experiences of Kanisza triangles and words as delusions. Moreover, they go on
to say, it would have the consequence that the science of linguistics studies
entities which are not real. What they prefer to say is that linguistic science
discovers perfectly real entities which happen simply to be remote from our
everyday experience of medium-sized dry goods. What is not clear is whether
Isac and Reiss believe that words, languages, and Kanisza triangles are identifiable
with mental structures and events. That is the interpretation which is suggested
by their discussion of the Kanisza triangle. After all, they believe that the
perceived triangle is real but deny that there is a physical triangle. What other
candidate for the real triangle is there if not some feature of the observer’s
mental state?
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Such a position would seem to embody a serious mistake. The fact that ghosts or
Sherlock Holmes are not real does not entail that they are ideas. Nor does the
fact that we have a perception as of a triangle entail that there really is a triangle
somewhere. Nonetheless, in the previous chapter – in connection with Kaplan’s
view that words are literally stored in memory – I commented as follows: “It is
tempting to object that words cannot be in human minds any more than
unicorns can: unicorns, of course, have horns, and there are no horns in human
brains. But that kind of argument is less persuasive in the case of words. We can’t
just point to some essential property of words which could not be instantiated
inside a brain since what properties words have is precisely the thing at issue.
Does a word have to be made of sound waves or ink? That would beg the
question... Also, the idea that the mind contains word-like things has become
familiar from work on the language of thought hypothesis. Finally, one might be
sympathetic to the idea that a word could be tokened in interior monologue. In
short, the idea that an instance of a word could be literally inside a mind is not
nearly as far-fetched as saying that an instance of a unicorn could be.”
All the same, it’s one thing to suggest that words can sometimes be instantiated
in the mind and yet another thing to suggest that words are only ever instantiated
in the mind, which appears to be Isac and Reiss’s view. The real problem with the
argument parallels that of Rey’s. Rey insists that representations of SLEs impose
conditions which are not met and the argument ends up threatening to eliminate
vast swathes of ordinary objects from our ontology. Isac and Reiss, on the other
hand, make the idealist move of identifying words with mental entities. But the
danger here is that if the argument were successful it would bring with it a kind
of wholesale idealism about social phenomena.
There are echoes of Jackendoff (1983, 2002, 2006) in this position. Jackendoff
(2002:303-304) denies that it makes sense to say that words, fictional characters,
social entities and auditorily perceived objects are “objects in the world.” Instead
they are objects in “the world as conceptualised by [a language user].” On one
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reading this could be taken to chime with my ECA approach. But Barber (2006)
interprets him as a full-blown idealist:
Idealists say that, despite never being realized in acoustic events,
sentences are realized in the minds of language users. Ray Jackendoff
adopts this position in claiming that discrete vowels and words
(along with shapes, musical structures, and, presumably, syntactic
structures) are elements in a ‘projected world’, not a real world ‘out
there’. (Barber, 2006:14, emphasis added)
This would be a fairly radical view. It’s not just words which turn out to be
mental entities on this interpretation of Jackendoff ’s view but also Wyoming and
the Mississippi River:
There is nothing tangible about Wyoming… It is a purely politically
constructed entity, its rectilinear boundaries fixed by a stipulative
act. We can touch the Mississippi River, and swim in it. But is the
river the water contained in it, the bed of the river, the complex of
the two? Exactly where does it end in the Gulf of Mexico, and
exactly where does its tributary, the Missouri end in it? One can
draw arbitrary lines on a map, but these are understood as matters
of convenience and not some sort of “natural truth about the
world.” (Jackendoff, 2002:301)
I am unsure whether Jackendoff is the idealist Barber takes him to be. For all his
talk of “pushing “the world” into the mind of the language user…right along
with language” (Jackendoff, 2006:226) he also talks about Wyoming’s “rectilinear
boundaries.” Wyoming is thus an entity with spatial properties and is presumably
too big to fit into anyone’s head. On the other hand, the following quotation
suggests the idealist interpretation:24
I would not blame the reader for being a bit suspicious of this
expression “the world as conceptualized by the language user.” It
smacks of a certain solipsism or even deconstructionism, as
though language users get to make up the world any way they want,
as though one is referring to one’s mental representations rather
24 Also: “[W]e should properly think of “the perceptual world” (or “phenomenal world”…) not as
absolute reality but as the “reality” constructed by our perceptual systems in response to whatever is
“really out there… Thus the perceptual world is reality for us. Apart from the sensory inputs, percepts are
entirely “trapped in the brain”; they are nothing but formal structures instantiated in neurons. But the
perceptual systems give us the sense, the feeling, the affect, of objects being out there. We experience
objects in the world, not percepts in our heads. That’s the way we’re built. (Jackendoff, 2006:228-229)
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than to the things represented. And indeed, there seems little
choice. [T]he conceptualist position, has no direct connection
between the form of concepts and the outside world. On this
picture our thoughts seem to be trapped in our own brains.
(Jackendoff, 2006:226)
It thus appears that the view defended by Jackendoff and Isac and Reiss is not
the moderate view embodied in the ECA approach which considers social
artefacts (for example) to be partially constituted by human intentions, but real,
mind-external entities nonetheless. Their view appears to be the radical one that
words are really inside minds. As these authors recognise, the kinds of features
of words which they take to support an idealist theory of words are also features
of ordinary non-linguistic objects, so the view amounts to a radical, wholesale
idealism. It’s not clear why anyone should want to believe that.
It should also be noted that Isac and Reiss’s worry about linguistics studying non-
existent entities can be resolved without making the idealist move they propose.
One can be a word eliminativist like Rey and still think that the mental processes
and representations of words are real. What linguistic science studies are the
cognitive processes underlying our linguistic behaviour. Whether or not such
states are such that their bearer could be held to be in error or to be experiencing
an illusion is beside the point from the perspective of science. The mental states
themselves are real and a perfectly worthy subject of study. Similarly, a cognitive
psychologist studying religious belief is not faced with a choice between believing
in God or asserting that they are studying entities which are not real. They study
people’s beliefs about God. Whatever the facts about God, beliefs about God do
appear to be real and might be worth studying from a scientific perspective.
In this section I have considered two fairly radical perspectives on words arising
from similar presuppositions in generative linguistics. Rey’s eliminativism
concludes that there are no such things as words (or sentences or phonemes, etc.)
Speakers are deluded into thinking that acoustic blasts have linguistic structure,
but in fact, nothing in the world has that structure. This doesn’t hinder
communication because we are all deluded in the same way, so the mistakes
202
cancel each other out. And it doesn’t involve censuring linguistics, since that
discipline is thought of by Rey as studying speakers’ mental representations,
which are real, even if the things they represent are not. (Although, as discussed
in chapter two (§2.2), Rey’s strong representationalist interpretation of linguistics
is controversial.) Isac, Reiss and Jackendoff think that words and sentences are
real, but they appear to identify them with strictly mental phenomena. I’ve
suggested that the problem with these arguments is that they pertain to quite
general features of the manifest image, and do not arise in light of phenomena
which are specific to linguistic matters. Thus, what these authors recommend is
either a wholesale eliminativism about ordinary objects, or a wholesale idealism.
These are radical options, and the arguments considered here do not exclude
pursuing the ECA approach to words and other artefacts. We will therefore turn
our attention to arguments based in philosophy of science, and subsequently to
matters more narrowly relating to generative linguistics.
2. NO SCIENCE ARGUMENTS
There is another strand to the criticism of public language associated with
linguists and philosophers influenced by Chomsky. It is an approach which
accepts the existence of ordinary words and languages, perhaps even assuming
something similar to the ECA view of words, but which argues that such entities
are for some reason not proper objects to feature in scientific discourse. In this
section I will canvass a range of such arguments and provide a response.
2.1 Resolvable by fiat
Stainton (2006:919) suggests that public language phenomena are attended by
questions whose answers seem to be resolvable by fiat: “Rather than calling out
for discovery of something real, these seem matters of decision.” For example,
Stainton asks whether ‘forge’, meaning to create a fraudulent imitation and
‘forge’ meaning to shape metal with fire and a hammer are distinct words or
really just one and the same word, and whether ‘forge’, ‘forged’, ‘forges’ are
distinct words.25 One problem with this is that it’s not so clear that these
25 This kind of objection echoes Jackendoff ’s claims about Wyoming, mentioned in §1.2.
203
questions can only be settled arbitrarily. In formulating a semantic theory, say, it
might be necessary to make a decision one way or the other, but then the choice
would be made in terms of the contribution it makes to the overall virtues of the
theory. This is compatible with the way Stainton puts the point in a later paper
(2012): there, he notes that “insofar as [the boundaries between words] get
precisified, it cannot reasonably be done in terms of ‘physical properties’.” This,
of course, is something I have argued for (especially in chapter three). Expanding
upon Stainton’s remark, and in light of the view developed in this thesis, we can
say that wherever the joints between words types lie, they are a reflection not of
physically detectable differences in speech signals, but of the way humans
represent or think about those speech signals.
Similar points can be made regarding the individuation of utterances. Are
utterances just the physical blasts of sound and air which come out of people’s
mouths? Or do certain extensions of these blasts count as utterances too? When
we listen to recordings of Winston Churchill’s speeches, is what comes out of
the speakers or headphones describable as instances of words or just as
representations of them? An analogy with sign language would suggest that what
come out of the headphones are not utterances but mere representations of
them: a photograph of a manual gesture is not a manual gesture but a
representation of one. On the other hand, an analogy with inscriptions is less
clear: is a photograph of an inscription an inscription, a representation of one,
or both? Whether a photograph of an inscription is an inscription or a
representation of one may depend on the intentions of the photographer.
In short, words (and utterances of them) seem to be individuated in ways which
depend on our decisions and our intentions, while one way of thinking about
science assumes that it inquires into how things are objectively, independently of
our decisions and intentions.
Ultimately, my response to this argument (as well as others considered in this
section) will be to question whether the fact that words depend on our intentions
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and decisions (or have a normative character, depend on our interests, etc.) really
implies that they are ineligible to enter into scientific discourse. I’ll make that
response in §2.4. In the meantime, I’ll continue to canvass the different forms
the no science arguments can take.
2.2 Normativity
Stainton (2006) suggests that certain forms commonly employed by children
such as ‘runned’, ‘broked’ and ‘swimmed’ are not genuine English words. He also
notes that there is a sense in which ‘hopefully’ is not supposed to mean ‘it is to
be hoped that’, and that a dictionary reveals the existence of the English word
‘peavey’, even though hardly anyone knows or uses it. He concludes that what
counts as a word depends on normative factors. What words there are in the
language is somehow a reflection of the ways people are supposed to speak:
“Clearly, what rules these words in or out is not how people do speak, but rather
something about how they should speak” (Stainton, 2006:920).
One of the triumphs of linguistics has been the adoption of a descriptive and
explanatory approach to language which sets aside normative attitudes to
language. That methodological stance has permitted a wide range of inquiry into
the cognitive processes underpinning our linguistic behaviour. For example, the
fact that children overgeneralise rules for past tense forms is often offered as
evidence for the existence of an internalised set of grammatical rules. Serious
scientific inquiry, the thought goes, benefits by abstracting away from people’s
normative attitudes to the objects under study.
One can of course reply that a theorist of public language could either attend to
or ignore normative attitudes towards words like ‘runned’ and ‘hopefully’ without
in either case denying that ‘runned’ is a word of English (though used mostly by
children) or that ‘hopefully’ has a public language meaning equivalent to ‘it is to
be hoped that.’ But a deeper point is that public language, as I have construed it
in this thesis, is inherently normative. The main thrust of Thomasson’s (2014)
work on public artefacts was to show that artefacts have a normative dimension.
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On her view, that something is intended to be regarded or treated in a certain
way (a crucifix, say) can be criterial for membership of a given artefact kind. On
my ECA view, speakers intend for their utterances to be regarded in a certain way
(as having certain intended linguistic properties). But not just any intention will
be successful. If someone intends an utterance which sounds like ‘cat’ to refer to
dogs, they will fail in their intention. There is a limited range of accepted ways of
signifying the ‘dog’-intentions. These consist in conventional associations
between phonological forms and other linguistic properties. These conventions
come with norms. The person does something wrong when they say ‘cat’ and
mean dog. They fail to utter the word ‘dog’ because their utterance does not meet
accepted standards for uttering ‘dog’.
In short, the present version of the argument holds that the normative character
of words (and other artefacts) is what makes them ineligible for scientific
theorising. Science tries to describe how the world is, and to explain why it is that
way, and ignores people’s attitudes regarding how the world should be. (Again, my
reply to the argument will be provided shortly.)
2.3 Interest relativity
A further kind of argument centres on the fact that words and public languages
are individuated according to criteria which reflect socio-political concerns. For
example, the languages of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia are differentiated for
cultural and political reasons, and not for any linguistic reasons:
The name ‘Serbo-Croat’ was officially adopted with the formation
of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (known as
Yugoslavia from 1928)…This situation lasted until the collapse of
Yugoslavia in the wars of 1991–1995. Since the establishment of
the independent states of Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia
and Montenegro (still officially known as Yugoslavia until 2003),
the term ‘Serbo-Croat’ no longer has any official validity in
sociopolitical terms. The language spoken in these countries is now
officially known as Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, respectively. In
linguistic terms, the standard language remains essentially the same,
but the sociopolitical reality is that it no longer has a single name.
(Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2006:259-260)
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Suppose, then, that the boundaries between public languages are drawn in ways
which reflect socio-political concerns rather than linguistic properties. If it were
then assumed (perhaps implausibly) that words cannot belong to more than one
public language, then a Bosnian’s utterance of ‘knjiga’ is literally of a different
word than a Croat’s utterance of ‘knjiga’. In other words, word individuation will
be infected with the same kinds of socio-political, interest-relative criteria as
public languages. These ways of categorising words and languages ignore their
properly linguistic properties: ‘knjiga’ has the same phonology, syntax and
semantics in both Bosnian and Croatian, and Bosnian and Croatian speech is
mutually intelligible.
One quick response to this argument is that although public languages are
sometimes counted in a way which reflects political tensions, recent wars, national
boundaries, etc., this does not mean that they are always or can only be counted in
that way: that a distinction is sometimes made between Bosnian and Croat does
not entail that there is no viable notion of public language which abstracts away
from precisely those socio-political parameters. It is, of course, much harder to
show how to count public languages in a way which abstracts away from socio-
political concerns. In this thesis I’ve largely set issues about whole public
languages to one side, focussing instead on words, and I don’t claim to have a
theory about how to draw the boundaries between public languages. I will
therefore pursue a different strategy, that of allowing that the characters of
words and public languages can, in some sense, be related to socio-political
concerns. What I will question is the idea that this means they have to be
excluded from scientific inquiry.
2.4 Responses to the above
The above arguments each have something like the following form:
1. Nothing with feature F can be targeted in serious science.
2. Words have F.
3. Therefore words cannot be targeted in serious science.
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Features which have been proposed as explaining the science-inaptness of words
have included the fact that conceptions of public language involve elements
which are apparently decidable by fiat, the fact they are suffused with
normativity, or that they depend on human interests including socio-political
concerns. This, I trust, is what Chomsky is suggesting in the following passage:
The idea [of a common public language] is completely foreign to
the empirical study of language... What are called ‘languages’ or
‘dialects’ in ordinary usage are complex amalgams determined by
colors on maps, oceans, political institutions and so on, with
obscure normative-teleological aspects (Chomsky 1993, pp. 18–19).
As McGilvray puts it:
[M]aking linguistic behaviour the subject matter of serious science
is to attempt to make a stable natural object out of what are, in
fact, highly variable, interest-dependent, context sensitive, creative
efforts of people. (McGilvray, 1999:110)
Since science seeks to abstract away from such matters, taking an objective and
value free stance, the argument goes, ordinary notions of words and languages
have no place in science.26 One thing to notice is that the arguments just
presented, though framed mostly in terms of linguistic cases, would have
implications for artefacts and social phenomena in general. If successful, they
would cut a very large swathe through the social sciences.
My response to these arguments has two main strands. The first is that nothing
has been said, so far, about why things which are norm-governed, interest-relative,
etc. are ineligible to enter into scientific discourse. I’ll consider two possible
answers to this question, finding each unsatisfactory. The second strand to my
response is what Stainton (2012) calls the Moorean response, which disputes the
alleged scientific inaptness of artefacts and other social phenomena on the
26 Stainton, (2012) puts the point in terms of Sellars’ distinction between the scientific and manifest
images: “What is metaphysically special about public languages…is that like Hinduism, jazz, Tuesdays,
[and] yarmulkes…these are only objects for us. All are value-laden; all are tacitly suffused with human
free will. In brief, all pertain to Sellars’ (1963) Manifest Image. In sharp contrast…a science aims to afford
a human-transcendant, value free, law-governed description of certain phenomena.”
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grounds that there are a multitude of scientific disciplines which study such
phenomena (including linguistic phenomena) with great success.
Just why do Chomskians assume that social entities with the kinds of features
I’ve been highlighting are ineligible to be targeted in serious scientific inquiry?
Perhaps one reason relates to the idea that, on the ECA view (and views within
the standard approach in social ontology more generally), competent speakers
enjoy a kind of protection from error or ignorance regarding their public
language creations. The thought may be that since linguistic artefacts have their
characteristic properties assigned to them by intention or perhaps by collective
agreement there is a sense in which we can’t be wrong about the properties of
linguistic artefacts. One implication of this is that a science of public language
couldn’t teach us anything we don’t already know.
It is true, on my view at least, that people are to a certain extent protected from
error with respect to the mentally/socially constructed entities sustained by their
own beliefs and intentions. For example, an artificer of a new kind of artefact
delineates a set of intended features which constitute an artefactual kind. They
cannot be wrong about what it takes for a thing to be a thing of that kind, for
that is something they have personally stipulated (although they can be mistaken
about whether some object constitutes a largely successful realisation of an
artefactual kind, i.e. whether or not a thing has the intended features). But there
are many ways in which we can be severely ignorant about artefacts and other
social phenomena, in ways which can be fruitfully addressed by scientific inquiry.
First, although artefacts depend for their nature on human representations, they
are also partly constituted by physical entities which have properties which can be
investigated scientifically without reference to the mental states of language
users. The physical properties of linguistic artefacts are studied in acoustic
phonetics, articulatory phonetics, etc. It is worth noting, however, that this will
not provide much succour to someone defending the aptness for scientific
inquiry of words and public languages. After all, I’ve spent a great deal of time in
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this thesis emphasising that specifically linguistic properties are not to be found
among the intrinsic properties of acoustic blasts and ink patches.
Second, our artefact-regarding intentions are not always easily articulable, as was
discussed in chapter two (§2). In particular, speaking is a speedy and spontaneous
affair and our linguistic intentions are less than fully conscious. In order to
generate linguistic artefacts, these intentions have to be contentful and
consciously accessible (in some sense), though artisans need not be able to
articulate these intentions in any way. I suggested in chapter two that elucidating
our language-regarding beliefs and intentions requires a systematic approach.
Generative linguistics itself can be seen as shedding light on our underlying
intentions regarding language (without assuming that generative linguistics targets
intentions specifically or exclusively), as can some work in truth-conditional
semantics.
Third, many artefacts depend not on any single individual’s beliefs and intentions
but on those of a wider community. No individual’s intentions tell the whole
story (for many kinds of artefacts). In addition, facts about those kinds of social
entities may not be evident to people from outside the specific group or society
in which those entities play a role, even if they are evident to those within the
group or society. In light of this, it looks like – for many artefacts at least – there
is a kind of protection from massive error, but this applies not at the level of any
individual, but at that of some larger group. We can’t all be wrong all the time,
but any individual can be wrong about just about anything. (It’s unclear to what
extent this response can be pressed in the case of linguistic artefacts. To be sure,
no individual has a complete grasp of a public language; on the other hand, we
can learn a lot about a nearly-extinct public language if we have access to the last
remaining native speaker.)
Fourth, there’s a lot about artefacts which cannot be learned by reflecting on
people’s attitudes towards them. Artefacts are real, they interact with each other,
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with people, and the laws of nature, often in unpredictable ways. As Thomasson
writes:
[S]ocial science does not typically concern itself with such issues as
whether or not it is in the nature of a pencil to be a writing
instrument or what the necessary conditions are for something to
be a dollar bill, but rather with such issues as the impact of the
printing press on the growth of religion in Europe, the
consequences of mechanical production on urban growth and
standards of living. (Thomasson, 2003b:34)
Though particular social entities and kinds may have their characteristic
properties via a process of mental/social construction, they are embedded in the
world in ways which are not evident independently of systematic inquiry. The
numerical values of our currency units may be stipulated and not a matter of
scientific discovery, but the same cannot be said for the effect of lowering
interest rates on property values, exchange rates or immigration levels. In the
same vein, historical linguistics inquires into, for example, the effect of the
Norman Invasion on English grammar and pronunciation, while other
disciplines study the kinds of vocabulary used by sports journalists when
discussing male athletes in comparison to when they are discussing female
athletes, the ways in which police use of public address systems affects the
behaviour of large crowds, etc. These are not matters which any individual has
knowledge of independently of systematic inquiry.
I’ve been considering one possible reason why ECAs (and other things which are
dependent on human intentions, norm-governed, related to socio-political
concerns, etc.) might be considered the wrong kinds of entities for targeting in
scientific inquiry. Now let’s consider another. Stoljar (2015) interprets Chomsky’s
(2000) sceptical stance on referential semantics in light of Lewis’s (1983)
discussion of natural properties, and the argument is very closely related to our
present concerns. I’ll first present Stoljar’s reconstruction of the argument before
making the minor adaptations that are needed for the present context. Stoljar
notes that, for Lewis, natural properties are associated with a “package” of
features including being sparse, conferring objective similarity on objects which
211
share the property, figuring in laws of nature, and – along with other natural
properties – forming a small set of properties upon which all other (less natural)
properties supervene. Finally, naturalness comes in degrees. This metaphysical
picture is implemented in a philosophy of science which holds that the aim of
science is to discover very natural properties, with physics perhaps aspiring to
discover perfectly natural, fundamental properties, and chemistry and biology
aiming to discover not perfectly natural but still very natural properties.
Stoljar then imagines the Chomskian argument to proceed as follows: if
semantics is a genuine science, then the objects and properties which have to
exist if semantic theories are true should be very natural properties and objects.
But if semantic theories are true then what has to exist are such things as
London (since referential semantics posits a relation between the word ‘London’
and London), a messy, gerrymandered, social object if ever there was one.27
Supplementing the argument in the obvious way to adapt it to present concerns,
we would note that words themselves (not to mention word-world relations such
as reference) are hardly very natural entities. Since naturalistic inquiry in general
should only be concerned with very natural entities, it should not be concerned
with public languages or words.
This response is helpful, but it doesn’t really justify the claim that words can’t be
studied in the manner of the natural sciences. It does explain why words aren’t
targeted in fundamental physics, but that doesn’t rule out the fruitfulness of a
social scientific discipline targeting public language phenomena.
A further problem with the argument is that it does nothing to address a host of
counterexamples to the thesis that public language phenomena are excluded
from naturalistic inquiry. Stainton (2012) offers what he takes to be a Moorean
response to the scientistic argument. He says that though he does not have a
philosophical account of how it is that social entities can enter into scientific
theorising, nor of how a science inquiring into social entities could occupy a
27 Stoljar notes that related arguments can be found in Bloomfield (1933) and Fodor (1980).
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middle position between the hardest sciences, and ordinary, non-scientific
discourse, his rejection of the no science arguments considered here is based on the
Moorean certainty that there are such sciences. There just are disciplines which
target norm-governed, interest-relative, not-very-natural phenomena. He (2006,
2012, 2014) gives the examples of archaeology, criminology, ecology, economics,
epidemiology, gerontology, horticulture, medicine and social psychology, as well
as – on the language side – clinical linguistics, computational linguistics,
dialectology, discourse analysis, educational linguistics, forensic linguistics,
historical linguistics, lexicography and pragmatics. So Stainton’s response is that
there just are sciences which target social entities and kinds, and in particular there
are such disciplines which target ordinary languages and words.
Unpacking this response a little, that criminology, say, is a science which studies
such phenomena as punishment, deterrence, incarceration, theft, murder,
manslaughter, corporate crime, and domestic abuse suggests that social entities
whose character is determined relative to human interests, norms, etc. are not
necessarily precluded from being studied scientifically. Criminology can also
target artefacts, such as in studies of different kinds of weapons used in different
types of crimes, perhaps seeking to explain these facts with reference to laws and
social structures within a society. Similarly, that forensic linguistics, say, is a
science which targets linguistic externalia is a counterexample to the conclusions
of the sceptical arguments canvassed above.
At this point, it is worth pointing out a different line of retrenchment that the
Chomskian might defend: although there are sciences which study social entities,
they could suggest that such sciences differ in important ways from the kinds of
scientific endeavours in physics, chemistry, biology and cognitive science. The
latter projects seek to explain phenomena in terms of deeper principles, to reveal
the joints in nature. In contrast, the argument might go, social sciences and
sciences of the complex are merely descriptive or taxonomic sciences which seek
statistical regularities, perhaps, but do not offer the promise of deep theoretical
understanding.
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Evaluating this argument would raise issues in philosophy of science which are
beyond the scope of this thesis. One thing to say is that if the assumptions of
this argument are correct, it remains an option for the public language theorist to
accept that philosophy and the social sciences are not engaged in a science of the
deep, explanatory kind and to construe their ambitions in a different way. I’ll
come back to this kind of response in §3.2.
In this section I’ve considered a range of arguments which aim to show that
words are the wrong kinds of things to enter into scientific discourse in light of
their status as human made artefacts whose characters depend on people’s
intentions, or on societal norms, or on socio-political concerns. However, I have
replied that these arguments do not provide an adequate explanation of why
such entities can’t be targeted in science. I have also argued that there are
sciences which target such entities. In light of this, it appears that the attempt to
discredit inquiry into public language by pointing to general facts about artefacts
is not successful. In the next section I turn to considerations which flow more
narrowly from generative linguistic theorising.
3. DON’T LOOK THERE ARGUMENTS
So far in this chapter I’ve discussed some fairly radical arguments which either
seek the elimination of words from our ontology (at least of words construed as
kinds of externalia) or which aim to show that social entities such as public
language entities are not the kinds of things which submit to naturalistic inquiry.
I think all of these radical arguments can be resisted. Nonetheless, there remain –
in the most sophisticated Chomskian critiques of public language – two themes
which deserve to be drawn out. That is the work to be undertaken in this section.
The first point is that public language phenomena are not required to enter into
generative linguistic theory in any substantive way. The second is a healthy
methodological scepticism about naturalistic inquiry into public language, based
on the idea that it constitutes an interaction effect. I am in substantial agreement
with both of these points. These critiques do not amount to any kind of radical
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rejection of common sense linguistic entities. Moreover, they seem to presuppose
something very like my ECA theory of linguistic artefacts. I will end the section
with some comments on what these conclusions mean for the status of inquiry
into public language phenomena.
3.1 The irrelevance of public language to generative linguistics
Theorising in generative linguistics is associated with a methodological stance
called methodological naturalism, (see Collins, 2010). One aspect of this stance is that
scientific inquiry should not be held hostage to common sense. While scientific
inquiry may sometimes take common sense conceptions as a starting point of
inquiry, as progress is made new concepts will be introduced which explain the
phenomena. The form such explanations take need not be constrained in any
way by common sense conceptions. As Collins notes:
[T]he concepts employed in successful scientific inquiry are
typically invented for purpose and have only a loose correlation
with commonsensical notions, which are often eliminated or
retained just for motivational purposes. (Collins, 2010:45)
To take a simple example, a scientific inquiry might begin with a common sense
conception of air as a simple substance which is eventually replaced with detailed
knowledge of the different gases in the Earth’s atmosphere. From the point of
view of atmospheric science, there isn’t really any such thing as air, just molecules
of nitrogen, oxygen, carbon dioxide, etc.; the notion of air is not required in
order to formulate our best theories of atmospheric phenomena. To subsume
this phenomenon under a general principle, Collins formulates his naturalistic
reality principle:
(NRP) At a given stage of inquiry, a category is taken to be
(naturalistically) real iff it is either successfully targeted by
naturalistic inquiry or essentially enters into the explanations of
such inquiry. (Collins, 2010:47)
Assuming that there is no science which takes air to be a central concept, NRP
entails that air is not “naturalistically real”. Collins then alleges that conceptions
of public language fail to meet the demands of NRP. The claim is not that public
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language entities fail to exist. Instead, it is that public language categories are not
regarded as linguistic types from the point of view of serious linguistic
theorising. That is, it is possible to state the theory without mentioning so-called
linguistic externalia. Genuinely linguistic entities (i.e. linguistic states of
individuals) interact causally with speech sounds, but there are no generalisations
associating linguistic types with types of externalia. Collins writes:
The externalia are not necessary because linguistic structure can be
realized in a wholly internal manner, as in private monologue. They
are not sufficient because (i) the richness of linguistic structure far
outstrips any external signature and (ii) the apparently unlimited
heterogeneity of the externalia recruitable in linguistic performance
does not admit generalizations mappable onto the linguistic
categories; for example, there are no independently specifiable
features common between tokens of the sound type /dog/ and
tokens of the inscription type ‘dog’ such that both are ambiguous
between verbal and nominal categorisation. In other words, the
relevant categories are invariant over external differences and so
cannot be identified with externalia without eliding that which does
remain invariant over the recruitment of externalia, viz., the
cognition of the competent speaker/hearer. (Collins, 2010:48)
That acoustic types cannot be mapped to linguistic types should be a familiar
point by now. What this shows is that linguistic theory is not concerned, in the
first instance, with acoustic phenomena. Generative linguistics seeks to explain
aspects of linguistic performance in terms of human cognitive structures, just as
one would seek to explain human visual capacities in terms of cognitive
structures. That utterances and inscriptions of ‘dog’ are ambiguous between
verbal and nominal characterisation, as Collins notes, is not primarily a fact about
the utterances and inscriptions, but about our response to them. A linguist’s
grammar is a theory of the internal mental structures which determine this
reponse. To see this, consider one of the principle methodologies employed in
linguistic theory. A central source of data for linguistics is that of speakers’
acceptability judgements. For example, a subject will be shown various written
sentences and asked to judge which are acceptable strings in their language. The
data are not facts about speakers judgements of grammaticality (whatever that
might mean to the informant). Instead, linguists take as data the mere fact that a
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certain set of strings are judged acceptable and others not. When we have a set
of judgements we then seek an explanation for why these strings are judged
acceptable and these not. What is needed is a theory of the workings of the
human mind. What is the nature of the internal processes which leads to these
judgements and not different ones? Collins writes:
Thus, the notion of being grammatical does not apply to strings in the
first instance; rather, a theory of the language faculty (a theory of
being grammatical, if you will) brings with it a delineation of the
structures that the FLN output. How these structures affect the
pattern of acceptability, which we take to be a FLB interaction
effect, is what we want to discover. (Collins, 2010:50)
In other words, the point is not that words don’t exist. We can very well maintain,
as Collins (2010:48) does, that “externalia are invested with linguistic
significance.” But we reach an immediate theoretical dead-end if we treat
externalia as the focus of linguistic inquiry. A satisfying explanation of linguistic
externalia requires adopting the internalist perspective. Linguistics studies
internal representations and the faculty competence which underlies them. These
states are the source of linguistic properties. From a scientific perspective these
are the proper focus of an explanatory scientific inquiry. Language as an external
object only has linguistic properties derivatively. It’s by pursuing internalist
explorations of human linguistic competence that we may hope to explain the
linguistic properties of mind-external entities.28
One might try to maintain that linguistic properties inhere in linguistic externalia
in a wholly mind-independent way. A competent speaker would then be
understood as someone who has managed to discern the linguistic structures
which are characteristic of their language community. The trouble with this,
according to Collins, is that we simply have no way of determining the linguistic
28 A similar argument is endorsed by Rey. According to him, the problem with “social, response-
dependent” accounts of words is their failure to take account of the fact that the arrows of linguistic
explanation point inwards towards the internal linguistic capacity of individuals: “[T]he underlying error
[of accounts of linguistic entities in terms of social, response-dependent proposals] is a failure to
appreciate the important shift of the explanatory locus in modern linguistics, from external objects to
internal conceptions” (Rey, 2008:177).
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properties of externalia without going through individuals’ conceptions of those
externalia:
One can always claim the linguistic structure is external…but if the
structure is identifiable only through the cognitive resources of the
speaker/hearer…then the externalia lose any independence as a
proper parameter in any serious explanatory practice. If the
structure is to be depicted as genuinely external for our best
science, then, lest it become an explanatory dangler, we should be
able to identify it independently of the relation it bears to our
cognition… [W]e must insist that the externalia be something more
than a reflection of the cognitive design with which we have
already credited the subject. (Collins, 2010:48-49)
The argument is that even if we affirm that language is some mind-external
linguistic system, if we are to explain humans’ competence with that system, we
will need to credit individuals with cognizance of that system. But since we have
no evidence that externalia have linguistic properties other than the fact that we
conceive of them in a certain way, the hypothesis that there really is some
linguistic system independently of such conceptions is taken to be explanatorily
vacuous. Linguistic properties considered as properties of mind/brains do real
explanatory work, the Chomskians say. Projecting such properties onto concrete
(or abstract) external objects adds no explanatory value.29
Summarising, Collins is arguing that linguistic externalia do not enter into
generative linguistic theorising in any serious way, and therefore fail to meet the
demands of NRP. The conclusion that public languages (and by extension public
language words) are not “naturalistically real” suggests an eliminativist attitude
towards public language, especially given that the subtitle of the article is “Why
there is no such thing as language.” However, that is not the main thrust of
29 As Collins notes: “The only thing that could explain the data is that which explains why speakers judge
as they do, and such an explanation is, at best, essentially postponed by attributing properties to the
strings, for the speaker/hearers must be cognisant of those very properties if they are to be on
explanatory duty. An externalism of grammatical properties, therefore, looks to be explanatorily
supererogatory; the externalism confuses what the language faculty (FLN and FLB) enables – the
projection of structure onto sounds/marks – with the target of explanation itself – the capacity to
project, inter alia” (Collins, 2010:50)
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Collins’s argument. His main concern is to show that public language notions are
entirely dispensable from the point of view of serious linguistic theorising:
My submission is that language, construed in an externalist manner,
fails to meet NRP, its identification being arbitrary and non-
essential to the explanation of the salient phenomena. If this is so,
then while languages so construed might be real in some or other
sense (in the same way, perhaps, games or pieces of music might
be) they are not naturalistically respectable… [S]uch entities do not
offer properties that are either necessary or sufficient for the
characterisation of the linguistic structures posited in current
linguistics, i.e. they are not linguistic types. (Collins, 2010:48)
We remain free to posit languages as abstractions and are equally
free to have whatever ontological attitude we like towards them,
and generate ontological conundrums much as we do about money
or games or pieces of music. It is not the aim of science, however,
to cleave to our quotidian ontological scheme. (Collins, 2010:55)
In short, Collins is arguing that serious theorising in generative linguistics has no
need for public language notions, the latter not entering into the theory in any
ineliminable way. Nor does affirming this mean affirming that linguistic
externalia have nothing to do with the entities studied in generative linguistics.
Collins can allow that linguistic externalia in a child’s environment constitute the
primary linguistic data – the environmental stimuli – which play a role in
determining parameter settings in a child’s language faculty as a natural part of
language acquisition. In addition, people’s person level judgements about
utterances and inscriptions, judgements of acceptability, synonymy, etc., can be a
significant source of evidence for theoretical linguistics. Nonetheless,
descriptions of kinds of linguistic externalia are not necessary in order to state
the fundamental commitments of linguistic theory.
One possible objection to this way of thinking is a kind of tu quoque. A
longstanding aspect of methodological naturalism is a commitment to the idea
that there are no in principle restrictions on the potential explanatory links
between disciplines, however unrelated they may appear (see, e.g. Anthony, 2003).
One might accuse Collins of a double standard here. After all, he is at pains to
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insist that “naturalistic inquiry into language has no need for the notion of
[external] language” (Collins, 2010:41). This would, however, be unfair. First, he
could rightly insist that that generative linguistics has dispensed with public
language notions as a result of extensive empirical inquiry, not by ideological pre-
emption. Second, Collins need not deny that new evidence for the internal
workings of the language faculty could come from newly discovered, ancient,
clay tablets inscribed with an unknown language. Moreover, the generative
linguist does not deny the interest of sociological approaches to language (or need
not). The reason they do not pursue connections between I-language and public
language has more to do with methodological preferences and scepticism about
the possibility of scientific progress regarding public language. (Such criticisms
are clearly related to those considered in §2, but there is a way of framing the
Chomskian position in a way which relates specifically to public language. This
will be discussed in the next sub-section.
This is one point at which something I take myself to be in agreement with the
Chomskians. When it comes to explaining language, the arrows of explanation
point inwards. I take it that talk of linguistic structure being projected onto
linguistic externalia resonates deeply with the ECA account of words. The head-
first direction of explanation was part of the ECA view from the start. That is
one of the reasons why I take it that something like my account of words, far
from being challenged by the Chomskians, is actually presupposed by them. It is
only within the framework of a theory which allows mental representations to
imbue externalia with significance that Collins’s (2010:48-50) assertions about
externalia being “invested with linguistic significance,” and as having structure
“projected” onto them can be fully appreciated. So I argued, in any case, in
chapter two.
Nevertheless, there are two points I want to make here. First, Collins has
convincingly argued that public language does not enter into generative linguistic
theorising. He has not argued that public language does not enter into any serious
science. But that is what he would have to argue in order to show that public
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language phenomena fail to satisfy NRP. As suggested in the previous section,
linguistic externalia do enter into such disciplines as forensic linguistics, clinical
linguistics, semantics (on some construals), and so on.
My second point is that public language is at once richer and poorer than I-
language. It is poorer because some of the mental operations of the language
faculty are completely unconscious. These will not be taken to enter into a
speaker’s conception of linguistic artefacts. It is richer because the study of
linguistic externalia, including public words and languages, is not exhausted by a
study of humans’ specialised linguistic competence. The strings outputted by
FLN are taken up by other cognitive systems associated with FLB, so the
properties projected on to linguistic externalia will not be fully described by a
theory of FLN. For example, an utterance may be intended to refer to cats, or to
a particular cat. This is a feature of the speaker’s speech act, and does not reduce
straightforwardly to the workings of FLN. Referring is something people do. To
limit one’s interest to the study of I-language, though fine for a practitioner of a
specialised science, shouldn’t satisfy a philosopher since it leaves out so much of
interest. This point would not be denied by the Chomskians, though some would
insist that theoretical progress is only possible by abstracting away from all the
things the philosophers are interested in and pursuing the narrow approach of
generative linguistics. That is the topic to which I now turn.
3.2 A healthy methodological scepticism
I’ve been trying to emphasise that my ECA theory of words is not only
compatible with modern linguistic theory, but that something like it is also
presupposed by many of the Chomskian critiques of public language. It is
precisely because the status of linguistic externalia is projected onto them by
human attitudes and intentions that the internalistic approach is pursued in
generative linguistics. What human linguistic competence (FLN and FLB)
enables is the ability to use an external system of signs. The performance of
speech acts using such signs is a cognitive achievement involving not just a
narrow computational capacity but also quite general factors including “memory,
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attention and communicative intention” (see the quotation from Collins, below).
These are assumptions which are shared equally by me and the Chomskians. The
criticism of philosophers’ tendencies to focus on public language need not,
therefore, reflect contradictory views of human psychology, nor of the
metaphysics of words. Instead, the disagreements reflect different theoretical
interests, and perhaps different assessments of the prospects for progress
regarding the chaotic domain of public language.
In the previous section I discussed arguments which aim to show that words
can’t be part of science in virtue of their mere status as artefacts. Those
arguments were not persuasive. In this sub-section I will try to say something
more reasonable about Chomskians’ aversion to a science of public language.
This critique is again driven by the Chomskians’ methodological naturalism.
Genuine science is understood as seeking underlying principles which offer a
deep explanation of certain phenomena. What is sought is not merely a detailed
description of the phenomena, but an explanation. This will standardly involve
an approach which seeks to idealise away from the messy detail of observable
phenomena. Collins explains the point as follows:
Our commonsense conception of language covers a host of
disparate phenomena. Any endeavour to gain theoretical traction
on this manifold is obliged to fractionate the phenomena and
idealize away from the massive interaction effects that produce our
normal linguistic behaviour… The first move in this ‘divide and
conquer’ direction in recent times was Chomsky’s (1965) distinction
between competence and performance. A whole range of factors
enter into performance, many of them perfectly general, such as
memory, attention, and communicative intention. Chomsky’s
distinction, in part, was an effort to isolate the hypothesised unique
linguistic system that underlies certain peculiar features of our
performance, and, in the first instance, we are interested in those
features simply because they are the ones that submit to theoretical
understanding (the drunk looks for his keys under the street light
because that is where the light is). (Collins, 2010:46)
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So the idea is that linguistic behaviour is fantastically complicated, and in order to
make any theoretical progress we need to ignore some of this complexity. The
distinction between competence and performance, as well as that between FLN
and FLB, is an attempt to gain insight into a specific aspect of human mental
architecture.
Mind-external linguistic phenomena – construed as ECAs or something similar –
involve relations between linguistic entities and human agents, their actions,
beliefs, intentions, interests, etc. From a specifically psychological point of view,
the mental processes which characterise individual speech acts involve
interactions between FLN and other cognitive systems. The products of human
action reflect a complex interaction between different cognitive systems, different
individuals, communities, etc. The products of human action can therefore be
regarded as interaction effects. But, the argument goes, science tries to discover
deeper principles which abstract away from the noise associated with interaction
effects to uncover aspects of a more systematic reality beneath the phenomena.
Chomsky often uses the following example: it is the business of no science to
theorise about the precise causes of the trajectory of a leaf on a windy day. For
one thing, determining those causes would not lead to the discovery of any
deeper principles about the nature of reality: it would just be a vast list of
uninteresting details. Second, it may not be possible, from an epistemic view, to
make any headway with such a complex interaction effect. Relatedly, Chomsky
often makes remarks to the effect that coming up with a comprehensive theory
of how people use words to communicate and talk about the world would
require a ‘science of everything’, something which no discipline ever purports to
provide.30
I agree with the general picture. I do think that the social sciences and
philosophy are (some of the time) inquiring into complex domains where the
30 In response to the point I made earlier, that disciplines such as forensic linguistics do in fact target
linguistic externalia, it might be alleged that forensic linguistics is not a serious explanatory science in the
same way as generative linguistics. Instead it seeks merely to describe and taxonomise phenomena.
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prospects for immediate progress are somewhat dim. But this is no reason to
stop trying! One way of thinking about the philosophy of language is as a kind of
quasi-scientific speculation, an enterprise which hasn’t quite achieved the
empirical success and explanatory power associated with mature scientific
theories, but which nonetheless shares many of the same goals. Alternatively,
philosophy of language could be construed as doing something quite different
from science. Chomsky sometimes seems to imply that attending to matters of
public language is best done in novels or art:
Plainly, a naturalistic approach does not exclude other ways of
trying to comprehend the world. Someone committed to it (as I
am) can consistently believe (as I do) that we learn much more of
human interest about how people think and feel and act by reading
novels or studying history or the activities of ordinary life than
from all of naturalistic psychology, and perhaps always will;
similarly, the arts may offer appreciation of the heavens to which
astrophysics cannot aspire.” (Chomsky, 2000:77)
I’m not sure how many philosophers would be ready to convert to writing
novels, but I think that there is hope for a more theoretical and systematic
approach to theorising about public language. Theorising about public language
does not entail renouncing all ambition of being systematic, rigorous, empirically
corrigible, etc.
In short, the Chomskian critique of public language need not be construed as
opposing public language views, in their conceptions of human psychology or
the metaphysics of words. A major aspect of the critique boils down to a
pessimistic assessment of likely progress. What’s new?
Finally, it is a longstanding feature of the scientific philosophy associated with
generative linguistics (methodological naturalism) that scientific theories should
aim for unification with other disciplines. This does not require that we be able
to literally derive higher-order theories from lower-order ones, just that we aim to
uncover links between theories at different levels, and understand broadly how
phenomena at different levels relate to each other. This attitude explains the
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efforts of linguists to integrate the discipline with theories in neurobiology. To
my mind, this willingness to seek unification downwards with neurobiology
would sit uneasily with a rejection of any attempt to unify social scientific
approaches to language with theories in generative linguistics. Part of the point
of this thesis has been to explore the extent to which a theory of public language
can be illuminated by pursuing connections with generative linguistics. The
prospects for integration between the disciplines may be remote, but the goal is
not unworthy.
4. CONCLUSION
I started this chapter by considering some radical arguments which involved
taking either an eliminativist or an idealist attitude towards public language
phenomena. These arguments failed to demonstrate that any feature specific to
linguistic artefacts rendered them metaphysically dubious. Instead, the arguments
turned on features of linguistic artefacts which are common to many kinds of
ordinary objects. Thus, the arguments considered in the first section are no more
plausible than wholesale eliminativism of ordinary objects, or wholesale idealism.
If we are happy to keep cars, vegetables, schools, contracts and coins in our
ontology then it would be discriminatory to exclude words and languages.
I then considered a secondary line of retrenchment for the public language
sceptic which consists in allowing the existence of words and languages but
denying that they are the kinds of things which feature in scientific inquiry.
Again, these arguments turn not on the specifics of linguistic artefacts, but on
general features of artefacts and social entities. I responded that no clear reason
had been provided to explain why artefacts and social entities can’t enter into
scientific theorising, and also pointed out that they do.
Finally, I argued that the best versions of the Chomskian challenge, far from
rejecting the artefactual account I’ve been elaborating, actually presuppose that
something like it is correct. They insist that naturalistic inquiry into language is
best pursued by ignoring and abstracting away from concerns with public
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language, and they express a healthy methodological scepticism about the
prospects for a fruitful, explanatory science of public language. I agree with
them on both points. None of this, I have suggested, impugns the practice of
philosophers and social scientists pursuing explorations of public language,
though it does perhaps impose an obligation on public language theorists to
explain just what they take the status of their discipline to be.
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CONCLUSION
In the first chapter I used Thomasson’s theory of artefacts to develop a notion of
essentially communicative artefacts. In particular, I drew on her (2014) and
pursued a clearer understanding of the role of intended recognisability in
determining the character of ECAs. This work provided the resources to bring
insights from social ontology to bear on debates about words in philosophy of
language. The result is a novel theory of the nature of words, which puts speaker
intention at the forefront of the account. Like Frisbees, chopsticks, chairs, pens,
knives, houses, footballs and desk lamps, words are essentially intentional
artefacts: their instances are partially constituted by their creators’ intentions.
Moreover, like some other essentially intentional artefacts, such as wedding rings,
chess pawns, traffic lights, military uniforms, foot-high fences, police tape and
crucifixes, words are essentially communicative artefacts: that is, at least some of
the features of a word utterance serve only to signal their creators’ intentions
regarding that utterance, and it is only in virtue of the recognisability of these
intentions that the utterance has the linguistic profile it has. The signalling of
linguistic intentions is possible in virtue of an arbitrary association between word
forms and clusters of linguistic intentions.
I have argued that this conception of words captures an ordinary, pre-theoretic
conception of words, one which is on active duty in ordinary cases of language
use, including inter-personal communication. This hypothesis draws support
from explaining widespread intuitions about such phenomena as swamp words,
minimal creation, and exaptation. In addition, the ECA theory was originally
motivated on more general grounds, not related specifically to linguistic artefacts.
That the ECA theory is independently plausible as an account of (non-linguistic)
artefacts means I have not been introducing specialist machinery just to deal with
problems in the theory of words. The theory also enables a convincing story
about such phenomena as malapropisms, spelling errors and typos.
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Cappelen’s approach to words has two features in common with my own: it
treats the theory of words as part of social ontology, and it assumes that words
are to be characterised in terms of their synchronic, specifically linguistic
properties. However, Cappelen defends a form-theoretic approach to word
individuation. I have rehearsed the well-known arguments against this approach,
adding a further criticism pertaining to the form-theorist’s assumption that
intrinsic, acoustic form is what matters to the theory. And I spent time
articulating and debunking the often ignored motivation which underlies form-
theoretic assumptions. A further significant contribution in this area has been to
question the suitability of Searle’s XYC schema as a way of theorising about
words: I have argued that this approach would require the possibility of
providing two type descriptions of word types, one to fill the X slot, the other to
fill the Y slot; the demise of the form-theoretic approach is a serious obstacle to
fulfilling this requirement. Happily, my ECA account has the resources to tell a
more convincing story about the role of utterance forms in the metaphysics and
epistemology of words.
Another rival account considered here was Kaplan’s common currency account.
Like my own, this view accords a constitutive role to speaker intentions, but it
has shortcomings which can be appreciated from the social ontological
perspective developed here. For example, Kaplan’s mistaken idea that having the
right intention could be sufficient for uttering a given word is remedied by appeal
to a general feature of the theory of artefacts: our artefact-regarding intentions
are not self-fulfilling; they impose satisfaction conditions; our intentions are
successfully realised to the extent that the world conforms to those conditions.
To take another example, Kaplan assumes that our word-producing intentions
can be transparent, involving an intention merely to make another one of those,
without requiring that the speaker have a substantive conception of the linguistic
profile associated with the word. The discussion of the Frisbee and the plate in
chapter one (§3.2) reveals the shortcomings of this view. Thomasson (2003b)
made a similar point about artefacts, but the parallel objection to Kaplan has not
been made, to my knowledge. The discussion of artefacts yielded a further
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objection to Kaplan’s view: I have argued that words (like many other artefact
kinds) could be multiply invented, something ruled out by Kaplan’s commitment
to individuating words in terms of common ancestry.
From the outset, one of my goals has been to provide an account which is at
least compatible with insights in generative linguistics, but which also aspires to a
kind of unification with current linguistic theory. Unlike other attempts to marry
an intentionalist account of words with an interpretation of generative linguistic
theory, I have refused to depart from the current, orthodox interpretation of that
theory. That is, I do not, like Barber, insist upon an interpretation which holds
that the mental states posited in linguistic theory are assumed within the theory
to be genuinely contentful. In light of this, there is no way of reading off an
account of speakers’ linguistic intentions from a linguist’s grammar (a theory
with phonological, syntactic and semantic components). A grammar is intended
to model an aspect of linguistic competence, but it abstracts away from the
messy detail of linguistic performance, and the phenomena it targets are partly
unconscious.
The promised unification of the ECA account of words and generative linguistics
consists in a shared approach in the philosophies of mind and science. Crucially,
the ECA account shares with generative linguistics a head-first approach to
explaining the significance of linguistic externalia. The linguistic properties of
utterances and inscriptions are treated as mental projections, the ultimate source
of linguistic properties being the internal structure of the mind/brain. Moreover,
it is agreed that language use is a person-level phenomenon involving ordinary
conscious knowledge and communicative intentions. The disagreement is about
whether we can make any significant theoretical progress in the study of public
language. Since language, broadly construed, is the product of an interaction
between various cognitive systems (between FLN and the various other systems
which make up FLB), the broad conception of language is thought to be too
complex and chaotic to submit to naturalistic inquiry. Nonetheless, when we ask
– in the most general terms – what language is, a full answer requires an
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approach which draws on the contrasting conceptions of language provided in
linguistics and philosophy, and attends to language as both a biological and a
cultural phenomenon. I’ve tried to show how part of that story might go.
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